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ABSTRACT
This study was motivated by the need to determine the key factors that influence credit
demand and credit rationing in the informal financial markets so as to contribute to policy
formulation to improve access for the poor in Uganda to the broader (formal and informal)
financial sector.
The results of the study suggest that credit demand in the informal financial sector is
positively and significantly influenced by capacity related variables (education level, and
household expenditure) at the household level, and the informal lenders' credit rationing
behaviour is also negatively and significantly influenced by household wealth factors (asset
values). The same variables have similar effects in the models for credit demand and credit
rationing in the broader financial sector.
Since households demand credit for both investment and consumption smoothing, improved
access to the broader financial sector will enable them to acquire more wealth, and move out
of poverty in the long run.
The policy options to improve small borrower access to the broader financial sector include
provision of incentives to banks to serve the smaller borrowers, development of credit
reference bureaus, provision of innovative insurance products to the poor, and broader
economic policies that enable households to acquire more wealth. In addition appropriate
linkages need to be developed between the formal and informal financial sectors so as to
broaden the financial system.
III
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie studie is gemotiveer deur die behoefte om die sleutelfaktore te identifiseer wat die
vraag na krediet en kredietrantsoenering in die informele finansiele markte bemvloed ten
einde In bydrae te kan maak tot beleid om beter toegang vir die armes tot die bree (formele
en informele) finansiele sektor in Uganda te bewerkstellig.
Die resultate van die studie dui aan dat die vraag na informele krediet In betekenisvolle en
positiewe verwantskap toon met kapasiteitsverwante veranderlikes (vlak van opvoeding en
huishoudelike besteding) op die huishoudingvlak. Informele uitleners se
kredietrantsoeneringsoptrede toon In betekenisvolle en negatiewe verwantskap met
huishoudings se vlak van rykdom (batewaardes). Dieselfde veranderlikes toon soortgelyke
verwantskappe in die geval van die modelle vir kredietvraag en kredietrantsoenering in die
bree finansiele sektor.
Huishoudings se vraag na krediet is vir beide investeringsdoeleindes en om In meer egalige
verspreiding van verbruik te verkry. Daarom sal verbeterde toegang tot die bree finansiele
sektor hulle in staat stel om meer rykdom te bekom en so uit armoede in die langer termyn te
ontsnap.
Die beleidsopsies om kleiner leners beter toegang tot die bree finansiele sektor te bied, sluit
in voorsiening vir insentiewe aan banke om klein leners te bedien, die ontwikkeling van
kredietverwysingsburo's, die voorsiening van innoverende versekeringsprodukte aan die
armes, en breer ekonomiese beleid wat huishoudings in staat sal stel om meer rydom te
bekom. Toepaslike skakeling tussen die formele en informele finansiele sektore moet ook
ontwikkel word ten einde In verbreding van die finansiele sektor te bewerkstellig.
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
1.1 Introduction
The informal (the unregulated) financial sector, which is part of the broader financial
system, mobilizes and allocates resources to economic agents that do not have access to
formal (regulated) sector services (Bouman, 1995). The constrained access to formal sector
credit by smaller borrower households is argued to be due to both institutional and
household level factors (Nwanna, 1995). At the institutional level, the banks incur high
information costs to assess the creditworthiness of small borrowers, and low returns due to
the small loan amounts involved. This motivates the formal lenders to adopt strict collateral
requirements as a screening mechanism to minimize default risk, hence rationing out the
small borrowers from the formal credit market. At the household level, the low levels of
income and asset accumulation, widespread poverty, highly skewed income and asset
distribution render the small households to have a high risk profile which makes them less
attractive to the formal lenders.
The small borrowers with no access to formal sector credit have to revert to the informal
financial sector to meet their credit demand. This constitutes the demand side of the
informal credit markets (Montiel et al, 1993). Informal credit is demanded for both
productive investment (agricultural production or business) and consumption smoothing.
Production credit facilitates the purchase of needed inputs for the production process,
thereby increasing the productivity of the household. The increased output has the potential
effect of increasing household income, other factors being constant. Business credit
enhances the establishment or expansion of existing businesses (such as the marketing of
agricultural products, general trade in goods and services) thereby raising the income level
of the households and also generating employment opportunities. Credit therefore enables
1
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poor people who are not risk-averse to overcome their liquidity constraints, undertake some
investments, increase productivity to boost income levels and create employment
opportunities. In the process credit contributes to poverty alleviation among low-income
households (Binswanger and Khandker, 1995).
Consumption credit (such as for food, health care, education of children, housing) enables
poor people to smooth out consumption patterns during the lean periods of the year
(Heidhues, 1995). This is particularly important for households whose main source of
livelihood is the income from the agricultural sector which is characterized by high
variability due to production and price shocks. Consumption credit therefore helps to
maintain the productive capacity of poor rural households and in this way consumption
credit is argued to be productive in the long-run (World Bank, 1989b).
In the Ugandan situation, Musinguzi and Smith (2000) argued that formal fmancial
institutions have not developed to meet the expectations of the rural population. Chemonges
(1999) further argued that formal banks are mainly urban-based, leaving most of the
population with inadequate access to formal financial services. For this reason, the Ministry
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED, 2001c) argued that the informal
financial sector is an "engine of growth" for the poor. Musinguzi and Smith (2000) further
argued that policies to promote economic development and to alleviate poverty (which
include promotion of macro-economic stability, the liberalization of trade and deregulation
of domestic markets) are necessary, but not sufficient conditions to achieve the stated
objectives. Improved access to financial markets is a sufficient condition to enable the poor
to share in national economic progress through the generation of new income earning
opportunities.
2
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On the supply side of informal credit markets, the major players are the relatives, friends,
moneylenders, and informal institutions (such as co-operative savings and credit
societies/unions, rotating savmgs and credit associations, and non-government
organizations). In the process of supplying credit to the deficit economic agents, informal
lenders have to take care of the possibilities of default risk which reduce the profitability of
lending operations. To minimize the default risk, informal lenders collect as much
information as possible to assess the creditworthiness of the potential borrowers. In addition,
informal lenders have developed collateral substitutes (such as joint liability contracts and
tied credit contracts) to hedge against default risk. Furthermore, based on the lender's
perception of the risk profile of the borrower, the lender may respond by rationing the
borrower's loan demand.
Mohieldin and Wright (2000) observed that informal credit in Egypt tends to be mainly
used for consumption smoothing while formal credit is mainly for investment. This raises
the importance of improving small borrowers' access to the broader financial sector, thereby
leading to an improvement in their welfare and movement out of poverty. By improving the
creditworthiness of the borrowers, their probability of being credit rationed in the formal and
informal credit markets is reduced, hence an understanding of the factors that influence the
lenders' credit rationing behaviour helps in the design of appropriate policies to increase the
borrowers' creditworthiness. Creditworthiness is influenced by borrowers' specific
characteristics and exogenous factors. The borrowers' specific characteristics include
income, savings, asset holding, profitability of business enterprises, and the willingness to
pay. The willingness to pay is especially rooted in the moral hazard problems due to
information asymmetry which is inherent in credit markets. The exogenous factors beyond
the control of the borrower may include production and price shocks faced by agricultural
households.
3
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Because of the central role of informal finance as an instrument for poverty alleviation in
Uganda, the questions that arise are "What household factors influence credit demand and
credit rationing in the informal credit markets? What can be done to improve small
borrowers' access to the broader financial markets?" Seeking to provide empirical answers
to the above questions motivated this study. Specific policies are proposed to improve small
borrowers' access to the broader financial sector.
1.2 Research Problem
Available evidence in Uganda suggests that poor households are constrained in their access
little research has been done on the factors that influence credit demand at household level.
to credit (MFPED, 200Ia; MFPED, 200Ib; MFPED, 200Ic). The informal fmancial sector
has a key role in the Ugandan economy as it serves the largest section of the population, but
An understanding of the factors that influence household credit demand is important because
it will guide the policy formulation process to enhance the welfare of the households
through credit access.
credit to especially rural households both in the formal and informal sectors (for example
Though some government interventions have targeted the improvement of the supply of
direct allocation of formal sector credit under the economic regulation era, and targeted
government credit schemes such as Entandikwa' and Youth Entrepreneurship schemes),
4
credit rationing remains a feature of both formal and informal financial sectors. An
understanding of the factors that influence the households being credit rationed is important
because they will highlight the specific interventions necessary to raise the creditworthiness
I "Entandikwa" in one of the local languages ill Uganda means "start-up capital" which was used to codename the
government credit programme that was intended to enable the low income households to start income generating
prOjects
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of the households. This will be to the advantage of both the financial institutions and the
households. From the institutional side, an improvement in the credibility of the borrowers
will lead to less default risk, higher profitability, and financial sustainability. From the
household side, increased credibility will mean increased access to credit, which may lead to
more investment income, and a movement out of poverty. But given the fact that the formal
financial sector mainly provides investment credit while the informal financial sector
provides mainly consumption smoothing credit, the issue is to enhance the households'
access to the services of the broader financial sector.
1.3 Objectives of the study
The aim of the study was to investigate the determinants of credit demand and credit
rationing within the informal financial sector in Uganda. The specific objectives of the study
were:
(i) To analyze the determinants of household credit demand in the informal financial sector
in Uganda.
(ii) To investigate the factors affecting informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour.
(iii) To derive policy implications to improve households' access to the services of the
broader financial sector (both formal and informal financial markets) in Uganda.
1.4 Research Design and Methodology
The study used the primary data from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS)
1999/00. Most of the variables of interest for this study were captured by this data set with
the exception of credit price related variables such as interest rates and transaction costs. The
study used the analysis of variance (ANOV A) for the descriptive statistics, the logit model
for estimation of the factors that influence the households' borrowing behaviour, the
Heckman probit model with sample selection for estimation of the factors that influence
5
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lenders' credit rationing behaviour, the Heckman two-step selection model for estimation of
determinants of the value of credit demanded and supplied, and the multinomiallogit model
for estimation of the determinants of the borrowers' choice between formal and informal
sector credit, and choice between different informal institutions.
1.5 The organization of the rest of the chapters
In chapter two, an overview of the functions of the financial sector (in terms of resource
mobilization and allocation) and financial sector regulation is discussed. The rationale for
doing this is that the informal financial sector is part of the broader financial system. The
informal financial sector is the unregulated component of the financial sector. In effect a
study of informal credit demand and informal credit rationing is actually an analysis of how
the informal financial sector allocates resources to deficit economic agents with no access to
formal sector credit. The deficit economic agents who have a need for credit express it by
applying for a specific amount of loan. The informal lender then undertakes a risk
assessment of the potential borrower to guide the lending decision on how much credit to
extend to the borrower, which may be characterized by credit rationing. The credit rationing
is therefore a product of the complex screening process as part of the default risk
management strategy. This makes the review of the functions of the financial sector in
chapter 2 to be relevant within the overall context of this study.
Chapter 3 gives an insight of the theoretical arguments that explain the emergence and co-
existence of the informal financial sector alongside its formal sector counterpart. A detailed
exposition of the informal financial sector in terms of the different types of informal lenders,
their characteristic features, the products provided, the terms for the products and the risk
management strategies are also provided.
6
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Chapter 4 gives on overview of Uganda's fmancial sector and how it has evolved through
the various policy regimes of economic regulation (1962 - 1986), financial sector
liberalization (1987 - to date), and their implications for the informal financial sector. The
non-market oriented monetary and financial policies involved government interference in
financial markets using instruments such as control of interest rates, credit allocation by
regulation, and government management of public sector banks. The market oriented
monetary and fmancial policies, which were advocated by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973), were geared towards liberalization of the formal financial sector. In the case of
Uganda, the market oriented policies were part of the financial sector reforms introduced in
1987 with support from The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This
chapter is important to this study because it highlights how the various policy regimes
influenced the emergence and co-existence of Uganda's informal financial sector.
Chapter 5 provides the theoretical framework for informal credit demand as well as
empirical evidence from other studies. This chapter is central to this study because it
identifies the various determinants of credit demand and the alternative models that were
used for analytical work in previous research.
In chapter 6, the determinants of informal credit rationing are discussed both from the
theoretical perspective and the empirical evidence. Just like chapter 5, this chapter forms the
basis for identification of the variables and the econometric models that were used for
empirical estimation of the factors that influence informal lenders' credit rationing
behaviour in Uganda.
Chapter 7 specifies the particular variables and econometric models for the analytical work.
Though many variables that influence credit demand and credit rationing were identified
7
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from the literature survey, the analytical work had to be done within the confines of the
available primary data from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 1999/2000.
The chapter details how the variables were measured and the specification of the
econometric models (Logit model, the Heckman probit model with sample selection,
Heckman two-step Selection model, and the multinomial logit model) that were used for
empirical work.
Chapter 8 provides a discussion of the descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample was
decomposed into three distinct categories by borrowing status: non-borrowers (those who
had not applied for any loan in the last 12 months prior to the study), formal sector
borrowers, and informal sector borrowers. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique
was used to compare the differences of means of the various socio-economic variables
between the various borrower categories at the national, regional and rural/urban levels. This
is a bivariate analysis that gives only the direction of association between the various
variables but does not give the exact relationship, hence providing the motivation for
multivariate analysis.
Chapter 9 discusses the results of the multivariate analysis for the determinants of informal
credit demand and credit rationing. The econometric analysis was done for the full sample
(combining formal and informal financial sectors) and then specifically for the informal
financial sector. The motivation for this approach was to see how the estimates for the
broader financial sector compare with those of the informal financial sector, as one of the
objectives of the study was to identify ways of improving households' access to the broader
financial sector. The models were estimated at the national, regional, and rural/urban levels.
8
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Chapter 10 gives a summary of the key findings of the study and proposes policy
recommendations to improve households' access (especially small borrowers) to fmancial
services from the broader financial sector.
..
9
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CHAPTER 2: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
2.1 Introduction
The financial sector is herein broadly defined to include the formal and informal financial
sectors whose primary role is the intermediation of resources. The arguments for the co-
existence of the formal and informal financial sectors are provided by the financial
repression hypothesis as advanced by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), and the
structuralist hypothesis as advanced Hoff and Stiglitz (1990). Although the rest of the
chapter focuses on the financial sector in general, the research referred to has been done
with reference to the formal financial sector. The informal fmancial sector will be discussed
in chapter 3.
The financial sector undertakes to mobilize resources from the surplus economic agents as
discussed in section 2.2 and allocates them to the deficit economic agents as discussed in
section 2.3. The deficit economic agents demand credit from the financial sector for both
productive investments and consumption smoothing, which demand is influenced by
enterprise and borrower socio-economic characteristics (to be discussed in section 5.4). As
part of the resource allocation role, the financial sector undertakes a risk-return assessment
of all potential investment projects and an analysis of borrowers' likely behaviour. The
motivation for the risk-return assessment is to minimize loss of resources through default
risk. The risk-return assessment process involves analysis of enterprise characteristics (e.g.
profitability levels) and socio-economic characteristics of the borrowers, which enables the
lenders to make financing decisions on borrowers' loan demand. Based on the lenders'
assessment of the borrowers' probability of default, some of the borrowers end up by being
credit rationed. The specific household characteristics that influence the lenders' credit
rationing behaviour are discussed in section 6.4. This is part of the financial sector's
10
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resource allocation process to investment, thereby promoting economic growth as discussed
in section 2.4. To enhance the functioning of the financial sector, financial regulation is
undertaken with the key objective of maintaining the stability of the financial system and
consumer protection (discussed in section 2.5).
It can be argued that a study of determinants of informal credit demand and informal credit
rationing is a reflection of the process through which the informal financial sector allocates
the scarce resources to deficit economic agents. This makes the exposition of functions of
the financial sector relevant to this study.
2.2 The Financial Sector and Savings Mobilization
One of the key functions of the financial sector is the mobilization of savings from surplus
economic agents. The financial sector influences the savings behaviour of economic agents
by: affecting the level of their income, the interest rate paid for savings, the transaction costs
it levies, its success in the transformation of credit/default risk, the efficiency of the payment
system and the effectiveness of corporate governance (Levacic and Rebmann, 1982:30).
2.2.1 Income
The incomes of the economic agents determine their level of savings. Savings, which is
defined as the difference between disposable income and consumption, is positively
correlated with income. The wealthier economic agents have a higher marginal propensity to
save (a,). The savings function can be expressed as follows:
11
S =f(Y,i} (1)
S = ao + a,Y+a2i (2)
Where:
S = Savings
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Y=!ncome
i= deposit interest rates
ao, ai, a2= parameters (a/>O, a2>O)
The income (1') to economic agents is derived from both human and non-human sources.
The human sources of income are from wages, where the wage is a function of the skills of
the worker. The higher the skills of a worker, the greater the likelihood of earning higher
wages. Human capital formation (skills acquisition) may be financed either by the savings of
economic agents or by borrowing from the financial sector. Where the latter source is
predominant, the financial sector can be argued to be contributing to the enhancement of
human capital skills, which increases labour productivity. In addition the financial sector
increases the probability of the skilled labour to earn higher wages, hence having a positive
effect on labour income. Non-human income sources on the other hand are earnings from
financial assets (such as fixed deposits, bonds and shares), income from resource ownership
(land, rents) and profits. The financial sector creates investment opportunities in financial
assets, which raises income levels of economic agents. This explains why economic agents
in countries with highly developed financial markets have high income and savings levels.
The financial sector can therefore be argued to have a positive effect on savings through its
effects on income.
However what is argued to be more critical in influencing the savings behaviour of rational
economic agents is permanent income as opposed to current income (Levacic and Rebmann,
1982:212). Permanent income is the discounted wealth stream over the lifetime of the
economic agent, at a given discount rate. According to the permanent income hypothesis
(Pill), a rational economic agent is expected to use all available information to predict as
12
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correctly as possible the expected wealth stream. The permanent income is derived as
follows:
Yt =Wt/(l +rY (3)
Where:
Y, = Permanent income
Wt = Wealth stream (from both human and non-human sources)
r = Discount rate
t = time period in years (t = 1, 2, .... , n)
Any deviations between the actual income and permanent income at any time period is the
transitory income that arises out of unexpected changes such as short business cycles and
windfall profits (which may either be negative or positive):
ym=yt+yz (4)
Where:
Ym= Actual income
Yt= Permanent income
yz = Transitory income
By contributing to the permanent income of economic agents through the wealth stream in
equation 3, the financial sector promotes the savings rate as in equation 2. Evidence by
Gupta (1987:310) using pooled and cross-sectional data for twenty-two countries in Asia
and Latin America for the period 1967 - 1976 suggested a positive and significant
relationship between permanent income and savings. Similar findings of the positive
relationship between savings and income were also reported by Vinieris and Gupta (1986)
and Wilson (2000).
13
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2.2.2 Interest Rates
The interest rate is one of the variables through which the financial sector influences savings
levels. As postulated in equation 2, there is a positive relationship between savings levels
and interest rates. The financial sector plays a key role in the determination of interest rates
in a liberalized environment. Interest rates influence the savings behaviour of economic
agents through three main channels: income, cost of consumption and portfolio choice. The
effect of interest rates on income was discussed in section 2.2.1, where an increase in
interest rates lead to an increases in income from financial assets, thereby increasing the rate
of savings.
The second channel through which interest rates affect savrngs is the cost of current
consumption. According to the utility maximization theory, the behaviour of rational
economic agents is geared towards realigning lifetime consumption to the expected income
stream (Levacic and Rebmann, 1982:26). Economic agents are therefore continuously faced
with two intertemporal choices: the proportion of income to allocate for current
consumption (which is simultaneously a savings decision) and the portfolio choice of the
stock of financial assets to hold, both of which decisions are influenced by interest rates. An
increase in interest rates increase the opportunity cost of current consumption, which results
in a reduction in current consumption in favour of future consumption, thereby increasing
the level of savings.
Interest rates also influence the economic agents' portfolio choice, which have implications
for the savings rate. The portfolio choice refers to the various combinations of financial
assets that the economic agent will choose to store the value of savings, either in the form of
liquid assets (money) with zero rates of return or in the form of interest bearing illiquid
financial assets such as bonds and fixed deposit investments (Levacic and Rebmann,
14
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1982:33). An increase in interest rates increases the opportunity cost of holding money as a
store of value, thereby increasing the demand for financial assets. As more economic agents
hold their wealth in illiquid interest bearing financial assets, the level of financial savings
increases. A fall in the interest rates on the other hand will result in changes in portfolio
combinations with a greater preference to hold money thereby having a negative effect on
the savings level. However what is argued to be more critical in influencing the savings
behaviour are the real interest rates as compared to nominal interest rates. Positive real
interest rates have a positive effect on savings behaviour while negative real interest rates
tend to act as a disincentive to savings.
It was against the background of the important role played by market interest rates in the
savings decision process that financial repressive policies were condemned in favour of
financial sector liberalization. Financial repressive policies entail the control of interest
rates, sectoral allocation of credit, government management of public sector banks and
restriction of entry to the banking sector (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Government
control of interest rates was argued to have a negative effect on savings through two main
channels. First these interest rates, which are administratively fixed below the market rates,
hinder financial intermediaries from exploiting their full potential from intermediation. This
therefore constrains the ability of financial intermediaries to pay high deposit interest rates
to savers, acting as a disincentive to saving. Secondly, in an inflationary situation, the fixed
interest rates may even be negative in real terms, thus negatively affecting savings. Through
a policy of financial sector liberalization positive real interest rates are expected to be
realized, hence leading to higher savings levels. The removal of barriers to entry into the
banking sector is expected to increase competition within the financial sector. This would
motivate the financial intermediaries to pay high deposit interest rates, hence induce
15
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increased domestic savings rates. The positive relationship between savings and interest
rates was reported by, among others, Asilis and Ghosh (2002:25) and Pryor (2003:555).
2.2.3 Minimization of Transaction Costs
The financial sector also influences savings levels by minimizing transactions costs for
economic agents. Economic agents face transaction costs in the process of saving their
surplus funds with financial intermediaries and/or investing them in interest bearing
financial assets. High transaction costs act as a disincentive for savings (Bain, 1992). The
transaction costs include financial and non-financial costs. The financial costs include
transport costs to the intermediary and fees/commissions charged by the intermediary for
services rendered. The non-financial costs are the opportunity costs measured in terms of the
waiting time taken from time of arrival at the financial intermediary and receiving the
service. It is for this reason that financial intermediaries try as much as possible to spread
their branch networks so as to move their services closer to the clients, streamline their
processes and improve service delivery through introduction of new products such as the
automatic teller machines so as to minimize client transaction costs. Through minimizing
transaction costs for economic agents, the financial sector induces an increase in the level of
financial savings.
2.2.4 Transformation of Credit Risk
The financial sector also influences the savings behaviour of economic agents through the
transformation of risk. The financial sector transforms credit risk by dealing with a large
number of economic agents, thus effectively spreading the risk. In addition the financial
sector undertakes to evaluate all investment projects to determine their profitability so as to
minimize default risk. The financial sector also bears any default risk, which it covers
16
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
through its intermediation margins, without passing default risk to the surplus economic
agents whose funds were lent to the deficit economic agents. By bearing the risk of default
for all categories of savers in financial assets, the financial sector positively influences
household savings behaviour (Blake, 1990).
2.2.5 The Payment System
The financial sector also influences savings levels in an economy by providing an efficient
payment system (Chemonges, 1999). As argued by Chami et al (2003:20), banks in the
developing country context playa dominant role in the payment system on whose credibility
the performance of the market economy depends. A payment system includes the
procedures, rules, standards, instruments, institutions and technical means involved in
exchanging value between two parties discharging an obligation. The exchange of value
between any parties can either be in the form of cash or fmancial instruments, which choice
is influenced by transaction and/or opportunity costs. While the opportunity costs of cash
transactions include transport costs and/or risks of cash loss, the costs related to transactions
through the financial intermediaries include the commissions charged on financial
instruments, the time taken to effect the transaction and potential loss through fraud.
The higher the opportunity cost of cash transactions, the higher will be the incentive for
economic agents to rely on the fmancial institutions to manage the financial transactions,
hence leading to an increase in the level of financial savings. This can be realized if the
financial system has the following attributes: speed, certainty, reliability, safety/security and
low transaction costs. The speed with which value is exchanged by the payment system
enhances the users' confidence in the financial system as any prolonged delays are
associated opportunity costs in terms of creating uncertainty of payment, risk of loss of
value in case of inflationary situations and potential loss of investment opportunities.
17
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Certainty and reliability of the payment system enhances the broadening of the financial
sector, that is creation of diversified financial assets such as credit cards, automatic teller
machines and bonds. An efficient payment system must also portray itself to be dependable,
safe and secure in terms of issues like fraud control, credit risk control and adequate
arrangements to guard against unauthorized access to data. Transaction cost effectiveness is
also a critical component of an efficient payment system, such that the lowest cost possible
is borne by all the parties involved in the transaction.
From the above discussion, it can be argued that the development of an efficient payment
system will raise the financial savings rates in the economy through the following channels:
raising the opportunity cost of cash transactions, enhancing the public confidence in the
system, minimization of transaction costs, and broadening the financial sector.
2.2.6 Corporate Governance
Financial sector development creates a mechanism for exerting corporate governance on
financial institutions. Corporate governance is defined as the relationship among various
stakeholders in determining the strategic direction and performance of institutions. The
primary stakeholders include the shareholders, board of directors and management.
Through corporate governance, the managers will be induced to maximize firm value
through improved efficiency. The improved efficiency will in tum motivate savers to save
more with the financial intermediary thereby increasing savings levels within an economy.
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2.3 The Financial Sector and Resource Allocation
The financial sector undertakes the allocation of resources to investment and/or
consumption through the market forces of demand and supply (King and Levine, 1993). The
deficit economic agents express their demand for additional investment resources, premised
on the assumption that the first sources of funds are own accumulated savings or retained
earnings. This therefore constitutes the demand side of the credit market, as discussed
further in chapter 5.
The financial sector in turn responds to credit demand by supplying the needed resources,
thus constituting the supply side of the credit market. But because of the likelihood of
default risk, the financial sector does not automatically supply all the resources demanded
by the deficit economic agents at the ruling price. The financial sector undertakes a number
of processes to determine the amount of resources to be supplied to economic agents, which
include the evaluation of the proposed investment projects to determine their viability and
analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of economic agents to determine their
likelihood of default. This analysis forms the basis for the lender to either grant the full
amount of resources demanded by the economic agents or to ration their loan demand,
which is further discussed in chapter 6. The financial sector also sets up monitoring systems
for financed projects so as to minimize default risk. The financial sector's role is allocating
resources to their most productive uses results in long-term economic growth and is
discussed in the next section.
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2.4 The Financial Sector and Economic Growth
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2.4.1 Overview of the Debate
The debate on the role of the financial sector in the economic development process dates
back to the initial work of Schumpeter (1911) whose arguments pointed out to productivity
and growth enhancing effects of the services provided by a developed financial sector. The
debate focused on whether the financial sector plays a causal role in economic development
or if the financial sector merely follows the developments in the real sector. While the latter
view was propounded by Robinson (1952), Goldsmith (1969) stressed the propulsive role
the financial sector can play in the process of economic development. The causality question
has remained an important issue in the debate.
In the 1960's and 1970's many governments tried to generate economic growth through
artificially low interest rates and inflationary monetary policies, referred to as financial
repression. This policy stance followed the theoretical works of Keynes (1936) who
advocated for government interference in credit markets. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973) argued against such financial repressive policies on the grounds that they act as
disincentives to savings mobilization, which negatively affect long-run economic growth.
The policy advice based on the McKinnon - Shaw models was that governments should
abolish interest rate ceilings and stop raising seignorage through inflationary monetary
policies. Through the policy of financial sector liberalization, implemented widely
throughout the world since the middle 1970's, real interest rates were expected to rise to
their equilibrium levels to clear the markets. This would in turn influence higher savings
levels that can be used to finance investment and thus accelerate the long-run economic
growth process.
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Neostructuralists made counter arguments against the McKinnon-Shaw school of thought
and predicted that financial liberalization may even slow down long-term economic growth.
Stiglitz (1989) criticized financial liberalization on the theoretical ground of market failures
in financial markets.
2.4.2 The Financial Sector and Endogenous Growth
The endogenous growth theory that positively links financial sector development and
economic growth emerged in the 1990s (Eschenbach, 2004: 10). This theory, which follows
the Schumpeter's argument, emphasizes the role of the financial sector in promoting
innovations and the speed of technological progress, thus contributing to long-term
economic growth (King and Levine, 1993). The endogenous growth literature argues that
the financial sector fosters capital accumulation and productivity growth by facilitating
trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risks; mobilizing savings; allocating
resources; monitoring managers and exerting corporate control; and facilitating exchange of
goods and services. The details of the channels are further discussed below.
Endogenous growth model literature argues that there is a two-way causal relationship
between financial sector development and long-run economic growth. The financial sector
influences long-run economic growth through two main channels: the volume of investment
and the efficiency of investment. There are also feedback effects from economic growth to
the development of the financial sector (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995:435). The causality
between financial sector development and long-run economic growth can be as follows
(King and Levine, 1993:722):
Y=K'PX (5)
Where: Y = real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
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K = rate of physical capital accumulation
X = all other determinants of per capita GDP growth
cp =production function parameter
When equation (5) is transformed into logarithm and differentiated, we get:
Y = cp (GK) + EFF (6)
But FSD= F(Y) (7)
Where: Y = growth rate of real GDP
GK = growth rate of real physical capital stock
EFF = efficiency of investment
FSD = financial sector development
The variable (GK) is the rate of capital accumulation, which is measured by the growth rate
of physical capital stock and the investment to GDP ratio. Since capital accumulation may
be financed by domestic savings, the financial sector influences long-run economic growth
through the channel of increased volume of investment as discussed further in section
2.4.2.1. The variable (EFF) is economic efficiency of investment (which is the growth
residual after controlling for physical capital accumulation). It captures all other factors that
influence growth, such as technology, human capital accumulation and improvement in
employment of factor inputs to which the financial sector makes a significant contribution
(discussed further in section 2.4.2.2).
Economic growth on the other hand, may influence the level of development of the financial
sector by creating the demand for financial services, thereby enabling the creation of new
financial products and deepening of the financial system. In this context the development of
22
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the financial sector follows the developments in the real sector. While there is consensus in
the literature about the positive effect of fmancial sector development on long-run economic
growth, the main channel of transmission remains debatable, with some economists arguing
that it is through the volume of investment (King and Levine, 1993) while others contend
that it is the efficiency of investment (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995).
2.4.2.1 Volume of Investment
King and Levine (1993) emphasized the role played by the financial sector in mobilization
of savings and allocation of credit into highly productive investments, thereby promoting
long-run economic growth through the volume of investment channel. Using a number of
indicators to measure the level of financial sector development (M2/GDP ratio', commercial
bank credit as a ratio of total credit, commercial bank credit to private sector as a ratio of
total credit, commercial bank credit to private sector as a ratio of GDP) and cross sectional
data for 80 countries (for the period 1960 - 1989), King and Levine (1993:730) concluded
that the financial sector has a positive and significant effect on economic growth through the
volume of investment channel.
Further empirical evidence by Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) based on cross sectional
data for a sample of 98 countries for the period 1960 - 1985, suggested that repressive
policies have a significant and negative effect on long-run economic growth, which
emanates from a decreased volume of savings and investment. The argument was that
repressive policies that result in negative real interest rates, high reserve requirement ratios
and high inflation tax act as a disincentive to savings, which in turn leads to a lower volume
of investment and growth levels. The findings led them to the following conclusion:
2
1112is the broad money supply which includes currency ill circulation, demand and time deposits, investments in
finanCial assets (such as treasury bills)
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"Among the many explanations given in the literature of the weaker growth performance of
Latin America, we find that policies that systematically repress the financial sector are
among the most convincing" (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992:6).
The fundamental argument behind these results is that the development of the financial
sector is important because savings are intermediated towards productive investment,
thereby increasing the rate of capital accumulation, which is a fundamental determinant of
economic growth. However Jappelli and Pagano (1994), in a study of the effect of
borrowing constraints on economic growth, argued that relaxation of borrowing constraints
through financial sector liberalization might not lead to an increase in the volume of savings.
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) also argued that the financial sector mainly influences
economic growth through its effects on the efficiency of investment rather than the volume
of investment. Using cross-sectional data of 100 countries for the period (1960 - 1985) and
panel data for 12 Latin American countries, using a six yearly average (1950 - 1985), they
asserted that
"Our findings strongly suggest that the main channel of transmission from financial
development to growth is the effect on the efficiency of investment, rather than its level" (De
Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995:445).
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) supported their case by arguing that the real interest rate
that McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) used as a proxy for financial intermediation was
inappropriate. Based on the Latin American experience, they argued that the real interest
rate might be picking other factors that are not related to marginal productivity of capital.
The high real interest rates may just be due to a high risk premium due to lack of credibility
of economic policies or specific country risks (such as fragile financial markets, lack of a
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legal framework to safeguard property rights). In such a scenario, high positive real interest
rates may have a negative effect on investment and growth.
However, the causality between savings and investment remains a debatable matter between
the classical and Keynesian economists (palley, 1998: 100). While the classical view is that
savings cause investment and that the economy must first save so as to promote economic
growth, the Keynesians argue that it is investment that causes savings and that investment is
not constrained by savings but by lack of investment incentives such as low profitability due
to insufficient aggregate demand, and high real interest rates due to tight monetary policy.
But both the classical and Keynesian viewpoints converge at the full employment level of
the economy, though with differences in beliefs about the full employment state of the
economy. At full employment, additional investment is only possible through savings in the
form of either voluntary reduction of private consumption, which results in increased private
savings, or reduction in government expenditure that results in increased government
savings. Alternatively private consumption can be reduced by higher taxation, which results
in increased mandatory savings. However the point of contention between the two
viewpoints is that the classicals believe that the economy is at full employment most of the
time, while the Keynesians believe that the economy is not at full employment most of the
time.
Evidence by Baxter and Crucini (1993: 431) using cross- sectional data for eight OECD3
countries, suggests a significant and positive relationship between national savings and
investment. On the other hand, Levine and Renelt (1992:944) found a positive and robust
correlation between the investment IGDP ratio and growth. These findings are important
3
Organization/or Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
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because they underscore the savings and volume of investment channels through which the
financial sector influences long-run economic growth.
2.4.2.2 Efficiency of Investment
The financial sector also contributes to economic growth through its effects on the
efficiency of investment. This is achieved through the financial sector's function of
collecting and analyzing costly information on entrepreneurs/investment projects, allocating
credit to its highest productive use, enabling technological advancement, transforming the
composition of savings to suit investment, and financing of human capital formation.
Analysis of Potential Investment Projects
The financial sector undertakes to collect information not only on the investment projects
but also on the character of the entrepreneurs for the risk-return assessment, which promotes
the efficiency of investment through the allocation of resources to their most productive
uses. King and Levine (1993:717) argue that the risk-return assessment of investment
projects involveS huge fixed research costs that cannot be borne by a single private investor.
The risk-return assessment mechanisms include the evaluation of the entrepreneurial skills;
market analysis for goods; technological aspects and profitability of the investment. The
development of the financial sector therefore enables the emergence of specialized
institutions to gather and process information on investment projects and thereby facilitates
the spreading of fixed research costs among many private investors. The cost reduction
implies that more evaluations can be done, thus maximizing the probability of allocating
credit to highly productive projects. This raises the efficiency of investments, which has a
positive effect on economic growth.
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Cost Efficiency
Competitive financial markets also deliver efficiency gains, forcing financial intermediaries
to reduce intermediation margins (the difference between deposit rates and lending rates) up
to the point where they earn only normal profits. Competition also forces financial
intermediaries to be efficient through the design of cost-effective strategies. By adjusting the
equilibrium market lending interest rates to their efficiency levels, the financial sector
reduces the investment costs and in this manner increase the profitability of investments.
Through this channel, the financial sector promotes economic growth through efficiency of
investment (Levacic and Rebmann, 1982: 239).
Transformation of the composition of Savings
The financial sector eliminates the need for economic agents to hold a large proportion of
their wealth in unproductive liquid assets (cash) to finance future consumption, thereby
encouraging them to hold more of their wealth in interest bearing financial assets. The
financial assets may be marketable or non-marketable. Marketable financial assets include
bonds, which can be exchanged at a price at any time so that the original lender can get cash
without waiting for maturity. Non-marketable financial assets on the other hand include
building society shares, post office savings accounts and deposit accounts in commercial
banks (Levacic and Rebmann, 1982:26). By guaranteeing economic agents access to their
savings deposits at minimum cost when they experience liquidity pressures, financial
intermediaries can transform the composition of financial savings to make them more
appropriate for capital accumulation. The financial sector therefore determines the
proportion of savings to be allocated to investment through its liquidity provision role
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991:207). For example, if the economy has total fixed savings CSt),
27
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
financial intermediaries have a choice of holding them in liquid assets (cash) with low
productivity (qt) to meet future liquidity requirements of economic agents or allocating them
to illiquid investment assets, which are riskier but more productive (qt*). By dealing with
large numbers of savers and borrowers, the financial sector can allocate a high proportion of
savings to productive investment (qt*/St), by economizing on the amount to be held in
unproductive liquid reserves (qt!St) to meet the cash withdrawal requirements, thereby
promoting efficiency of investment and economic growth. The development of the
secondary capital and money markets where existing securities are traded enables economic
agents who experience liquidity pressures to convert their bonds into cash. Through the
channel of transformation of savings composition, the financial sector enables allocation of
resources to the most productive investments while at the same time meeting the liquidity
requirements of economic agents.
Eliminating the need for self-financing
By providing investment finance for projects, the financial sector eliminates the need for
self-financing which minimizes the risk of premature liquidation of productive investments
that arise due to unpredictable future liquidity crises coupled with the slow cycle of returns
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). Returns from investment projects are characterized by a time
lag between making investment expenditures and receipt of profits, and so economic agents
who experience unexpected liquidity pressures may be forced to prematurely liquidate their
investments especially if they are self-financed. For example, if the returns from an
investment project can only be realized in two years' time but the economic agent faces a
liquidity crisis in year one, the only option in the absence of financial intermediaries may be
to liquidate the investments. Demers (1991) pointed out that premature liquidation of fixed
capital investments results in heavy losses due to the irreversibility of investment. This
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irreversibility arises from the specialized nature of capital that cannot easily be switched to
other uses, as well as the resale value that tends to be lower than the purchase price. By
providing investment finance, the financial system eliminates the need for self-financing and
allows economic agents to earn the highest return from fixed capital investments, thereby
improving the efficiency of investment.
Technological Choice
Financial intermediation also enables econormc agents to choose highly specialized
technology, which increases the efficiency of investment and economic growth (Saint-Paul,
1992). As the returns from investment projects are subject to demand risks, the choice of
technology by firms will be greatly influenced by their expectations of the intensity of future
demand for their products. In the absence of well-developed financial and capital markets,
economic agents may choose highly flexible technology that allows for product
diversification but with low productivity so as to hedge against the demand risk shocks.
Highly flexible technology ensures that if the demand of a particular product falls, the same
machines may be switched over to produce other goods. The opportunity cost however of
less specialized technology is that it promotes inefficient use of resources, which lowers the
marginal productivity of capital.
The development of the financial and capital markets enables the choice of highly
specialized technology which is more productive but rigid in that it cannot be converted into
the production of other goods, in the event that the demand of the products which they were
designed to produce falls (Demers, 1991:346). Hulten (1992) also argued that marginal
productivity of capital is highest in specialized technology due to the embodied technical
change, which increases total-factor-productivity. The development of the capital markets
29
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
therefore enables economic agents to diversify their investment risks to insure against the
negative demand shocks, and simultaneously to choose the more productive technology,
which raises the efficiency of investment and accelerates economic growth.
The financial sector also provides private investors with information not only of the risks of
their own investment projects but also the risks that are common to all projects, thus
enabling them to diversify the technological shock risks (Greenwood and Jovanonic,
1990:1079). The technological shock consists of two components, namely the risk
associated with a specific investment project (idiosyncratic component) and the risk
common to all investment projects (systemic component). By providing an accurate
breakdown of technological shocks, financial intermediaries enable the investors to diversify
the intrinsic risks in private projects thereby enhancing efficiency in resource allocation and
promoting economic growth.
Human Capital Formation
The financial sector also promotes human capital formation by easing liquidity constraints
through borrowing for educational purposes. Financial arrangements that ease human skill
creation in turn accelerate economic growth. This is because a highly skilled labour force
will be more productive.
In summary it can be argued that a developed financial sector has a positive effect on long-
run economic growth, by increasing the volume of investment (capital accumulation) and/or
through increased efficiency of investment. Economic growth also influences the
development of the financial system by creating a demand for financial products, hence
leading financial sector deepening which in turn promotes further growth. It should be
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noted the arguments of causality between financial sector development and economic
growth (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; King and Levine, 1993) formed the basis for the
World Bank/IMF sponsored financial sector reforms which were designed to reduce the role
of the state in the management of the economy and make markets more efficient in resource
mobilization and allocation (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000:6). The fmancial sector
reforms included the deregulation of interest and foreign exchange rates, abolition of credit
controls and privatization of public sector commercial banks (Levine, 1997). However the
financial crises that rocked the liberalized systems resulted in renewed calls for prudential
regulation of the financial sector, discussed in detail in the next section.
2.5 Financial Sector Regulation
2.5.1 Objectives of Financial Regulation
Falkena et al (2001) argued that the ultimate goal of financial regulation is the attainment of
a high degree of economic efficiency and consumer protection. The specific objectives of
financial regulation include: securing systemic stability in the economy, ensuring safety and
soundness of financial institutions, and enhancing consumer protection.
Systemic stability in the economy can be achieved by ensuring that financial markets
function smoothly with minimum shocks created by market imperfections (such as
ineffective or inefficient trading, weak clearing and settlement systems, and poor market
infrastructure). Financial regulation addresses such market imperfections and promotes
overall economic efficiency.
Ensuring the safety and soundness of financial institutions is another critical aspect of
financial regulation. Financial regulation ensures that individual institutions are profitable,
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are sufficiently capitalized to cover overall risk exposure, and have "fit and proper"
management and staff.
Consumer protection is important in that consumers may not always have the necessary
information with which to make accurate decisions on the choice of fmancial institutions to
deposit their savings. The collapse of such institutions may inflict heavy losses of life-time
savings. Financial institutions may also develop exploitative monopoly powers in the form
of charging excessively high interest rates, for which the regulatory authorities must offer
protection to consumers. By ensuring that various financial services are provided by
specialized financial institutions (such as leasing, insurance), financial regulation protects
consumers against poor financial advice which can lead to heavy losses.
Schmidt and Willardson (2004:48) identified the protection of consumer information as one
of the critical aspects of consumer protection. While financial institutions gather information
on their clients for purposes of evaluating their creditworthiness and risk-pricing, the
transfer of such information to unrelated third parties constitutes a violation of the rights of
the consumer. The problem is compounded when errors are generated in the process of
transfer of such information to unrelated third parties, causing innocent consumers to be
victimized in the credit markets (by being denied credit) or in the labour markets (by being
turned down for jobs).
2.5.2 Components of Financial Regulation
Jordaan (1997) summarized financial regulation into three broad components: prudential
regulation, protective regulation, and monetary requirements.
32
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.5.2.1 Prudential Regulation
Prudential regulation is geared to ensuring that the risk exposure of financial institutions is
fixed within tolerable limits so as to minimize the risk of bank failures. The policy
instruments for prudential regulation include entry requirements, permissible banking
activity, information disclosure, capital adequacy requirements, risk asset limits, and
liquidity risk limits.
The main objective of the entry requirements regulation is to ensure that new entrants into
the financial sector are sound and have adequate risk management capacity. The entry
requirements include, among others, minimum paid up capital, and "fit and proper"
management. The permissible business activity regulation involves a separation of activities
that the financial institutions can involve in so as to limit the risk exposure. The disclosure
of all information regulation enables the assessment of the level of risk assumed and
managed by banks, so as to determine appropriate risk-based capial adequacy requirements.
By implication, the accuracy and consistency of such information is pivotal to the correct
assessment of risk exposure of banks, which brings into play the need for standardization of
accounting and reporting systems and imposing additional responsibilities to external
auditors (e.g. to disclose the weaknesses in the internal control systems, weaknesses in
management).
The capital adequacy requirements regulation provides a disincentive to banks to take on
excessive risks, which reduces the probability of bank failures. In addition capital adequacy
requirements provide a cushion against losses, thereby minimizing the risk of banks using
depositor's funds to meet operational expenses. Capital adequacy requirements include
minimum paid-up capital and risk-weighted on-going capital requirements. The risk asset
limits regulation includes regulatory stipulations on maximum loan concentration (expressed
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either in terms of maximum loan amount to a single customer or as a percentage of the
capital base), interest rate risk and exchange rate risk. The liquidity adequacy requirements
regulation is geared to ensuring that financial institutions have sufficient funds to meet the
liquidity risks faced by consumers. The liquidity risks may arise from factors that include
demands for cash withdrawals, unexpected shortfall in earnings. The liquidity requirements
regulation also boosts public confidence in the financial system (Jordaan, 1997).
2.5.2.2 Protective Regulation
Protective regulation is designed to protect distressed banks from collapse, especially if they
are large and their collapse has a higher probability of ushering in systemic instability to the
financial system. Protective regulation consists of crisis management of distressed banks and
deposit insurance (Jordaan, 1997). Crisis management regulation includes provision of
emergency liquidity assistance and corrective action to the distressed bank. Emergency
liquidity assistance entails the provision of temporary liquidity to the distressed bank by the
regulatory authority (as a lender of the last resort, or even direct or indirect subsidies).
Corrective action may include recapitalization of the distressed bank from existing or new
shareholders, change inmanagement, mergers with sound banks or outright liquidation.
Deposit insurance regulation is designed to boost public confidence in the financial system
and minimize the risk of financial instability. Mandatory deposit insurance schemes
covering the whole banking sector are commonly used in least developed countries (LDCs),
which may be flat or risk-weighted premiums.
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2.5.3 Monetary Requirements Regulation
Monetary requirements regulation is geared more to the attainment of the broader monetary
policy objectives of price stability, employment creation and high economic growth rather
than prudential regulation. Monetary requirements instruments may include variations in
reserve asset requirements, control of interest rates, credit ceilings and allocation by
regulation. It should be noted that direct non-market oriented monetary policy instruments
may have profound distortionary effects on the financial sector (Jordaan, 1997).
2.5.4 Global Harmonization of Financial Regulatory Standards
With the globalization of banking business (Giannakoudi, 1999), the need for harmonization
of regulatory standards arose to enhance the stability of the global financial system (Chami
et al, 2003: 4). This was as a result of the observed banking crises that followed financial
sector liberalization in most LDCs, which threatened the stability of the international
payment system.
2.5.4.1 Weak Financial Regulation and Banking Crises: Empirical Evidence
Most developing countries experienced banking crises following the implementation of
financial sector reforms. Evidence by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998:10) in a study of 20
countries that had experienced banking crises indicated that 18 of the 26 crises were
experienced immediately after liberalization. The time frames ranged between five or less
years after the reforms, thus linking financial sector liberalization to emergence of financial
crises. Weller (2001: 109), using data for 27 emerging economies for the period 1973 - 1988
with univariate and multivariate analysis models, also showed a positive correlation between
banking crises and financial liberalization. The argument for this observed phenomenon is
that financial liberalization allows more liquidity to enter the emerging economy, especially
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to speculative investments, which increases the probability of borrower default. On the
other hand, the outflow of international capital becomes more likely after liberalization,
especially in response to currency overvaluation, thus having destabilizing effects on the
financial system.
Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000:5) argue that developing countries had weak financial
regulatory frameworks prior to liberalization due to two main factors: economic regulation
and inherited systems. First, government policies prior to the 1980's were geared towards
economic regulation through control of interest rates and sectoral allocation of credit to
realize the predetermined goals (economic, social and political), implying limited experience
in supervising market-based financial systems. Secondly, foreign-owned banks dominated
the banking system in most LDCs, which banks were subject to strict prudential controls
from their parent banks. The implication here is that LDCs inherited a banking and
regulatory system from their colonial masters which needed less domestic regulation. The
resultant effect was a weak regulatory framework characterized by understaffed supervisory
departments, shortage of skilled supervisors, regulatory forbearance, and obsolete banking
laws with low capital requirements which were often eroded by inflation to negligible levels.
Regulatory forbearance is the inability or unwillingness of the regulators to rigorously
enforce the prudential regulations due to either pervasive political interference and/or
corruption. To counter these crises, Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2000) argued for further
reforms, which include higher capital adequacy standards, explicit rules covering
intervention policy in distressed banks, restraints on competition in banking markets and
greater use of the market for monitoring banks.
Sau (2003:510) emphasized the role played by the dominance of banks in the financial
system and the prevalence of information asymmetry as the main explanation for the
36
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
financial crises experienced after fmancial sector reforms. According to this hypothesis,
banks can increase the price of capital that reduces the profitability of the investments, thus
reducing the net worth of firms. This therefore reduces the ability of the firms to repay their
debts, hence increasing the banks' exposure to risk default. This will be reinforced by the
moral hazard behaviour of the borrowers to adopt high-risk projects when faced with high
interest rates, which increases their probability of default. On the other hand, the existence
of high levels of information asymmetry in LDCs implies that banks adopt credit rationing
behaviour that reduces credit to the firms, thus leading to liquidity crisis at firm level. To
cope with the liquidity problem, firms may choose the option of reducing or selling off their
assets, which in turn leads to a fall in asset prices and a reduction in the net worth of firms.
This also increases the banks' exposure to default risk, as firms that have borrowed will not
be able to pay due to bankruptcy.
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995:443) noted that the Latin American financial crisis was due
to liberalization of financial systems coupled with inadequate regulatory mechanisms. The
public expectation that government would bailout banks in case of a crisis, despite the
announced government policy of liberalization, caused the banks to be less circumspect in
evaluating projects. This led to over-financing of low productive projects, which could not
repay the loans and sparked off the costly banking crisis, where governments had to
intervene to refund the depositors' funds. The existence of deposit insurance schemes has
also been argued to be a key factor in explaining the occurrence of financial crises after
financial liberalization as it acts as an incentive for banker's moral hazard behaviour, as the
state undertakes to bear the costs of bank failure. Boyd and De Nicolo (2003 :3) also argued
that a deposit insurance scheme encourages risk taking behaviour by banks because it
generates a pay structure in which large gains go to the bank shareholders and large losses to
government. Diamond and Rajan (2003:40) pointed out that poorly targeted government
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bailout of banks in the form of recapitalization or deposit insurance can even tip the banking
system into a systemic crisis. This is because such interventions affect the availability of
aggregate liquidity in the economy. The formulation of a regulatory policy was argued to
deter risk-taking by banks through the use of instruments like risk sensitive capital
requirements, cash asset reserve requirements and bank disclosure policy. Poirot (2001)
showed that lack of effective oversight and regulation was the major cause of the Russian
financial crisis.
Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) used data for 53 countries for the period 1980 - 95
to analyze the relationship between effectiveness of regulation, liberalization and banking
crises. Using alternative proxies for the regulatory environment such as the degree to which
the rule of law is respected, the extent of bureaucratic delay, the quality of contract
enforcement, the quality of bureaucracy and the degree of corruption, the results suggested
that an improvement in the quality of regulation minimizes the risk that liberalized financial
markets will fall into systemic banking crises. Williamson and Maher (1998) in a study of
33 countries that had implemented financial sector reforms during the period 1973 -1995,
concluded that countries that had stronger regulatory and supervisory systems experienced
less severe financial crises as compared to those with weak regulatory frameworks.
It should also be noted that the financial sector reforms were implemented by most
developing economies in the 1970's and 1980's in which the macroeconomic environment
was characterized by high and variable inflation, advances in technology and globalization
of the banking business which all gave rise to financial instability (Chami et al, 2003:9). The
high and variable inflation generated a demand for hedging products, thus inducing savers to
seek higher yields and this intensified banking competition. Technological advances in
information and communication broke down the traditional demarcations of the banking
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industry into banks and non-banks, thus motivating other firms to also enter the banking
business. The new technology cut down the financial intermediation costs and facilitated the
development of new financial products such as automatic teller machines, and credit cards.
The removal of barriers to entry into the banking business further led to globalization of the
banking business as domestic banks had to compete against foreign banks and in some cases
resulted in mergers. While competition in the banking sector is argued to lead to efficiency
in resource mobilization and allocation through minimization of intermediation costs
(Belaisch, 2003:20), competition might have negative effects on the stability of the financial
system as it motivates banks to take on more risky investments (Weller, 2001).
The conclusion drawn from the empirical research referred to is that a strong fmancial
regulatory framework is important to maintain the stability of the financial system and to
prevent costly bank failures. Itwas for this reason that the Basel Committee of the Bank of
International Settlement (BIS) took the lead role in the formulation of international
minimum prudential regulation standards upon which all the national government financial
regulatory frameworks were to be based.
2.5.4.2 Minimum International Prudential Regulation Standards
The Basel Accord 1 of 1988, among other things, established two categories of minimum
capital adequacy ratios: core capital being at least 4% of the risk-weighted assets and total
capital being at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. However many banks responded to the
Basel Accord of 1988by engaging in regulatory capital arbitrage whereby they exploited the
ambiguity of the Accord in terms of categorization of assets into different risk-weights to
economize on the capital to be held. This was through deliberate loading of the riskiest
assets in a particular category, thereby minimizing the capital requirement. In addition banks
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took on more market and interest rate risk, and even used bank capital to finance lending
operations, hence ending up holding low quality assets on their balance sheets.
This resulted in the revised Basle Accord II of 1999, which introduced a three-pillar
approach to the regulation of banks (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 2000:6). Pillar I
constituted the regulations imposed by the regulators on the banks with regard to capital
adequacy requirements. Emphasis was put on a comprehensive risk assessment of the banks
so as to determine appropriate capital requirements. Four components of risk were
considered: credit risk, market risk, interest rate risk and operational risk. Pillar II focused
on supervision of banks to ensure that they have adequate internal procedures for risk
assessment and computation of the required amount of capital to hold. The supervision
approach envisaged continuous dialogue between the regulator and the banks, but with the
regulator empowered to review and intervene. Pillar ill underscored the reliance on the
market for continuous assessment of banks. Through the market approach, banks were
expected to have regular and timely disclosure of information both to the regulators (for
effective assessment of risk assumed and managed by banks) and to the public (for
continuous monitoring of the performance of the banks by the market).
2.6 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the functions of the broader financial sector
in terms of intermediation of resources, and the importance of financial regulation. The
relevance of this analysis is that the informal financial sector is part of the broader financial
sector.
The conclusion is that the financial sector plays an important role in the mobilization and
allocation of resources, thereby promoting long term economic growth. The financial sector
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influences domestic savings levels in an economy through the following channels: income,
interest rates, minimization of transaction costs, transformation of credit risks, creation of an
efficient payment system, and corporate governance. The fmancial sector influences
economic growth through the volume of investment and efficiency of investment channels.
By raising the savings levels to finance capital accumulation, the financial sector influences
economic growth through the volume of investment channel. The financial sector also
increases the efficiency of investment, thereby promoting economic growth through the
following channels: provision of an efficient mechanism for evaluation of investment
projects that ensures that resources are invested where they get the highest return,
diversification of investment risks, diversification of liquidity risks, prevention of premature
liquidation of physical capital investment and promotion of specialized technological
innovation. Economic growth also influences the development of the financial sector by
creating demand for new financial products thereby broadening the financial sector. This in
turn stimulates higher growth levels. This is the two-way casual relationship between the
financial sector and economic growth highlighted by the endogenous growth literature. The
importance of the financial sector in promoting economic growth acted as the basis for the
design of the World Bank/IMP financial sector reforms, which were implemented in most
LDCs in the 1980's.
Regulation of the financial sector plays a key role in maintaining the stability of the
financial system and consumer protection. The components of financial regulation include
prudential regulation, protective regulation and monetary requirements regulation.
Consumer protection safeguards depositors from the potential loss of funds in case of the
collapse of financial institutions, monopoly power exploitation through excessive interest
rates, and abuse in the use of clients' confidential information by the financial institutions.
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To maintain the stability of the global financial system, the mmunum international
regulatory standards were developed under the Basel Accord to guide the national
governments in the design of their own regulatory frameworks.
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CHAPTER 3: THE INFORMAL FINANCIAL SECTOR
3.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the structure of the informal financial sector in terms of the
distinguishing features of each market. The informal financial sector is part of the broader
financial system that provides resources to those economic agents with no access to formal
financial services. Informal finance, defined to include all financial transactions that take
place outside the officially regulated or monitored financial sector, include unregulated
savings and credit activities (Montiel et ai, 1993 :8). These informal savings and credit
activities are argued to be a market response of economic agents to their economic
environment, which activities are demand driven generated purely by the needs of the
market place. While the formal financial sector is subject to regulation and supervision by
the monetary authority (the central bank), the unregulated informal financial sector escapes
all such regulation.
The informal financial sector plays a key role in resource mobilization and allocation in
developing economies. Bouman (1995:373) suggested that in Cameroon approximately 50%
of the national savings and 27% of the total credit requirements was provided by the
informal sector. Jones et al (1998:105) noted that 55% of all private savings in Ghana are
mobilized through informal sources. Timberg and Aiyar (1984:43) estimated that informal
credit markets account for approximately 20% of total commercial credit outstanding in
India. Bagachwa (1995: 10) observed that approximately 55% of the start-up capital for
microentreprenuers in urban and rural areas is provided by the informal sector.
The theoretical framework for the emergence and co-existence of the informal fmancial
sector with its formal financial sector counterpart has been provided by two competing
theories, namely the repression and structural hypotheses that are discussed in section 3.2.1
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and 3.2.2 respectively. The policy of promoting linkages between the formal and informal
financial sectors as a strategy for enhancing the broadening of the financial sector is
presented in section 3.3, and the types and characteristic informal financial institutions are
discussed in section 3.4.
The relevance of this chapter to the study is that it highlights why informal financial
institutions exist in the first place, which implies the existence of demand for informal
credit. The demand for informal credit is influenced by household socio-economic
characteristics and other variables (to be discussed in section 5.4), which is specifically
examined by this study in the case of Uganda. Secondly, the findings of this chapter
underscore the risk-return assessment mechanisms that are adopted by informal financial
institutions to overcome the problems of information asymmetry which are prevalent in
credit markets. The risk-return assessment forms the basis for the lender to decide whether
to fully grant the loan amount applied for by the borrowers, partially ration the loan amount,
or completely reject the loan application. The last two scenarios constitute the lenders'
decision to credit ration the borrowers' loan demand, which decision is influenced by the
borrowers' socio-economic factors and other factors (to be discussed in section 6.4). An
empirical investigation of the factors that influence the informal lenders' credit rationing
behaviour forms part of this study.
3.2 Factors that influence the Emergence of the Informal Financial Sector
In most less developed countries (LDCs), informal financial markets operate parallel with
the formal financial markets, and in some instances their services play a complementary
role. Different reasons have been propounded to explain the emergence and continued co-
existence of the formal and informal financial sectors. The conceptual and theoretical
underpinnings have been provided based on arguments from two schools of thought: the
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financial repression hypothesis (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) and the structuralist
hypothesis (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
3.2.1 The Financial Repression Hypothesis
The financial repression hypothesis argues that the opportunity for the emergence of the
informal financial sector is created whenever there is excessive regulation of the formal
financial market in the form of fixed interest rates, sectoral credit allocation, state
management of public sector banks and restriction of entry into the banking sector
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). The fixed interest rate policy generates excess demand for
credit, which conditions the formal banks to use non-price measures such as collateral
requirements to ration credit. Arndt (1982:417) argued that the discrimination between
borrowers on the basis of collateral and credit rating is a characteristic feature of credit
rationing by banks, while government control of interest rates discriminates among
borrowers in a socially desirable way. Nissanke (1994) argued that collateral requirements
as a rationing device increases the lender's expected return because collateral reduces the
incentives to default and shifts the expected loss from the lenders to the borrowers. Coupled
with selective or sectoral credit policies, segmented and fragmented credit markets emerge
in which favoured borrowers obtain credit at highly subsidized interest rates, while the non-
favoured borrowers are rationed out and must obtain funds at high interest rates in informal
credit markets.
The conventional development wisdom of the 1960's and 1970's for intervention in formal
credit markets was that subsidized credit would lead to rapid rural transformation through
adoption of modem agricultural technology that would lead to increased agricultural output
and income. It was also expected that these subsidized rural credit programs would lead to
poverty alleviation and a more equitable income distribution. Such intervention was
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motivated by attainment of social goals, in which governments resorted to use of less direct
and more inefficient means of redistributing income by altering relative prices. This was as a
result of budget constraints that made direct transfers of income to targeted activities more
costly (Riedinger, 1994:301). Most developing countries adopted deliberate policies of
directed credit and interest rate controls with a view to increasing access by the rural poor to
cheap credit so as to stimulate investments in the agricultural sector and simultaneously
break the monopoly power of the moneylenders, who operated in the informal financial
sector and were perceived to be exploitative. This was to be achieved in two ways: first
through massive rural branch banking where cheap institutional credit was expected to
compete away the moneylenders. Secondly, by enabling the moneylenders to have access to
cheap institutional credit, it was expected to result in a reduction in the moneylenders'
opportunity cost of funds, thereby having a positive trickle down effect by lowering rural
interest rates (Bell, 1990; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).
However the cheap credit policy failed to achieve its objectives (Braverman and Guasch,
1986:1256). Firstly, there was limited agricultural production response. The fixed interest
rate policy distorted the cost of capital, generated poor investment incentives and failed to
increase agricultural output cost-effectively. Secondly, the cheap formal credit was accessed
mainly by the richer households. Since many developing country governments also taxed
agricultural output, the subsidized credit policy that benefited mainly the rich implied that
the poor were subsidizing the rich, thus worsening income inequality. The marketing of
agricultural output was often handled by State Marketing Corporations where producer
prices were controlled, implying a high implicit tax to the farmers. Thirdly, the lender
institutions that were created to channel the cheap credit were very inefficient. They were
riddled by corruption, high transaction costs and poor loan repayment rates, which created a
heavier fiscal burden in terms of continuous subsidization of their operations. Riedinger
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(1994:301) also argued that the subsidized credit policy generated important patronage
opportunities for the people in power. The politicians simply used cheap credit to reward
some people, who in turn reciprocated with electoral support.
The cheap formal credit policy also failed to reduce the high interest rates charged by
moneylenders in the rural financial sector. Evidence by Aleem (1990) based on a study of
fourteen moneylenders and their clients in Chambar, Pakistan suggested that the
moneylenders continued charging high interest rates despite the many years of government
intervention in rural credit markets with cheap institutional credit. The interest rates charged
by the moneylenders (78.6% p.a.) far exceeded their marginal resource cost (48.0% p.a.),
confirming the failure of the cheap formal credit policy to break the moneylenders'
monopoly power in the rural credit market. The resource cost analysis included overhead
costs, borrower screening costs, costs of pursuing delinquent loans, cost of borrowing funds
from the formal sector, and provision for unrecoverable loans.
Further evidence by Siamwalla et al (1990) based on a study of 1600 rural households and
37 money lenders in Thailand, also suggested that informal lenders' interest rates remained
relatively high (25% - 60% p.a.) as compared to formal sector rates (12% - 14%p.a.) despite
government intervention which injected huge amounts of cheap funds into rural credit
markets through the extensive rural branch network. In addition about 75% of all the active
households in the credit markets continued accessing credit from informal sources, revealing
the unique role played by informal lenders despite the high interest rates charged.
Bose (1998) argued that a cheap credit policy in the formal sector might raise informal
sector interest rates and even reduce the volume of credit available. His theoretical model
was based within the context of information asymmetry in the informal financial market,
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with two categories of lenders: the more informed lender [Type 1] and the less informed
lender [Type 2]. The more informed lender [Type 1] has more information about the
borrowers, can identify the low risk borrowers to whom he lends, has low default rates, low
transaction costs and can afford to charge low interest rates. The less informed lender [Type
2] who has very little information about the borrowers, lends to high-risk borrowers, has
high default rates, has high transaction costs in terms of contract enforcement and can only
survive by charging high interest rates. Even though the more informed and less informed
informal lenders both face the same external source of funds (i.e. the formal sector charging
interest rate, r), a decrease in r may lead to an increase in interest rate charged by the Type 2
lender. This is because of the negative indirect effect on the Type 2 lender resulting from
the response of the Type 1 lender to a fall in r. A fall in r induces Type 1 lender to reduce
his interest rate (il) and increase his portfolio (nl) by taking away most of the low risk
borrowers (as he has more information fo~ screening borrowers). This leaves the Type 2
lender with mainly high-risk borrowers. This results in the adverse composition effect for
Type 2 lender, which increases the probability of default and high enforcement costs. The
Type 2 lender will respond by increasing the interest rate charged to clients (i2) and reducing
the volume of the portfolio (n2)' Hence the cheap credit policy in the formal financial sector
may result in an increase in informal sector interest rates and a decrease in the volume of
credit.
Financial repression is therefore argued to create financial dualism that has negative effects
on economic development (Germidis, 1990). In the first instance, financial dualism leads to
the creation of regional and sectoral disparities through its effects on resource mobilization
and allocation especially when savings from the rural sectors are siphoned for investment in
urban sectors. This scenario occurs when formal banks use their rural branch network
mainly for savings mobilization but not to lend to the rural poor on the pretext that they are
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not creditworthy due to a lack of collateral security. This results in growth differentials
between economic sectors, as their growth will be dependent on access to credit. Secondly
financial dualism leads to negative equity effects through the interest differentials between
formal and informal sector loans. The formal sector interest rates are lower compared to the
informal sector interest rates, but formal sector credit is less accessible to the poor with no
security. The poor are conditioned to choose high cost informal loans or no credit at all,
while the rich access low cost formal credit thus worsening the inequality between the rich
and the poor. Thirdly financial dualism makes the implementation of coherent economic,
monetary and fiscal policies difficult. The lack of data on informal sector transactions
renders the planning process ineffective. The monetary policy instruments (interest rate,
reserve requirements) may be rendered ineffective in the presence of large liquidity outside
the banking system, hence the management of money supply for effective control of
inflation may be difficult.
The major policy recommendation from the repression hypothesis school of thought was the
liberalization of the formal financial sector, which would in the long-run crowd out the
informal financial sector. This would lead to integration of the formal and informal financial
sectors (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). The liberalized interest rate as a market price for
financial resources was expected to result in the re-allocation of funds from the informal
credit markets to the formal financial sector. The re-allocation was postulated to depend on
the smooth substitution of financial assets by the asset holders. An increase in the formal
sector deposit rates or bond rates was expected to induce asset holders to shift their
portfolios from claims on the informal credit activities into bank deposits or bonds. This
enhances the modernization of the formal financial sector and subsequent reduction of the
informal financial sector. Elimination of all other forms of repressive policies such as high
reserve requirements, abolition of credit controls, removal of barriers to entry into banking
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business and privatization of state owned banks was expected to enhance competition in the
formal sector. The potential benefits of such measures would be a reduction in
intermediation margins, increased efficiency in resource mobilization and allocation, and
higher growth rates as previously discussed in section 2.4.
Teranishi (1994:315) however argued that liberalization of formal sector interest rates may
not be sufficient to result in a significant portfolio shift from claims in the informal credit
markets to bank deposits. This is because the informal lenders are not merely asset holders
but are professional lenders with highly efficient information capabilities. The information
accumulated by informal lenders over time is a form of intangible capital stock, implying
that a shift of their portfolios to the formal sector will entail a loss of capital value. Evidence
by Steel et al (1997:826) from a study of four African countries (Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania
and Nigeria) suggested that the portfolio of informal lenders continued to grow by between
20% - 150% over the period 1990 - 1992 despite the liberalization of the formal financial
sectors in the 1980's. Steel et al (1997) also observed that informal sector risk-adjusted
interest rates were higher than the formal sector rates, suggesting the continued existence of
monopoly power in the informal financial sector despite the implementation of financial
sector liberalization policies. Aryeetey and Nissanke (1998: 117) were also of the view that
financial sector liberalization had failed to solve the problem of financial market
fragmentation in developing countries. Wide differences in interest rates and returns among
the lenders in the different sectors have continued to persist due to limited interaction
between the different segments.
Timberg and Aiyar (1984:51) in a study of urban moneylenders in India also suggested that
they charged higher interest rates (18% - 24% per annum) as compared to formal banks
(13% - 16% p.a.). Further evidence by Bagachwa (1995:36) showed that moneylenders'
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interest rates of 6% - 9% per month were significantly higher than those of the formal sector
of21% - 31% p.a.
3.2.2 The Structuralist Hypothesis
The structuralist hypothesis argues that the emergence and existence of the informal credit
market is based on sound economic considerations due to differences in transaction cost
structures faced by the formal and informal lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990). Due to market
and market support infrastructure deficiencies, the transaction costs for formal financial
intermediaries are prohibitively high when dealing with small borrowers. The high
transaction costs prevent formal financial institutions from undertaking adequate screening,
monitoring and credit enforcement procedures against default risks over small loans. This
leads to the perceived high risks by formal lenders, making them extremely risk-averse in
extending credit to small borrowers, particularly to those without credible collateral. The
collateral is expected to serve both as a screening device against default risk and an
incentive to the borrower to repay the loan within the framework of asymmetric information
(Van Tassel, 1999).
Information asymmetry is a situation where the borrowers have more information about
their potentials and risks as compared to the lenders due to lack of recorded credit history,
existence of high information gathering and analysis costs (Stiglitz, 1990). But the lender
also needs accurate information to assess the viability of the project, the creditworthiness of
the borrowers and their strategic behaviour so as to minimize default risk and enhance
repayment rates. Formal institutions faced with high transaction costs ration out smaller
borrowers and the poor without acceptable collateral, to safeguard their operational viability.
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Heterogeneous informal lenders therefore satisfy the unsatisfied demand for credit of those
left out by the formal financial sector. Informal lenders have access to local information on
their borrowers, with whom they have interpersonal relations at very low cost, which they
use for screening the borrowers thereby greatly controlling transaction costs and default risk.
This gives the informal lenders an informational cost advantage over banks when dealing
with small borrowers. In addition, by being part of the community, informal lenders are
able to continuously monitor their borrowers at minimal cost, as compared to formal lenders
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).
It is also argued that formal credit is not accessible to small borrowers due to the high
borrowing cost in the formal sector (Adams and Nehman, 1979:168). The borrower
transaction costs include the nominal interest rate charged on loans, commissions charged
by the bank (for example application fees, loans registration fees), borrower travel expenses,
and the opportunity cost of the borrower's time spent in negotiating for the loan. The
borrowing cost ratio, defined as the total borrowing cost as a percentage of the total loan
received, was estimated to be 29% for small borrowers and 15% for large borrowers for
loans with a duration of one year. The high borrower costs for formal credit therefore tend to
make the smaller borrowers to prefer informal credit. Further evidence by Yadav et al
(1992:427) suggested that the borrowing cost as ratio of outstanding loans is highest for
formal credit (1.8%), followed by moneylenders (0.7%) and least for friends and relatives
(0.3%). From the institutional side, evidence by Timberg and Aiyar (1984) suggests that the
administrative costs of the informal lenders (1.2% of outstanding loans) are lower than for
formal banks (1.7% - 2.75% of outstanding loans). Evidence by Aryeetey (1994:39) also
suggested that moneylenders have very low transaction costs computed as percentages of
loan amounts: screening costs (1.4%), loan monitoring costs (0%), loan repayment and
enforcement costs (0.2%).
52
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The high savings transactions costs in formal banks on the other hand explain why Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) (see section 3.4.3) continue to be the most
viable savings option for low-income people in may parts of the world. In a study of urban
market women in Harare, Chamlee-Wright (2002:992) argued that one of the main reasons
why market women continue being members of ROSCAs despite having personal bank
accounts is due to the high transactions costs involved in saving small amounts. The
transaction costs include transport to the bank and opportunity cost due to long waiting time.
The ROSCAs provide opportunities to conveniently save small amounts, which would
otherwise have been spent on other incidentals. In addition the ROSCAs provide a cost
effective alternative for credit. Handa and Kirton (1999:192) in a study of 1000 households
in Jamaica also concluded that the ROSCA provide a cost minimizing strategy for saving to
the members, whereby instead of all the members going to the bank to the deposit their
savings, only the leader goes. What all this evidence points to is that the decision by
economic agents to participate in informal financial markets is based on cost considerations.
Informal lenders also use effective collateral substitutes such as joint liability contracts and
interlinked credit transactions. The joint liability contract is a lending arrangement where the
group members are not only responsible for repayment of their personal loans, but also for
loans of their fellow members in case of default. The whole group is sanctioned (i.e. can't
access a repeat loan) before the entire group loan is fully paid. In effect the members are co-
signers under the joint liability contract. Joint liability contracts are instrumental in resol ing
information asymmetry problems by: (i) providing a screening mechanism for borrowers,
thus separating them into different risk types (Van Tassel, 1999; Ghatak, 1997). Borrowers
have more information on the creditworthiness of their fellow members, so the joint liability
contracts induce endogenous group formation and self-selection among borrowers hence
low risk borrowers choose to group together so as to avoid the burden of paying for others in
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case of default; (ii) inducing endogenous peer monitoring thereby minimizing the moral
hazard problems in borrower investment choices (Stiglitz, 1990); (iii) providing a
mechanism for enforcement of repayment, hence controlling willful default due to fear of
embarrassment/pressure from members (Besley and Coate, 1995; Conning, 1999); (iv)
reducing transaction costs to the lenders (Conlin, 1999); (v) acting as insurance to other
members in case their projects fail (Coleman, 1999); and (vi) providing an incentive for
members to transfer skills to their peers to ensure that their projects succeed and pay back
the loans (Varian, 1990).
Joint liability contracts also promote group homogeneity, which plays a critical role in
enhancing high repayment performance of group lending programmes. However evidence
by Paxton et al (2000) based on 140 lending groups in Burkina Faso suggested that group
homogeneity" and peer pressures have a positive but insignificant effect on loan repayment
behaviour. Group homogeneity was expected to enhance group solidarity such that members
may opt to pay on behalf of their fellow members who experience some repayment
difficulties. The statistical insignificance of the homogeneity index was explained by the
existence of covariant risk, which affects the members' joint repayment ability because of
their involvement in similar activities and facing the same exogenous shocks (such as
production and price shocks). For example if the members of the group are involved in the
agricultural production of a similar crop which is affected by pests, all the members may
default because they are all affected by the same natural hazard. Peer pressure on the other
hand was expected to reinforce the individual members' willingness to repay the loans for
fear of embarrassment or evoking the anger of group members. The insignificance of the
4 The homogeneity index was a summation of nine binary variables (J = Yes, O=No) relating to the socio-economic
characteristics of each group. The index captured whether the members were of the same ethnic group, gender, age,
income level, participated in same economic activities, lived in the same neighbourhood.
S The peer pressure index was constructed ranging from zero (no anger and no action taken against the member who
has defaulted in loan repayment) to four (members angry with defaulter and took some form of action).
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peer pressure variable in the Paxton et al (2000) model was explained by the fact that the
people attached greater value to village social harmony than continued access to loans. For
this reason no serious action was taken against defaulters by fellow group members as the
loan in default was perceived to belong to an organization external to the community. The
feeling they had was that there was no need to antagonize fellow community members with
whom they shared their daily life.
The interlinked credit contract, another collateral substitute, is where a credit transaction
involves interdependent exchanges in two or more markets (such as product, labour, land)
which are simultaneously agreed upon (Basu, 1983). For example, a landlord lends to
workers on condition they provide him labour at predetermined wage rates over a period of
time (interlinkage between the credit and labour markets), a trader/money lender extends
credit to farmers on condition they market their output through him (interlinkage between
the credit and product market) or credit granted on condition the borrower assigns land user
rights to the lender (interlinkage between credit and land market). Interlinked credit
transactions arose because of potential default risks and hence the need for markets to get
interlocked so as to provide insurance against such risks. Interlinked credit transactions not
only act as collateral substitutes but also explain the existence of factor price differentials in
different market segments.
Basu (1983) argued that informal financial markets are characterized by monopolistic
competition. For example, for credit contracts interlinked to the labour market, different
landlords can charge different interest rates to their clients and pay different wages but the
workers will have no incentive to migrate from one landlord to another in search of cheaper
credit due to the existence of transfer costs. On the other hand for credit contracts
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interlinked to the product market, moneylenders can offer farmers different combinations of
interest rates for loans and prices of output marketed through them.
The structuralist hypothesis concludes that informal lenders have sizable comparative
advantages over the formal lenders in engaging in small-scale credit transactions on account
of their lower transaction costs and effective risk management. These include use of
interlinked credit contracts, joint liability contracts, personal knowledge of their borrowers
for effective assessment of risk and debt repayment capacity. This explains the emergence
and co-existence of the formal and informal financial sectors because they have different
cost structures and market niches (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Aryeetey, 1994).
3.3 The Policy of Interlinkage of Formal and Informal Financial Sectors
The policy implication from the structuralist analysis is that financial dualism may be
reduced through promotion of linkages between the formal and informal financial sectors
(Schirmeister and Nadler, 1996; Aryeetey and Nissanke, 1998). The promotion of linkages
can be through banking arrangements where informal lenders deposit mobilized savings
with banks, andlor banks lend to informal lenders for on-lending to their clients. The
informal agents' bank deposits may act as collateral for any borrowing (Jones et al,
1998:105). The other policy option is for the formal banks to adopt the lending practices of
informal lenders so as to serve the smaller borrowers. These include simplification of bank
structures and procedures, provision of appropriate financial services that meet the needs of
the poor (such as small loans, flexible repayment schedules, consumption and production
loans), use of alternative collateral arrangements (household chattels, joint liability
contracts), and use of informal agents as representatives of formal banks to take advantage
of their lower transaction costs and personal contact with the clients. It is hoped that
increased access to formal financial services by the poor will in the long run lead to a
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diminishing of the informal financial sector (Germidis, 1990). The institutionalization of the
informal financial sector through the development of a regulatory framework that allows
licensed informal agents to mobilize public savings is critical in strengthening the linkages
between the two sectors. However the institutionalization process has to follow a financial
systems development approach (Aryeetey and Nissanke, 1998: 118). An example of
Uganda's regulatory framework for the microfinance sector is discussed in section 4.3.4.4.
The development of the social insurance sector is also viewed to be a key strategy in
strengthening the formal and informal financial sector linkages. The presence of
spontaneous savings associations (e.g. savings clubs) is a reflection of the need for social
insurance among the poor, as existing insurance schemes are not accessible to them. Inmost
developing countries, old age insurance schemes are for those in salaried employment, thus
leaving the rural people with no recourse. It is argued that the development of a social
security system or social insurance will act as a substitute for the spontaneous informal
savings associations and will generate stable savings that can be allocated to long-term
investment. The long run effect will be a reduction of the significance of the informal
financial sector. The argument for demanding informal credit as an alternative for insurance
products is further discussed in section 5.2.3.
3.4 Types and Characteristic Features of Informal Financial Institutions
The informal financial sector markets compnse of friends/relatives, moneylenders,
ROSCAs, landlords, savings and credit co-operative societies (Yadav et al, 1992:423) and
microfinance institutions (Aryeetey and Nissanke, 1998:117). The various informal fmancial
sector markets have unique features depending on the degree of their engagement in
resource mobilization and resource allocation, the products offered and the terms of
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contracts (Fernando, 1988). The contract terms vary from interest free credit, subsidized
interest rates, and market interest rates.
3.4.1 Friends and Relatives
The friends and relatives market is characterized by occasional lending using own surplus
funds (Montiel et al, 1993:11). The implication here is that the relatives and friends do not
engage in lending activities on a full time basis. The terms of contract in the friends and
relatives market is usually characterized by interest free and collateral free loans, which
explain the importance of social relationships in that market. The friends and relatives value
more the continuation of existing social relationships and/or strengthening them further. In
rural societies where a number of activities are characterized by reciprocity, provision of
interest free loans by friends and relatives may be interpreted as an attempt to establish
reciprocal obligations on which they can draw in future times of need. The interest free
loans therefore constitute part of a complex social system of spreading risk, as the lenders
are also potential borrowers from the same friends or relatives to whom they lent free of
interest in the past. Though the nominal rate of interest on such loans is zero, the real rate of
interest may be negative depending on the rate of inflation during the period of the loan.
Evidence by Mohieldin and Wright (2000:661) suggested that in Egypt, 90.6% of the credit
from friends, relatives and neighbours was implicitly and explicitly interest free. In addition
92.6% of all the informal credit was collateral free.
The credit from the friends and relatives market is mainly used for smoothing consumption
and for small business loans. The consumption smoothing requirements arise due to income
uncertainty and variability especially in agrarian economies that are subject to production
and price shocks. The consumption requirements may include durable goods purchases,
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education, and marriage. The strong social relationships in the friends and relatives market
ensure that transaction costs and default risks are minimal.
3.4.2 Moneylenders
The moneylenders market is comprised of pawnbrokers, landlords, traders and private
finance companies (Terasnishi, 1994:316). The source of funds that they use for lending
activities may either be own funds or borrowed funds from either the formal or informal
financial markets. The credit contracts in the professional moneylenders market are
characterized by market interest rates which are generally higher than formal sector interest
rates.
Credit is rationally allocated to clients in this market based on risk perceptions and past
performance. The moneylenders have an informational advantage, which gives them a
monopolistic position in the market. This enables them to minimize transaction costs,
default risk and earn rents on the information they possess (see section 3.2.2).
Another common feature in the moneylender market is interlinked credit contracts, which
also reinforces their monopolistic position. The pawnbrokers lend against household
valuables (such as jewellery, gold chains) or assets to minimize default risk. Evidence by
Bagachwa (1995:29) suggested a high level of interlinked credit transactions in the informal
financial sector in Tanzania: 86% of the total volume of credit extended by rural
moneylenders, 87% of all credit from trader-moneylender, 71% of credit from landlords.
Nagarajan et al (1998:356) noted that 92% of the observed credit contracts in the Philippine
credit market were from the moneylenders (mainly traders and farmer lenders). The
informal credit contracts were characterized by interlinkage to the product, labour and/or
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land markets so as to overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems due to
asymmetric information.
Private finance companies mobilize resources for intermediation through a shareholding or
equity arrangement. The clients buy shares from the company, and the pooled resources
constitute a revolving fund that will be used by the company to extend loans both to the
members and non-members. The credit contract terms are purely market interest rates,
commensurate enough to give a good return to the shareholders (Montiel et al, 1993). The
private finance companies emerged as a market response to the desire by economic agents to
invest their surplus funds at market determined interest rates. This was particularly true for
economies with controlled formal sector interest rates coupled with high inflation rates.
3.4.3 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs)
ROSCAs and Accumulated Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRAs) markets are key
components of the rural financial markets (Bouman, 1995:372). ROSCAs are voluntary and
autonomous institutions that are created with unique objectives, rules and organizational
patterns. These are self-regulating groups that may be set up for social or economic
purposes. The ROSCAs are argued to create long-lasting economic relationships to enable
the members to develop their businesses, withstand economic hardships more effectively
and plan for their old age/retirement. The high participation rate of adults in ROSCAs (for
example between 50% - 95% in the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, and Gambia) is
testimony to the importance of this informal institution. In addition, savings mobilized
through ROSCAs account for approximately 8% -10% of GDP in Ethiopia and about 50%
of total savings in India.
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The homogeneity of participants of the ROSCA in terms of socio-economic status is also a
distinguishing feature. The participants may be involved in the same economic activity,
income group or residential area. This homogeneity ensures that members have adequate
information on one another that helps in the self-selection of members to minimize default
risk and transaction costs. Empirical evidence of the homogeneity of ROSCAs was
presented by Bagachwa (1995) who in a survey of 49 ROSCAs in Tanzania found that 33%
were formed from employment relationships, 20% from geographical proximity, 13% from
friendships and 20% from shared housing arrangements.
The ROSCAs undertake financial intermediation through mobilization of savings and credit
allocation. The resource mobilization mechanism takes the form of regular pooling of
savings from the members. The credit allocation mechanism is mainly by lottery, where
credit is allocated to the members on a rotational basis until each person has had a turn. The
advantage of ROSCAs is that it enables members to have quick access to a large sum of
money than when saving individually. The credit contract may either be interest free or
market interest depending on the set rules of the group. Even in the case of interest free
contracts, implicit interest rate is paid by the members in form of foregone interest on
pooled savings deposits over time as one waits for the turn.
The Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRAs) have many similarities with ROSCAs. The
distinguishing features of ASCRAs are that the pooled savings are used as a revolving loan
fund and the credit allocation mechanism is mainly through the bidding process, where the
highest bidder takes the money. The credit contracts in ASCRAs are characterized by
charging market interest rates. Evidence by Bouman (1995:375) suggested that ASCRAs
charge interest rates in the range of 5 - 10% per month. The membership of the ASCRAs is
more heterogeneous with open participation of both the poor and rich.
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3.4.4 Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies and Unions
The savings and credit co-operative societies and unions is a variant of the ROSCAs, which
are registered and governed by legislation such as the co-operatives acts, though generally
not regulated by central banks (Soyibo, 1994: 14). The savings and credit co-operative are
basically membership organizations that operate share capital and deposit accounts. The
mobilized savings constitute a significant proportion of their source of funds for lending.
Savings and credit co-operatives are the shareholders of credit unions, which act as
precursors to peoples' banks. Credit unions usually link small savers with commercial banks
to earn interest on union deposits. They may also use the savings of the union as collateral to
\
obtain loans for on-lending to the members. The screening and lending mechanisms of
savings and credit co-operatives is such that credit is linked to the member's savings. This
enhances the low screening and transaction costs incurred by these informal institutions.
Estimates by Soyibo (1994:46) based on savings and credit co-operatives in Nigeria
suggested that the screening costs were about 0.5% of the loan amount, while the loan
monitoring costs were about 0.1% of the loan amount. The interest rate charged by the
savings and credit co-operatives is generally lower than other informal lenders. Estimates by
Bagachwa (1995:35) suggested that savings and credit co-operatives in Tanzania charged
monthly interest rates of 2.5% as compared to other informal lenders that charged between
5% - 9% per month.
3.4.5 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs)
The Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) market is a new generation of informal financial
institutions providing specialized financial services to small borrowers (Aryeetey and
Nissanke, 1998:117). In the economic regulation era, credit granting Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) emerged and were used by donors to channel subsidized credit to the
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poor for poverty alleviation. The credit granting NGOs were also involved in development
work. Over time there was a shift in donors" focus to the financial sustainability of the credit
granting NGOs as a strategy for sustainable access to financial services by the poor, which
led to the emergence of specialized micro finance institutions (MFls) providing only
financial services. Some of these MFls developed into regulated banks (such Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh, BancoSol in Bolivia, and Bank Rakyat in Indonesia), while some MFls
remained in the unregulated category (such as Foundation for International Community
Assistance [FINCAJ). The MFls were perceived to be a "win-win" situation where both
financial institutions and poor clients would benefit (Morduch, 1999: 1570). The thinking
was that it was a profitable business to lend to the poor despite the high transaction costs and
lack of collateral. The MFls were combining the attributes of both pure commercial banking
(profit making) and the social mission of poverty alleviation. This thinking captured the
attention of both the socialists and the capitalists. The socialist advocates of micro finance
stress such attributes as the "bottom - up" approach, being community based, focus on the
disadvantaged persons especially women, and use of social capital. The capitalists on the
other hand were fascinated by micro finance because it provides prospects for poverty
alleviation while providing incentives to the poor to work as opposed to previous subsidized
credit programmes which created dependency syndromes with no incentives to work. In
addition the capitalists stressed the use of market determined interest rates by MFls.
Following the arguments of Rhyne and Otero (1992) that sustainable poverty alleviation can
only be realized if the lender institutions are financially sustainable, these MFls have
developed unique characteristic features based on the financial systems approach. These
include targeting clients excluded from the formal financial sector, charging market interest
rates, use of group lending techniques, dynamic incentives, regular repayment schedules and
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integration of rural savmgs mobilization as a strategy to improve resource allocation
(Morduch, 1999:1579).
The target group of the MFls are predominantly those among the poor who are perceived by
banks to be risky borrowers due to lack of credible collateral. However the degree to which
the MFls serve the poorest of the poor varies, with some programs like BancoSol targeting
the richest of the poor. The charging of market interest rates by MFls is primarily geared to
attainment of financial sustainability. BancoSol is reported to be charging interest rates of
48% p.a. in an economy with inflation rate of less than 5% p.a. Grameen Bank charged
interest rates of 20% p.a. as opposed to the full cost recovery rates of 32% p.a., while
FINCA charged 4% per month. The success in the attainment of the financial sustainability
goal has been mixed across different MFls. While programs like BancoSol and Bank Rakyat
are reported to be financially sustainable, the majority of the MFls worldwide are just
making progress towards that goal (Morduch, 1999).
The use of group lending techniques as a trademark in most MFls is intended to harness the
local information through the self-selection process of the members so as to eliminate high-
risk borrowers. This group lending methodology, which effectively makes the members co-
signers of the loan, gives incentives for peer monitoring which simultaneously results in
lower transaction costs and high repayment rates for the MFIs. Different MFls have
innovated different modes of group lending. While some use the Grameen Bank model of
lending only to a proportion of group members at a time while conditioning disbursement to
other members of the group to the performance of those who had received the loan earlier,
other programs like BancoSol disburse to all the members simultaneously (Morduch, 1999).
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The use of dynamic incentives is another unique feature of MFls (Braverman and Guasch,
1986:1260). Dynamic incentives is a lending methodology where MFls start off by giving
clients small loan amounts which will then be progressively increased over time subject to
the clients' loan repayment performance. It is argued that progressive lending limits enable
the MFls to develop relationships with clients over time and to screen out the worst cases
before the loan amounts become too big. Braverman and Guasch (1986) pointed out the
shortfalls of dynamic incentives. Firstly, if the lending relationship has a finite end, that is
the borrower knows the maximum loan amount that can ever be got from the MFI, then this
may act as an incentive to default in the final period. In such a scenario the MFls will suffer
huge amounts of default. Secondly, competition among MFls may diminish the power of
dynamic incentives. This is particularly true when MFls struggling to increase their outreach
end by lending to the same clients who have accessed credit from other MFls. Thirdly,
dynamic incentives may work more effectively in rural areas where there is limited mobility
among the clients. In urban areas where there is high mobility, it becomes difficult to trace
the clients who change their rented premises and can easily shift to borrow from other MFls.
Fourthly, the dynamic incentives may be more effective among women who have limited
borrowing alternatives. Despite these shortfalls, dynamic incentives have made a significant
contribution to high repayment rates of MFls.
The use of regular repayment schedules is also a unique lending technology peculiar to
MFls (Park and Ren, 2001 :58). The repayment schedules usually range from weekly to bi-
weekly. The rationale for the regular repayment schedules is to screen out undisciplined
borrowers. In addition it also provides early warning signals to the MFls and the peer group
members of any emerging default problems so as to take timely action. It is also argued that
it conditions households to have a diversified income base to service the loans.
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The MFls mainly use compulsory savings as part of the lending methodology. The
compulsory savings is a proportion of the loan amount, which is deposited with the MFI
upfront. These compulsory savings will not be accessible to the clients until the loan
amounts are fully repaid. Recent development thinking on micro finance argues that the poor
can save and all they need are conveniently located facilities, flexible savings instruments
and positive returns. The new thinking emphasizes that MFls should fully integrate savings
into their operations so as to enhance their sustainability and also develop the households.
From the institutional point of view, savings mobilization will create a cheap source of
funds for on-lending. It also creates a natural pool of clients, as today's savers will be future
borrowers. The savings operations therefore facilitate development of strong relationships
between clients and the institutions. From the point of view of clients, savings operations
give them opportunities to build up their own capital that can be used to finance business
expansion instead of continuously borrowing. Through savings, the clients can also build up
an asset base that can be used as collateral for borrowing from the formal sector when they
need bigger loan amounts than those provided by MFls. The households also get an
opportunity to save for future consumption.
3.5 Conclusion
The main goal of this chapter was to examine why informal financial markets exist, the key
characteristic features of the different informal financial institutions, and how these relate to
the current study.
The theoretical framework for the emergence and co-existence of the informal financial
sector is provided by two competing schools of thought: the financial repression hypothesis
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973), and the structuralist hypothesis (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).
According to the financial repression hypothesis, the informal financial sector emerged due
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to the excess regulation of the formal financial sector through policies like controlled
interest rates, high reserve requirements and sectoral allocation of credit. The effect of these
repressive policies was the creation of excess credit demand for formal credit and the use of
non-price mechanisms to ration credit. As a result those rationed out had to satisfy their
credit requirements in the informal financial sector at very high interest rates. The
conclusion of the repression hypothesis was that the liberalization of the formal financial
sector would result in a transfer of resources from the informal to the formal financial sector,
and consequently a wiping out of the informal financial sector.
The structuralist hypothesis however argued that the informal frnancial sector exists on the
basis of the cost structure that has led to segmentation of the credit market. Informal lenders
have developed cost effective methods of delivering small credit and overcoming the
information asymmetry problems prevalent in rural credit markets as compared to the formal
lenders. The conclusion was that the informal sector can not be wiped out by liberalization
of the formal sector, hence linkages should be developed between the two sectors as they
serve different market segments. The view of this study is that the structuralist hypothesis
more accurately explains the observed phenomenon of the co-existence of formal and
informal financial sectors in LDCs.
The continued existence of the informal financial sector demonstrates the fact that it plays
an important role in providing financial services to economic agents who do not have access
to the formal financial sector. The demand for informal financial services is influenced by
household socio-economic characteristics and other factors, which are to be investigated by
this study. The informal financial sector institutions have also developed mechanisms for
screening borrowers (by use of information collected on borrowers) and the use of collateral
substitutes (such as joint liability contracts and interlinked credit contacts) to minimize the
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default risk. This function is consistent with the role played by the broader fmancial sector
in analyzing potential investment projects so as to increase the efficiency of investment as
previously discussed in section 2.4.2.2. These unique mechanisms also define informal
lenders' response to the borrowers' loan demand, thus influencing their credit rationing
behaviour. The current study also seeks to investigate the specific factors that influence the
informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour in Uganda. The next chapter examines the
structure of Uganda's financial sector.
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CHAPTER 4: UGANDA'S FINANCIAL SECTOR
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to relate all the literature so far reviewed to the developments
in the Ugandan financial sector and how it fits into the important question of credit demand
and credit rationing in the informal financial sector. A number of conclusions have so far
been derived from the literature review. First, the financial sector (broadly defined to
include the formal and informal financial sectors) plays an important role in the mobilization
and allocation of resources to promote economic growth, mainly through the channels of the
volume of investment and the efficiency of investment. Secondly, two different policy
regimes have been implemented in LDCs in the quest to promote economic growth, which
had implications for the informal financial sector. The policy regimes comprised of
economic regulation with non-market oriented policy instruments, and liberalization policies
which emphasized the use of market-oriented financial and monetary policy instruments.
Thirdly, the informal financial sector co-exists alongside its formal counterpart, hence the
need for interlinkages to broaden the financial sector. Fourthly, financial regulation is
important to maintain the stability of the financial sector and for consumer protection.
Fifthly, informal fmancial institutions use cost effective techniques in the delivery of credit
in small amounts, which includes among others the use of collateral substitutes (such as
joint liability contracts and interlinked credit contracts).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 gives an overview of the structure
of Uganda's financial sector, section 4.3 discusses the performance of Uganda's financial
sector over the various policy regimes including regulatory frameworks, and section 4.4
concludes.
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4.2 The Structure of Uganda's Financial Sector
Uganda's financial system comprises of the formal and informal fmancial sectors. The
formal financial sector comprises the Bank of Uganda (Central Bank), 18 commercial banks,
7 credit institutions, 3 development banks, 26 insurance companies, one leasing company
and one National Social Security Fund (Katimbo-Mugwanya, 1999:20). The informal
financial sector includes relatives and friends, moneylenders, co-operative savings and credit
societies, rotating savings and credit associations, community based organizations and non-
government organizations (Wamasembe, 2001:14). While the formal financial sector is
regulated under the Financial Institutions Statute of 1993 (which regulates banks, credit
institutions, and insurance companies), the informal financial sector has largely been
unregulated until the recent enactment of the Microfinance Deposit-taking Institutions Act,
2003. Only the deposit-taking micro finance institutions will be regulated under the MDI Act
(2003), while the non-deposit institutions will be self-regulated under an industry-based
umbrella organization.
4.3 The Performance of Uganda's Financial System
The performance of Uganda's financial system will be discussed in the context of two
distinctive policy regimes: non-market oriented financial and monetary policies (economic
regulation, 1962 - 1986), and market oriented financial and monetary policies (financial
sector reforms, 1987 - 2004), and the implications of the two policy regimes for the
informal financial sector will be spelled out.
4.3.1 Uganda's Financial Sector in the Economic Regulation Period
The period 1962 - 1986 was characterized by non-market oriented financial and monetary
policy regimes. The policies that government adopted included the creation and
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management of public sector banks (for example Uganda Commercial Bank), control of
interest rates (both deposit and lending interest rates), credit allocation to priority sectors,
partial nationalization of foreign banks and control of foreign exchange rates.
Bategeka (1999a: 9) argued that the financial sector was highly directed with
administratively fixed interest rates and credit allocation that compromised the resource
mobilization and allocation efficiency of the financial system. The non-market oriented
financial and monetary policies created inefficiencies within the financial system.
The weak financial state of the public sector banks led the Central Bank to compromise on
its function of effective conduct of monetary policy, which partly contributed to inflationary
pressures experienced in the economy. The public sector banks relied on Bank of Uganda
for liquidity support, leading to more money being put into circulation. The easy access to
liquidity support by public sector banks from the Central Bank diminished any incentives to
improve performance. The Banking Act of 1969 also undermined the authority of Bank of
Uganda by the requirement to consult the Minister of Finance on key policy issues such as
prudential matters and licensing of banks. The financial sector was therefore very weak and
unable to efficiently perform its desired functions of resource mobilization and allocation.
Muwanga (2000) further argued that the weak internal control systems of banks, coupled
with the weak supervisory function of Bank of Uganda, led to unprecedented malpractices
such as excessive insider lending, lending without adequate collateral, fraud and forgery.
The local banks were therefore weak and grossly undercapitalized, as the capitalization
levels stipulated by the Banking Act of 1969 had been eroded by inflation. It was in the
spirit of addressing these weaknesses in the banking systems worldwide that the Basel
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Accord of 1988 (referred to in section 2.5.4.2) was designed. The specific capital adequacy
requirements that were adopted in Uganda are discussed in section 4.3.2.
The informal financial sector institutions that existed in the economic regulation period were
mainly the relatives/friends, moneylenders, savings and credit associations/co-operatives,
and credit granting NGOs. The co-operative savings and credit societies/unions were
governed by the Co-operative Act of 1964, but not supervised by the Central Bank, while no
law governed the other categories of informal financial institutions. The powers of
registration and supervision of the co-operative institutions lay with the Minister of Co-
operatives and Marketing. The co-operative savings and credit societies/unions provided
financial services to their members at controlled interest rates. The co-operatives sector was
also characterized by mismanagement and corruption that led to its collapse in the late
1990's (Wamasembe, 2001). The co-operative savings and credit societies mainly mobilized
resources for lending operations from their members. The credit granting NGOs emerged as
a response to the donors' desire to have alternative institutions to channel development
finance directly to the beneficiaries (discussed further in section 4.3.4.1).
4.3.2 The Financial Sector Reforms
As stated earlier, government interference in financial markets sparked off a debate in the
1970's championed by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) who argued that these policies
were repressive and a disincentive to savings with negative effects on long-run economic
growth. The policy advice based on the McKinnon-Shaw school of thought was the adoption
of market oriented financial and monetary policies, which entailed the liberalization of the
financial sector. This new thinking greatly influenced the design of Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. The financial sector reforms were part of the broader SAPs initiated in Uganda in
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1987 under the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). The objective of ERP was to remove
all distortions within the economy so as to enhance market forces in the mobilization and
allocation of resources (Bategeka, 1999a: 6).
The financial sector reforms that were introduced in 1991 and funded under the Financial
Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC) had three critical components which included the review
of the Banking Act of 1969, institutional reforms and financial sector liberalization
(Tumusiime-Mutebile (2001, Muwanga, 2000).
4.3.2.1 Review of the Banking Act, 1969
The Banking Act of 1969 stipulated very low capitalization levels for financial institutions
and their capitalization levels were furthermore eroded by high inflation. The Banking Act
of 1969 had also invested a lot of powers in the Minister of Finance to decide on key issues
regarding prudential regulation of financial institutions, thereby denying the Central Bank of
much needed autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy.
As a result of the review of the Banking Act of 1969, two new statutes were passed in 1993:
the Financial Institutions Statute (FIS) and the Bank of Uganda (BOU) Act, both of 1993
(Government of Uganda, 1993). The Bank of Uganda Act (1993) gave the Central Bank the
powers to discipline financial institutions that flout the law or its prudential regulations
and/or become insolvent. It is as a result of this new mandate that the Bank of Uganda used
its powers in the resolution of failed banks such as International Credit Bank, Greenland
Bank and Co-operative Bank. The Financial Institutions Statute (FIS 1993) also gave BOU
more independence in the licensing and regulation of financial institutions, and in issuing
prudential regulations related to capital adequacy, liquidity and reporting requirements.
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The FIS (1993) stipulated capital adequacy requirements for financial institutions which
were consistent with the minimum standards spelled out in the Basle Accord of 1988
(discussed in section 2.5.4.2), and reflected the country's specific risks. Under the Basle
Accord of 1988, each country was free to fix their capital adequacy ratios, but subject to the
minimum standards and the severity of financial instability concerns. In the case of Uganda,
minimum capital requirements were set as follows: Foreign Commercial banks Shs1 billion;
Local Commercial banks ShsO.5billion; Non-bank financial intermediaries ShsO.3billion.
In addition there was the on-going capital reserve requirement that was equivalent to 10% of
the risk-weighted assets. In January 2000 Bank of Uganda, through the Statutory Capital
adequacy instrument, raised the minimum capital requirements to Shs2 billion for all
commercial banks (and 4 billion by 2003) and Shs1 billion for all other financial
institutions. The rationale for the enhanced capital adequacy requirement was to give
appropriate incentives to the owners of financial institutions to undertake prudent
management so as to minimize costly bank failures. In addition the enhanced capital
adequacy requirements would provide a cushion for banks to absorb any losses
commensurate with the risks and safeguard depositors' funds. Higher minimum capital
requirements would also discourage entrance into the financial sector by entities with a
weak financial base (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2001).
4.3.2.2 Institutional Reforms
The institutional reforms focused on two components, namely restructuring the Bank of
Uganda to strengthen the supervision function and divestiture of the Public Sector
Commercial banks (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2002:8). The strengthening of the supervisory
function of the Central Bank was intended to ensure commercial banks' compliance with the
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law and to minimize bank failures that emanate from internal mismanagement of financial
institutions. The prudential regulatory function of Bank of Uganda focused on proper
categorization of financial assets (especially the loan portfolio) and loan loss provisioning to
avoid misrepresentations in financial statements, adequate disclosure of financial
information (by ensuring that financial statements are prepared in accordance with
international accounting standards), governance and management issues (by ensuring that
the shareholders of a bank are not from one family or merely one person as was the case
with defunct International Credit Bank and also ensuring that Senior Managers are
technically competent), internal control systems (to curb financial malpractices like insider
lending, credit concentration), timely intervention and resolution of failed banks.
The divestiture of government interests in public sector commercial banks was intended to
reduce government interference in the management of financial institutions. As pointed out
earlier, government involvement in management of loss making public sector banks with
huge non-performing assets was disastrous to the development of an efficient financial
sector. Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) was divested to a strategic investor, Standard Bank
Investments Corporation (Stanbic) of South Africa, in February 2002. The residual role of
government was to provide a conducive environment for the efficient functioning of the
financial sector through an appropriate regulatory framework (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2002).
4.3.2.3 Financial Sector Liberalization
The financial liberalization component included the decontrol of interest and foreign
exchange rates, abolition of the credit allocation system and any forms of financial
repression. Liberalizing interest rates and foreign exchange rates was systematic and
gradual. The first stage of the interest rate liberalization process was the indexation of
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interest rates to the Treasury Bill (TB) rate. The Treasury Bill (TB) market was introduced
in 1992 and lending and bank deposit rates were linked to the 91-day TB rate. The time
deposit rates were subject to minimum limits and lending rates to agriculture were subject to
a ceiling.
The major instrument that BOU used for the conduct of monetary policy was the Treasury
Bill (TB), with commercial banks being major players in the TB market. Bank of Uganda
also adopted the Reserve Money Programme (RMP) in 1993 as a tool to guide monetary
policy. Under the RMP, a desired path of money supply was determined at the beginning of
the financial year, and intervention in the market would be undertaken to minimize the
deviations of liquidity levels from the desired path. If the money supply level exceeded the
desired path (for example through increased donor inflows), the BOU would mop up the
excess liquidity through Open Market Operations using the Treasury Bill instrument,
thereby averting inflationary pressures. The reverse action would be undertaken in the event
of the money supply level being lower than the desired path. In 1996 BOU developed its
own instrument, the BOU Bill, to support the Treasury Bill in the implementation of
monetary policy. BOU also institutionalized a Central Depository System (CDS) and a
Repurchase Agreement Market (REPO) to facilitate secondary trading and flexible open
market operations. The resultant effect of these policy measures was control of the rate of
inflation that supported macro-economic stability.
However the net effect of the reliance on the Treasury Bill (TB) as an instrument of
monetary policy was high domestic interest rates and the crowding out of private sector
credit. The crowding out of private sector credit arose because the commercial banks that
participated in the TB market found it more lucrative to invest in TBs rather than lend to the
private sector due to low default risks and transaction costs. The rapid expansion of the
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informal financial sector in Uganda following the liberalization of the formal financial
sector may be partly explained by the crowding out effect due to the use of the TB as a key
instrument in the conduct of monetary policy.
The fixed foreign exchange rate system was abolished and replaced by the inter-bank market
that was created in 1993 to which the exchange rates were linked. Under the inter-bank
market arrangement, it was only the banks that participated in the foreign exchange market,
where the exchange rate was determined by forces of demand and supply. The interest rates
and exchange rates were fully liberalized in 1994 and all restrictions on commercial bank
operations (such as credit allocations) were eliminated. Government borrowing from the
banking sector also witnessed a downward trend. The fmancial sector liberalization also
involved the liberalization of the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments,
which enabled Uganda to attain "Article 8 status of the IMF .... Convertibility of the Uganda
Shillings isfully guaranteed" (Bategeka, 1999b: 13).
However, the BOU had to regularly intervene in the foreign exchange market to minimize
the high exchange rate variability that emerged from speculative activities. In addition, the
intervention in foreign exchange markets was done as part of monetary policy management
policy to mop up excess liquidity created by Government spending. Government received
donor budget support in foreign currency, which averaged 10% of GDP in the 1990's and
rose to about 13% of GDP for the period 200112 to 2003/4. This support was mainly from
the debt relief funds under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (EHIPC) initiatives for poverty reduction programs. These
large external aid inflows increased money supply beyond money demand levels, hence
BOU had to intervene in the foreign exchange market to sterilize the effects of excess
money supply (Muwanga, 2000).
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intermediation margins, low savings rates, and inefficiencies in the payment system.
4.3.3 The Challenges in the Financial Sector in the Post- Reform Period
The key challenges in the financial sector after liberalization included among others the high
4.3.3.1 High Intermediation Margins
High intermediation margins" continue to characterize Uganda's financial system, despite
liberalization. As can be seen from Appendix 2, average intermediation margins rose from
6% in the economic regulation period to 10% in the post-liberalization period. As earlier
pointed out, one of the cardinal objectives of the financial sector reforms was to improve the
efficiency of financial markets through the liberalization of interest rates. The expectation
was that liberalization would lead to a reduction. in the intermediation margins due to
increased competition and efficiency within the fmancial system. In the first instance, the
removal of interest rate controls was expected to enable financial intermediaries to charge
market lending rates which would increase their profitability and capacity to pay higher
deposit rates to savers. Secondly the removal of barriers to entry to the banking sector were
also expected to lead to increased competition within the banking sector which would result
in financial institutions striving to improve the efficiency of their operations to survive the
stiff competition. The expected result was a reduction in the lending interest rates in a bid to
attract more business and an increase in the deposit rates so as to attract more deposits,
thereby leading to a reduction in the intermediation margins.
Tumusiime- Mutebile (2002) argued that the high intermediation margins are structural in
nature, especially as a result of the accumulation of large non-performing assets by banks in
the 1980's, where the high lending rates were geared to cover those losses. However a
6 Intermediation margin is defined as the difference between the bank lending rates (for loans/overdrafts) and the
deposit rates paid to savers.
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number of policy measures have already been undertaken to address the high costs of
intermediation which include: strengthening of the legal system to improve the loan
recovery rates and reduce forgeries and fraud, establishment of a credit reference bureau at
the Uganda Institute of Bankers, mandatory publicizing of all charges and interest rates by
Commercial banks (to remove information asymmetries between banks and their clients, and
to shape up rational business expectations to enhance efficiency and transparency in the
financial system), strengthening the supervision and regulation of the banking system, and
reducing the bulk of government domestic arrears that has negatively impacted on lending to
the private sector. The high lending rates constrain long-term productive investment, hence
may stifle economic growth. To this end, it can be argued that Uganda's fmancial system is
inefficient because of prevailing high intermediation margins.
Bategeka (1999a) further argued that the continued existence of high financial
intermediation margins is accounted for by the high operational costs and limited
competition within the banking sector. In an attempt to break-even, the banks are forced to
maintain high lending rates. The existence of few financial intermediaries portrays
oligopolistic tendencies within the financial system. The limited competition within the
financial system acts as a disincentive to banks to improve their efficiency that can lead to a
reduction in the financial intermediation margins.
4.3.3.2 Low Savings Rates
The commercial banks' deposits (demand and time deposits) as a proportion of GDP, rose
marginally from 7% in the economic regulation period to 8% in the post-liberalization
period, suggesting the existence of large cash transactions outside the banking system (see
Appendix 2). This may be explained by some of the developments in the financial sector
that may have hurt public confidence in the banking system, which include the conversion
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tax levied during the currency reform of 1987, the collapse of some banks in the 1990' s, and
the urban bias in the location of commercial banks (Chemonges, 1999). The currency reform
involved striking off two zeros plus a conversion tax of 30% on all financial assets (cash,
bank deposits, and financial investments such as in Treasury Bills). For example, if
someone had Shs1000 in old currency, he/she would get Shs7 in the new currency. The
conversion tax, whose utilization was not adequately explained to the public, hurt
confidence in the banking system.
The other incident that hurt public confidence in the banking system was the closure of
insolvent banks as part of the financial sector reforms. Under the Deposit Insurance Scheme
the Central Bank was under obligation to refund depositors up to Shs3 million per account,
implying that those that had more than Shs3 million at the time of bank closure would lose
the difference. For the initial batch of banks that were closed (such as Teefe Bank), the
policy of refunding depositors' funds up to the maximum insured limit was strictly adhered
to. But the government decision to refund 100% of depositors' funds for the three banks
closed in 1998/99 (namely Co-operative Bank, Greenland Bank and International Credit
Bank) may be seen as an attempt to restore public confidence in the banking system. This
however cost the taxpayer over shs100 billion (approximately 1.2% ofGDP in 1999/2000).
Most of the formal financial institutions are urban based, leaving the rural areas largely
under-banked and under-served such that approximately 87% of the rural households do not
have bank accounts (MFPED, 2000). The urban location of commercial banks makes the
savings services inaccessible to the majority of the rural population.
80
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.3.3.3 Weaknesses in the Payment System
The payment system is viewed to be inefficient and underdeveloped. The weak legal and
regulatory framework is argued to be among the main factors that constrain the development
of an efficient payment system in Uganda (Chemonges, 1999; Mwebya, 2001). The laws
governing the payment system in Uganda are not integrated in one instrument but spread
across several laws. For example, the Bills of Exchange Act governs the usage of bills of
exchange including cheques, while the Financial Institutions Statute governs the licensing,
operations and supervision of all deposit-taking institutions. The other relevant laws include
the Bank of Uganda Statute, the Capital Markets Authority Statute, the Evidence Act, the
Penal Code section on false cheques, the Companies Act, the Bankruptcy Act, and the
Deeds of Arrangement Act. As a result of the multiplicity of relevant laws, no single law
governs the payment system (including modem payment technologies and payment cards) in
the country. In addition, the bureaucratic and inefficient judicial system weakens the
effective conflict resolution process and acts as a constraint to the development of an
efficient payment system.
4.3.4 Implications of Different Policy Regimes on the Informal Financial Sector
The developments in the financial sector under the different policy regimes had a number of
implications for the informal financial sector, including the emergence of credit granting
NGOs, rapid expansion of the informal financial sector following liberalization of the
formal financial sector, emergence of specialized MFIs, and development of a regulatory
framework for deposit-taking microfinance institutions.
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4.3.4.1 Emergence of Credit Granting NGOs
Economic regulation created inefficiencies within the financial system through
mismanagement of public sector banks (state owned commercial banks and development
banks) and high default risk. The public sector banks were grossly mismanaged as the
managers were cronies of the political powers of the day and cared less about prudential
management of their banks. The public sector banks made huge losses that were subsidized
by the Treasury and had a high proportion of non-performing assets. The non-performing
assets were the result of loans being given on political lines and not on a proper evaluation
of the viability of the investment projects. The non-performing assets had to be transferred
to a Non-Performing Assets Trust (NPART) for recovery (Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2000).
The implication of the poor performance of the public sector banks during the economic
regulation period was the emergence of credit granting NGOs (mainly foreign NGOs
operating in Uganda) as alternatives through which donors channeled development
assistance directly to the poor. This is consistent with the observations made by Schoombee
(1998) that NGOs (with commitment to social welfare goals, their non-profit orientation,
their closeness to the community, and their high level of motivation) presented a viable
alternative to development banks. These NGOs provided microfinance as part of the broader
development programmes (such as health, education, advocacy) at subsidized interest rates.
4.3.4.2 Rapid Expansion of Microfinance Institutions
The financial repression hypothesis by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), referred to in
section 3.2.1, had argued that the inefficient informal fmancial sector created through
economic regulation would be wiped out through liberalization of the formal sector.
However the observed rapid expansion of informal financial institutions following financial
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sector liberalization in Uganda lends more credence to the structuralist hypothesis (Hoff and
Stiglitz, 1990). The financial sector reforms (earlier discussed in section 4.3.2) resulted in
the closure of failed banks and the divestiture of state-owned banks which left most of the
rural areas unbanked. The re-structuring of UCB, for example, resulted in the closure of
non-viable branches that were mainly located in the rural areas (Bategeka, 1999b: 14). The
MFls therefore emerged to fill the vacuum in financial service delivery created by financial
sector reforms, especially in rural areas. While estimates by Katimbo-Mugwanya (1999)
indicated that there were 79 registered MFls in the late nineties, Ledgerwood et al (2002 :21)
indicated that there were about 500 MFls by the early years of the new millenium. The
difference in the two estimates may be accounted for by the registration status, where
Ledgerwood et al (2002) includes all MFls irrespective of whether they have any form of
registration or not. Registration here refers to having a legal status by being registered as a
company (limited by guarantee or shares), registered with the NGO Board or registered
under the Co-operative Act. Some MFls (for example Community-Based Organizations,
church-based credit schemes) do not have any legal status.
According to Hannig and Bohnstedt (1999:24), the MFls provide financial services
especially to small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) owned by the poor, which
MFPED (2001a) argues contributes to poverty alleviation. Microfinance has been argued to
have evolved as an economic development approach intended to benefit low income people.
This has been recognized in Uganda's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), where the
use of microfinance and other tools to enhance the capacity of the poor to engage in
sustainable productive activities have been identified as a poverty reduction strategy.
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4.3.4.3 Evolution of Specialized Microfinance Institutions
Liberalization of the financial sector in Uganda also led to the emergence of specialized
micro finance institutions providing only financial services (savings and credit) as opposed
to a myriad of development services. Following the arguments of Rhyne and Otero (1992),
the focus of attention within the international donor community shifted to sustainability of
micro finance institutions and using a market based approach in the delivery of services (for
example, charging of market interest rates). The rationale was that sustainable institutions
provide the poor with sustainable access to credit, thus contributing to poverty alleviation in
the long run. The specialized MFIs that emerged on the Ugandan scene were either
completely new entities (such as Uganda Women's Finance Trust, Foundation for
International Community Assistance - FINCA) or institutions created from existing old
NGOs involved in development work. An example of such is Micro Enterprise
Development Network (MEDNET), which is subsidiary company incorporated by World
Vision International to manage the credit programme, while the parent NGO continues with
development work.
4.3.4.4 Regulatory Framework for the Microfinance Sector
The liberalization of the formal financial sector and the rapid expansion of the informal
financial sector created the motivation to regulate the informal financial sector so as to
maintain the stability of the financial system and to protect consumers (which arguments are
similar to those referred to in section 2.5.1). Previously, MFIs operated outside the
regulatory framework of the Financial Institutions Statute (FIS) 7 of 1993, though they
provided both savings and credit services. Some MFIs were mobilizing client deposits either
as part of their lending methodology (compulsory savings linked to loans) or for safe
7 The Financial Institutions Statute of J 993 regulates financial institutions that include Banks, Insurance firms and
Credit Institutions in Uganda.
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custody that they kept on their bank accounts with commercial banks. Some MFIs were
intermediating these public deposits contrary to the provisions of the FIS of 1993. Bank of
Uganda (BOU) got concerned about the safety of these public savings, which concern was
heightened by the commercial bank failures that had hit the financial system in the 1990's
(Katimbo-Mugwanya, 1999; Hannig and Bohnstedt, 1999).
A consultative process was put in place to design the regulatory framework for the
microfinance sector. The key players in the consultative process included Bank of Uganda
(as the regulator of the financial system), microfinance practitioners, policy makers and
development partners. The policy framework was designed with the overriding goal that
micro finance must be run as a business and that the safety of public deposits must be
guaranteed. For this reason, the critical issues that were covered in the micro finance policy
included sustainability and outreach, capital adequacy requirements, liquidity requirements,
ownership and governance (Bank of Uganda, 1999). The MDI8 Act (2003) was subsequently
enacted by parliament and promulgated into law in May 2003 (Government of Uganda,
2003).
The financial sustainability issue concerns the ability of the MFls to sustain their operations
from internally generated revenues. The argument for emphasis on financial sustainability is
that it guarantees continuity of access to financial services by the poor. Of course financial
sustain ability actually is all about profitability, which is expected to have a number of
positive effects on the development of the microfinance sector. First the more profitable the
MFI operations, the higher will be the stake of the shareholders and the more they will take
all actions to safeguard the collapse of such institutions. These range from design of policies
and procedures that enhance the sustainability of the MFls, hiring competent staff to manage
8 MDI refers to the Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions
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the MFIs, monitoring and supervising the senior management, and maintaining a high
portfolio quality. Secondly since the licensed MFIs will be allowed to intermediate public
deposits, the sustainability of the MFIs will ensure the safety of public deposits. The
shareholders will take prudent decisions that will ensure the safety of public deposits. It
should be noted that sustainability of MFIs is directly linked to the stability and broadening
of the financial system. The act of deposit-taking entails accepting the risk that these public
deposits can be lost either in the process of safekeeping or through intermediation. So the
BOU policy clearly focused on the safety of these deposits through profitability of MFI
operations to enhance the stability of the financial system.
The policy on adequate capitalization of MFIs also relates to the safety of public deposits.
Because of the potential risk of loss of public deposits, the shareholders of the deposit-
taking MFIs will be required to put up sufficient capital to be able to absorb any losses
without encroaching on depositors' funds. The capital requirements will in addition act as an
incentive to the owners of these institutions to prudentially manage the depositors' funds
because they have a stake in the operations. It is argued that there is a positive relationship
between capital requirements and sustainability of the financial institution. The MDI Act
(2003) therefore stipulated the minimum paid up capital for deposit-taking MFIs to be
shs500 million to be invested in liquid assets in Uganda approved by the Bank: of Uganda. In
addition, there are provisions for on-going capital requirements that are based on risk-
weighted assets. The core capital adequacy ratio must at any point not be less than fifteen
per cent of the risk-weighted assets, while the total capital adequacy ratio must not be less
than twenty per cent of the risk-weighted assets.
The liquidity requirements policy was based on the rationale that failure to have adequate
liquidity could threaten the stability of deposit-taking MFls. This was because the duration
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of MFI deposits is more likely to be on the lower end of the spectrum, hence the need to
have higher liquidity ratios as compared to formal commercial banks so as to meet the client
cash withdrawal requirements. The minimum liquidity requirements shall be determined by
the Central Bank in the detailed regulations ofMFIs.
The ownership and governance policy indicate the need for MFIs to have good corporate
structures that can stand the challenges of intermediation. The deposit -taking MFIs will be
required under the new law to change their legal status from being companies limited by
guarantee to companies limited by shares as a precondition for licensing. Though most MFIs
are already registered as companies limited by guarantee, the contention with this legal
structure is that the owners cannot be identified in cases of resolution of the institution. The
stipulated shareholding arrangement in the MDI Act (2003) is that no one person or group of
persons shall be allowed to own more than thirty per cent of the shares of the MFIs unless
approved by the Central Bank. This however does not apply to the holding or acquisition of
shares in the MFIs by a wholly owned subsidiary of a bank licensed under the Financial
Institutions Statute, 1993 or by a reputable financial institution, or in exceptional cases, a
reputable public company (Government of Uganda, 2003).
From the examination of the MDI Act 2003, it is clear that the prudential regulatory
measures that are stipulated are similar to those of the formal financial sector, with slight
variations in capital adequacy requirements. This clearly demonstrates that the micro finance
sector is an important component of the financial sector, whose performance could have far
reaching implications for the financial system.
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4.3.5 Potential Implications of the MDI Act (2003) for the Microfinance Sector
The MDI Act (2003) has a number of potential effects on the micro finance sector (Okurut et
al, 2004a). The MDI Act (2003) classifies players in the micro finance industry into four
different tiers. Tier 1 is the formal commercial banks and Tier 2 is the credit institutions
(such as housing finance, capital finance company, insurance companies) registered under
the Financial Institutions Statute of 1993. Tier 3 will consist of deposit-taking MFIs that will
be licensed and supervised by the Central Bank. The Tier 3 MFIs will be allowed to take
public deposits and intermediate them. The Tier 4 MFIs will not be regulated by the Central
Bank and will not be allowed to accept and intermediate deposits. The Tier 4 MFIs will be
self-regulated under a membership based umbrella organization that will set performance
standards such as reporting, portfolio quality and best practices (Namara et aI, 2003:8). The
Tier 4 MFIs will be the credit-only institutions such that even if they take compulsory
savings as part of their methodology, they are not allowed to intermediate those savings.
Because all institutions in Tier 3 are legally allowed to take public deposits for
intermediation, it raises the opportunity for a cheaper source of capital. This has the
potential effect of enhancing the profitability and sustainability levels of MFIs by lowering
the cost of funds. The challenge however raised by the MDI Act (2003) relates to the
number of MFIs that are likely to meet the licensing requirements and qualify to be in Tier
3. Ledgerwood et al (2002) estimated that very few MFIs (less than 5) are likely to meet the
licensing requirements in the short-term and most of them will remain in Tier 4. This raises
specific challenges relating to access to savings services by the rural poor. As discussed
earlier, the financial sector reforms resulted in the closure of non-profitable rural bank
branches thereby creating a vacuum of financial service delivery to the poor. The
implementation of the MDI Act (2003) implies that the rural poor who had hitherto
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depended on MFIs for savings services will be denied that facility in the short-run since the
Tier 4 MFIs will not be legally allowed to accept public savings.
Wamatsembe (2001) has also observed that micro finance best practice MFIs tend to operate
only in urban and peri-urban areas (usually within a radius of 5 kilometers from town
centers) to minimize the large transaction costs that are associated with rural credit
operations. It is these microfinance best practice MFls that have a higher probability of
being licensed under the MDI Act (2003).
To counter this potential negative effect of having no branch networks of deposit-taking
MFIs in rural areas, the Government of Uganda established the Microfinance Outreach Plan
(MOP) under the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) to
coordinate the industry, with various forms of institutional support services from the donor
community (Okurut et aI, 2004b). The key elements of MOP's vision for the microfmance
industry over the five years include: (i) providing a conducive environment for expansion,
growth and professionalizing the micro finance industry, (ii) motivating best practice MFIs
to expand their services to the underserved rural areas using market oriented incentives, and
(iii) bridging the financial services gap between formal and informal services providers by
supporting interlinkages among the tiers of players in the fmancial industry.
One of the components of the MOP is the Matching Grants for Capacity Building (MCAP)
which is a market oriented incentive package to motivate best practice MFls to expand their
services to the under-banked areas, especially the rural areas that were greatly affected by
the financial sector reforms that led to closure of some banks and/or branch networks. The
incentives include the refund of genuine losses incurred for a fixed period of time (first two-
years losses proposed) as a result of opening a new branch in a rural remote area, and
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provision of grants (for infrastructure, product development, staff capacity building). The
infrastructure to be covered relates to the new rural remote branches, which include
buildings, computers, safes, and motorcycles. The design of MCAP is such that the costs
shall be shared between MCAP and the MFIs, with the grant funding declining over time.
The delivery mechanism for capacity building services will be market oriented, where the
private sector agents will be the service providers (constituting the supply side) and the
MFIs constituting the demand side. The prices for the capacity building services rendered to
MFIs (consultancy fees) will therefore be determined by forces of demand and supply. So
one of the objectives of MCAP is to build the capacity of private sector service providers, so
as to increase the supply side and enhance competition in service delivery, and thereby
enhance efficiency. Through this incentive mechanism, the few MFIs that will be able to
meet the licensing requirements will be motivated to extend their branch networks to the
rural areas and fill the gaps created by the financial sector reforms (Okurut et al, 2004b).
The MDI Act (2003) places too much emphasis on financial sustainability, thus requiring
microfinance to be run as businesses generating profits. The new profit orientation implies
that MFIs have to separate the NGO social program from the credit program. While
development work may continue targeting all clients including the poorest of the poor (the
most vulnerable in society), the credit program may only target the "the economically active
poor" as their market niche. The economically active poor are those who have the capacity
to repay loans, which may include the richest of the poor and even the non-poor. The
challenge is how the welfare of the poorest of the poor (the core poor) will be enhanced
given the fact that they may be rationed out by both the formal financial and Microfinance
institutions.
90
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter had set out to examine the structure of Uganda's financial sector and the
implications of the different policies in the economic regulation and liberalization periods on
the informal financial sector.
Economic regulation pursued from the 1960's to 1986 resulted in the inefficiency of
Uganda's financial sector as reflected by the high non-performing assets and the heavy
losses of the public sector banks (state owned commercial banks and development banks),
which had to rely on subsidies from the Treasury over the period. This led to the emergence
of credit granting NGOs which the donors used as an alternative to channel development
finance directly to the beneficiaries.
The financial sector liberalization policies resulted in the expansion of the informal financial
sector in Uganda contrary to the predictions of the financial repression hypothesis
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). The conclusion is that the continued co-existence of the
informal financial sector alongside its formal counterpart even after liberalization is best
explained by the structuralist hypothesis (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990).
In the Ugandan case, financial regulation covers both the formal fmancial sector (The
Financial Institutions Statute of 1993) and the micro finance deposit-taking institutions (The
MDI Act of 2003). This is important for the stability of the financial system and customer
protection. The informal financial sector has been recognized by the policy makers as
playing a key role in the poverty alleviation process through the provision of microfmance
to the poor (MFPED, 2001 a), which makes the study of the determinants of informal credit
demand and credit rationing very relevant.
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In summary, it can be argued that a vibrant informal financial sector exists in Uganda and it
serves a unique market niche of small borrowers/savers. The questions that arise and are
addressed in subsequent chapters are: What factors influence households' demand for credit
in the informal financial sector? What factors influence the lenders' response to the
borrowers' loan demand and subsequent credit rationing behaviour? What should be done to
improve households' access to the broader financial sector?
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CHAPTER 5: DETERMINANTS OF INFORMAL CREDIT DEMAND
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key determinants of informal credit demand
that are reported in the empirical literature. In addition, alternative econometric models will
be identified from which an appropriate model can be selected for this study. While a large
number of empirical studies on informal credit demand has been done the world over, the
literature reviewed was mainly from LDCs because of its relevance to Uganda.
The McKinnon - Shaw hypothesis (discussed in section 3.2.1) postulated that the demand
for informal credit is a function of repressive policies in the formal financial sector, where
economic agents rationed out of the formal sector had to meet their credit needs at high
interest rates in informal markets. It was argued that liberalization of the formal financial
sector would increase its efficiency in resource mobilization and allocation, which would in
turn diminish the demand for informal credit in the long run. The structuralist hypothesis
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990), referred to in section 3.2.2, however argued that the demand for
informal credit would continue to exist even if the formal financial sector is liberalized, due
to market deficiencies and information asymmetries that have resulted in credit market
segmentation.
Transaction costs define the market niches for different lenders. For the formal lenders, the
transaction costs of engaging in small credit transactions are too high, thus this category of
clients are better served by informal lenders who have developed cost-effective mechanisms
for small credit delivery. The formal and informal financial sectors will continue to co-exist
over time as they have different market niches, thus a continuous demand for informal
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sector credit. The specific question that arises and is addressed in this chapter is what
specific factors determine households' informal credit demand.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 presents a discussion of why
informal credit is demanded, section 5.3 presents an overview of empirical studies reviewed
and section 5.4 discusses the determinants of informal credit demand.
5.2 Informal credit demand
Rural households and other low income households typically have inadequate access to
formal sector credit as they are considered to be risky borrowers due to lack of acceptable
collateral. Due to the small size of loans demanded by small borrowers, the formal financial
sector institutions are also unwilling to lend because of high transaction costs. In addition,
the high variability of rural household incomes due to their dependence on agriculture,
which is prone to both exogenous production and price shocks, makes formal financial
institutions rate them as highly risky. High income variability is indicative of the low
repayment capacity of such rural households. For these reasons, rural households mainly
depend on the informal financial sector to meet their credit needs. Estimates by Adugna and
Heidhues (2000:27) suggest that approximately 84% of the credit disbursements to rural
households in Etiopiacome from informal sources. Informal credit, it is argued, is in demand
for production and consumption purposes as well as an alternative insurance product.
5.2.1 Informal Credit Demanded for Production Purposes
The demand for informal production credit is a derived demand for factors of production
(Batterham and Majid, 1987:292). This demand depends on the demand for factors of
production such as improved seeds, fertilizer and ox ploughs. Under conditions of certainty,
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the optimal demand for a factor of production can be determined by equating the marginal
value product to the marginal. factor cost. However, under conditions of uncertainty, the
optimal use of a factor of production may decrease due to risk, which in turn reduces the
demand for credit. This is because the marginal value product is equated with the marginal
factor cost plus a marginal cost for risk. The marginal cost for risk is influenced by the
variability of expected future profits, which in turn is determined by expected price and
output variability. The marginal cost for risk is a reflection of the degree of risk aversion by
the household. The greater the degree of risk aversion, the higher the marginal cost of risk,
and the lower the demand for credit.
Adugna and Heidhues (2000) argued that credit enables small farmers who are not risk-
averse to overcome their liquidity constraints and to make farm investments that could lead
to increased agricultural output. The farm investments could be in the form of adopting new
technologies such as high yielding seeds and also other agricultural inputs. Increased
agricultural output from the credit-fmanced investments will lead to an increase in
household income, other factors constant. Similar views of the importance of credit in
facilitating farm investments and the adoption of improved production practices for
increased output were underscored by Yazdani and Gunjal (1998:263). They argued that the
initiation of credit programmes is one key policy measure to improve the welfare of farmers.
Zeller et al (1994: 169) however pointed out that credit to the rural household should not
only be for farm production but also for investments in non-agricultural enterprises to boost
household income and rural employment opportunities.
5.2.2 Informal Credit Demanded for Consumption Purposes
Informal credit is also demanded to meet household consumption needs such as health care,
education of children, durable goods, housing and social events (pradhan and Dinakar,
95
1990:203). The demand for informal consumption credit is therefore a derived demand for
consumption goods/services (Batterham and Majid, 1987:292). Household demand for
purchased consumption goods/services can be determined using the marginal conditions
from the theory of consumer choice, where at the optimum, marginal utility equals marginal
cost. The optimal condition that defmes the quantity of the good/service demanded also
determines the amount of consumption credit demanded given the household characteristics.
This is because household consumption expenditure can be financed from a number of
sources such as income, accumulated savings and/or credit. External credit is usually
demanded when household consumption requirements exceed the available household
resources (that is income and accumulated savings). Mohieldin and Wright (2000:657)
argued that in Egypt informal credit tends to be demanded for consumption smoothing while
formal credit is for investment. The same observation was made by Duong and Izumida
(2002:319) that Vietnamese formal banks tend to extend loans for production and
investment while informal lenders mainly finance consumption.
The rationale for rural households to demand credit for consumption purposes was provided
by Zeller et al (1994:170) who argued that the productivity of a household does not only
depend on conventional production inputs, but also on the productivity of the labour force.
This is because labour is one of the critical factors of production in the agricultural sector.
The productivity of the labour force is influenced by its skills, education, nutritional and
health status, which raises the likelihood of increased future output. By maintaining and
enhancing human capital, consumption credit is argued to be highly productive. This was
clearly demonstrated by the remarks of a village leader in Gambia on his willingness to pay
interest for consumption credit (as quoted by Zeller et al, 1994:174):
"Most important is health. If my brother is ill, he can't go to the field. One member of the
family has to care for him, and the crops cannot be properly cultivated. Therefore I would
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pay the highest interest on credit which allows me to buy medicaments if needed. Second
comes food. Being hungry, one cannot work hard enough. Therefore I would pay more
interest for food credit than for credit to obtain fertilizer"
This perceived high productivity of consumption credit explains why rural households
continually borrow from the informal financial sector despite the high interest rates.
5.2.3 Informal Credit Demanded as an Insurance Alternative
The lack of formal insurance markets and inaccessible national social security systems in
many rural communities in developing countries also explains the high demand for informal
credit as an alternative insurance mechanism (Zeller et al, 1994: 171). Rural poor
households face exogenous shocks, idiosyncratic or covariate in nature, which require some
form of insurance as a risk-management system (Chaudhuri, 2003:2). Idiosyncratic shocks
(such as sickness, death of a family member) affect individual households and community-
based social security networks may act as the insurance substitute. The covariate shocks,
which affect the entire community, are comprised of production and price shocks. The
production shocks (such as drought, floods, pests) result in high variability of agricultural
output, which in tum raises income variability for those households engaged in the
agricultural sector. Negative price shocks such as a fall in prices of major agricultural
products, also renders the rural households vulnerable even in times of a good agricultural
harvest. Lack of markets for the bumper harvest, the heavy post-harvest losses and the
depressed prices may still result in low incomes for agricultural households despite
increased productivity. The efficiency of community-based social networks is seriously
constrained in managing the covariate risks.
Ahmed (1999:59) pointed out the life-cycle shocks that are related to demographic changes
that are faced by households for which insurance is required. In a bid to build up future
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reserves that can be drawn during old age, the demand for informal credit is created at
household level to start-up or expand existing income generating projects. Such informal
credit therefore acts as a substitute for old age insurance. However Ahmed (1999) further
argued that for informal credit to have the maximum positive impact on the livelihoods of
the rural poor, the MFIs must understand the vulnerabilities that the poor operate in so as to
guide the design of flexible products and policies.
Udry (1990:251) argued that informal sector credit raises the risk-management capacity of
households, thereby acting as a substitute for insurance. Households with better access to
credit will have a greater capacity to absorb risks and pool these risks across periods, thus
stabilizing consumption over time. Evidence from Northern Nigeria suggests that the state-
contingent informal credit contracts among the predominantly Muslim community clearly
demonstrates the risk-sharing arrangements between informal lenders and borrowers. Since
the charging of interest rates is prohibited under Islamic law, the lender can only share in the
benefits of the investment if he also shares in the risks of the investment. Under a state-
contingent contract, the terms of the loan (interest rate, loan period, repayment) depends on
the outcome of the investment and the observable random production/consumption shocks
experienced by both the lender and the borrower. Both parties to the informal credit contract
(the lender and the borrower) understand that if the returns to the investment are good, then
the loan will be repaid over a relatively shorter period with high interest. If on the other hand
the borrower suffered observable unexpected negative shocks, then the interest rate will be
lower. The lender will also automatically extend the loan period to allow the borrower to
recover from the negative shocks and re-organize the investments to generate funds for loan
repayment. In such a scenario, the informal credit market plays the important role of an
alternative and efficient risk-management system for the rural sector. Households will be
able to borrow more when they experience adverse shocks and lend more if they realize
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positive shocks. The free flow of information in informal financial markets between the
lenders and borrowers allows informal credit to playa more direct role in insuring against
risk.
5.3 Overview of Empirical Studies on Informal Credit Demand
A lot of empirical work has been done on determinants of informal credit demand, but the
choice of literature reviewed for this study was motivated in terms of comparability of the
results to Uganda. For this reason, the reviewed literature was mainly from LDCs. The
questions that are addressed in this section include: What motivated these studies and is it
related to the motivation for the current study? What were the main findings of the reviewed
studies?
5.3.1 Motivations for Empirical Studies Reviewed and their Relationship to Current
Study
The reviewed research was generally motivated by the need to have an in-depth knowledge
of the functioning of rural credit markets. Rural credit markets were characterized by the
parallel market structure of the regulated formal financial sector and the unregulated
informal financial sector. Rural households were observed to be participating in both
markets, but with low income households being more dominant in the informal financial
markets. The rationale was that low-income households were mainly rationed out of the
formal financial sector due to lack of appropriate collateral.
These parallel market structures in rural credit markets raised a number of interesting
research questions which include: What explains the co-existence of the formal and informal
financial sectors in rural credit markets? What determines households' borrowing behaviour
from the rural credit markets? What factors influence the lenders' decision regarding the
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amount of credit supplied? Does credit rationing exist in both the unregulated informal
sector and the formal sector, and if so, what explains the lenders' credit rationing
behaviour? What costs are incurred by households in their participation in the various
sectors of the rural credit markets (formal and informal)? The quest for answers to these
questions motivated the various empirical studies that were reviewed.
The vanous studies addressed the different research questions (or combinations of
questions) highlighted above, but the selection criteria adopted was such that the research
must have examined directly or indirectly the core themes of this study, namely
determinants of informal credit demand and informal credit rationing. The studies can be
broadly classified into three categories depending on the extent to which they covered the
areas of interest to this study. First were studies that estimated both models for the
determinants of households' borrowing behaviour (credit demand) and lenders' credit
rationing behaviour (credit supply) in rural credit markets (Zeller, 1994; Bell et al , 1994;
Baydas et aI, 1994; and Duong and Izumida, 2002). Secondly, studies that specifically
estimated the credit demand model or as part of the research (Adugna and Heidhues, 2000;
Nagarajan et aI, 1998; Musinguzi and Smith, 2000; Baydas and Cuevas, 1990; Pradhan and
Dinakar, 1997; and Yadav et aI, 1992). Thirdly, the category of studies that examined the
determinants of credit supply in rural credit markets (Kochar, 1997; Vaessen, 2001; and
Zeller et aI, 1994).
The rationale for the current study is to examine the determinants of credit demand and
credit rationing in the informal financial sector in Uganda, to enable identification of
strategies to improve households' access to the financial services of the broader financial
sector. The reviewed studies guided the identification of gaps to be filled by the current
study, the selection of specific variables to be included in the respective models, and the
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selection of econometric models to be used. The literature reviewed revealed that little
empirical work has been done on rural credit markets in Uganda, with no specific study
done on informal credit demand and credit rationing. Musinguzi and Smith (2000) analyzed
the determinants of household credit demand for the general rural credit market. However,
there was no distinction in the analytical work between formal and informal sources of
credit, which is an extension made by this study. In addition, given the imperfections and
information asymmetry problems that are prevalent in rural credit markets, the current study
sought to investigate the factors that influence informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour,
which aspect was not covered by the Musinguzi and Smith (2000) study.
5.3.2 Summary of Findings on Informal Credit Demand from the Literature
The demand for informal credit has been argued in the literature to be influenced by
household, enterprise, village/community and lender characteristics. Empirical work has
mainly used two types of models: the LogitlProbit models (Adugna and Heidhues, 2000;
Zeller, 1994; Nagarajan et al 1998; Musinguzi and Smith, 2000); and the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS)/ Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) models (Baydas et al, 1994;
Baydas and Cuevas, 1990; Pradhan and Dinakar, 1997; Yadav et al, 1992; Bell et al, 1997;
Duong and Izumida, 2002). The logit/probit models are probability models where the
dependent variable is the probability of borrowing informal credit (=1 if household
borrowed informal credit, otherwise zero) and the explanatory variables being household
characteristics, enterprise characteristics, village/community characteristics and/or lender
characteristics. For the OLSIMLE models, the dependent variable is the amount of loan
applied for from the informal sector, with the same explanatory variables specified above
(Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 1992). The detailed discussion and specification of the credit
demand models is presented in section 7.4.2.1.
101
Adugna and Heidhues (2000: 35) used a logit model to estimate the factors that influence
informal credit demand in Lume District, Central Ethiopia, using cross-sectional data
collected in 1993/94 for 161 households. The results suggested that informal credit demand
is positively and significantly influenced by the dependency ratio, health status, liquid assets
and renting out of part of the land. The wealth of the household negatively influences
informal credit demand.
Zeller (1994: 1902), in a study of the determinants of informal credit demand in Madagascar,
estimated a probit model using data for 189 households and 148 informal lending groups.
The results suggested that informal credit demand is positively and significantly influenced
by age, education level, poverty status, being a household head, health status and social
relationship network.
Nagarajan et al (1998:356), in a study of the demand for agricultural loans in the Philippine
credit market, also estimated a probit model. The data was based on 127 farm households in
Nueva Ecija Province in Central Luzon, which was collected for the three cropping seasons
in 1985 - 86 and 1989 - 90. The results suggested that credit demand is positively and
significantly influenced by age, education level and size of cultivated area. Non-farm
income negatively influences informal credit demand.
Musinguzi and Smith (2000: 134), in a study of the borrowing behaviour in rural Uganda,
also estimated the logit model using data on 300 rural households collected from 4 regions
in 1997. The dependent variable was the probability of borrowing (=1 if household ever
borrowed, otherwise zero) and the independent variables were household characteristics. It
should be noted that the borrowing captured in this study was from both formal and informal
sources. But since the study sample was rural households, it can be argued that the bulk of
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credit that was available to them was from the informal financial sector. This is exemplified
by the stated reasons for not borrowing reported in the study, which included lack of access
(27.8%) and lack of collateral (15.3%). The regression results suggested that household
expenditure and household size have a positive and significant effect on credit demand.
Yadav et al (1992:427) used a tobit model (dependent variable =1 if household borrowed
from a particular source, otherwise zero) to estimate the determinants of credit demand in
the dis aggregated rural credit market based on a sample of 190 households from Western
and Central Nepal. The borrowers were decomposed into three categories according to
borrowing source: formal sector, moneylenders, and friends/relatives, with separate models
estimated for each category. Family size had a positive and significant effect on informal
credit demand while education level had a negative and significant effect.
Duong and Izumida (2002:319), in a study of Rural Development Finance in Vietnam, used
a tobit model based on a sample of 300 households from three provinces (Ninh Binh, Quang
Ngai and An Giang). Their conclusion was that borrowing from the informal financial sector
is significantly influenced by the dependency ratio and total farming area.
Baydas and Cuevas (1990:374) estimated the determinants of demand for rural credit from
co-operative unions in Togo using the ordinary least squares method (OLS) based on a
sample of 137 households. The regression results suggested that the loan amount demanded
is positively and significantly influenced by transaction costs, working capital requirements
and household income, and negatively by family size.
Baydas et al (1994:283) used the maximum likelihood estimation techniques (MLE) to
analyze the factors that influence household demand for credit from micro enterprise
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programmes in Ecuador. The results suggested that informal credit demand is positively and
significantly influenced by business asset value, business profits, ownership status, off-farm
activities, education and being male.
Pradhan and Dinakar (1990:206) also used OLS models in their investigation of the regional
factors that affect household demand for consumption and production credit in India. Their
findings were that while the households accessed both formal and informal credit, formal
credit was mainly used for production purposes and informal credit was largely for
consumption purposes. The significance of the informal financial sector was reflected by the
fact that 78.6% of the total credit outstanding at household level in 1961 came from informal
sources. However this proportion fell to 37.4% in 1981 but remained an important source of
credit especially to the poor for consumption. The estimated model for consumption credit
can therefore be argued to be a demand function for informal credit. The results suggested
that regional consumption credit demand was positively influenced by the rural
unemployment rate and regional productivity, and negatively by the size of land holding.
Mohieldin and Wright (2000:663) examined the determinants of informal credit demand
using a probit model based on a sample of 200 households from four Egyptian villages in
the Kalyoubbiya Governorate. The results suggested that borrowing decisions from the
informal financial sector are positively influenced by household assets and negatively by
wage income and savings.
Kochar (1997:364), who used a probit model based on data from the All-India Debt and
Investment Survey 1981 - 1982 for 2415 households in Uttar Pradesh State, found that the
choice of informal credit is positively and significantly influenced by the predicted interest
rate and collateral requirements in the formal sector. The choice of informal credit was
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negatively and significantly influenced by productivity. Regions with higher levels of
agricultural productivity (proxied by yield per acre), demanded mainly formal sector credit
for investment, thus explaining the negative relationship between productivity and the
choice of informal credit. By implication it was the poor regions that demanded informal
credit for consumption smoothing.
5.4 Determinants of Informal Credit Demand
This section gives a detailed discussion of each of the determinants of informal credit
demand that were identified from the empirical literature, including how they were
measured and the interpretation of the results. It is only the variables that were reported to
be statistically significant (at least at the 10% significance level) that are discussed here.
5.4.1 Age
In all of the empirical research, the age of the borrower was measured in years. The results
by Zeller (1994) suggested that the age of the borrower has a positive and significant effect
(at the 1% significance level) on informal credit demand. The intuition for the positive and
significant coefficient for age is based on the fact that older persons have control over
household resources, which increases their creditworthiness and raises their demand for
credit. The results by Nagarajan et al (1998) also suggested that credit demand is positively
and significantly influenced by the age of the household head (at the 5% significance level).
5.4.2 Gender
The sex variable has been captured as a binary variable. Empirical results by Baydas et al
(1994) revealed that sex (male=l) has a positive and significant effect (at the 10%
significance level) on informal credit demand. The intuition for the result is that the males
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mainly dominate in the control of household resources, which makes them more
creditworthy, hence raising the demand for credit. These results may also suggest
discrimination against women in informal credit markets.
5.4.3 Household Wealth
Household wealth is articulated in the literature as one of the significant determinants of
informal credit demand. Household wealth is captured in various studies using different
proxies which include income, household expenditure, and value of household assets. In the
study by Adugna and Heidhues (2000), household wealth (proxied by the number of oxen)
had a negative and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on informal credit
demand. The rationale for this result was that wealthier households had more resource
endowments that enabled them to produce sufficient food crops to meet subsistence needs.
This implied that such wealthier households demanded less informal credit for consumption
purposes.
Evidence by Baydas and Cuevas (1990) suggested that household income has a positive and
significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on informal credit demand. Household
income, which was interpreted as a measure of future consumption, significantly affects
credit demand. Musinguzi and Smith (2000), who used household expenditure as a measure
of wealth, also reported a positive and significant (t-value 2.15) relationship with credit
demand. Both studies (Baydas and Cuevas, 1990, Musinguzi and Smith,2000) did not
adduce any explanations for the positive and significant relationship between informal credit
demand and household expenditure.
Mohieldin and Wright (2000) examined the effect of the source of income on informal credit
demand. The results suggested that individuals are less likely to borrow from the informal
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financial sector if they have stable wage income from salaried employment in the public or
private sector (coefficient negative and t-value -3.235). This explains why rural households
whose livelihoods are dependent on agricultural income, which is subject to exogenous
production and price shocks, mainly borrow from the informal financial sector to meet
unexpected shortfalls in income.
Land size is one of the indicators of household wealth. Nagarajan et al (1998) used the
number of cultivated hectares as a proxy for the borrower's farming capacity. The results
suggested a positive and significant relationship between farming capacity and informal
credit demand (at the 10% significance level). This implies that credit demand is influenced
by the ownership of physical and human resources that are necessary for farm production.
Duong and Izumida (2002) also found a positive and significant relationship (at the 10%
significance level) between total farming area (measured in hectares) and informal credit
demand. What was implied by this result was that households borrow from the informal
financial sector even at high interest rates for production purposes. The results by Bell et al
(1997) suggested that land value has a positive and significant effect on informal credit
demand.
Household assets, which form part of household wealth, were captured in the studies by the
monetary value of the assets. Evidence by Mohieldin and Wright (2000) found that
household assets have a positive and significant effect (t-value 2.98) on the probability of
borrowing from the informal financial sector. What this result highlighted was that despite
the fact that most lending in the informal financial sector is collateral free, some informal
lenders might still require some form of collateral due to information asymmetries and weak
enforcement mechanisms in rural credit markets.
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From a logical point of view, it can be argued that wealthier households may tend to use
own savings for self-financing andlor to borrow larger loans from the formal financial sector
at lower interest rates given the fact that they are rated as being creditworthy. This would in
tum lead to a negative relationship between all measures of household wealth and informal
credit demand, which may explain the negative coefficients of wealth and informal credit
demand as reported by Adugna and Heidhues (2000) and Mohieldin and Wright (2000).
5.4.4 Education Level
The education level variable has been measured in most studies as a continuous variable in
terms of completed years of schooling, while in a few cases it was captured as a binary
variable. Baydas et al (1994) captured education level as a binary variable (=1 if high
school and above, otherwise zero). The results suggested that education level has a positive
and significant effect (at the 10% significance level) on informal credit demand. The
significance of the education coefficient was explained in terms of its contribution to
knowing the rules of the game and effective utilization of the credit. The more educated
people are more likely to understand and abide by the rules of the micro enterprise programs
and to make successful use of the credit. Evidence by Zeller (1994) also suggested that
education level has a positive and significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on
informal credit demand, because education increases the returns from human capital.
Nagarajan et al (1998) also reached similar conclusions regarding the positive and
significant effect of education (at the 10% significance level) on credit demand.
Yadav et al (1992) observed that the education level of the household head had a negative
and significant effect on borrowing decisions from the informal financial sector, but with
varying levels of significance. From the moneylender source, the education level coefficient
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was negative and significant at the 5% significance level, while for friends/relatives it was
negative and significant at the 1% significance level. The argument behind these results is
that more educated people are more likely to borrow from the formal sector as compared to
the informal sector. These results may be rationalized in the sense that since the formal
banking sector is characterized with a lot of formalities, it requires some level of education
to comprehend the processes. In addition given the lower interest rates and larger loan
amounts that can be accessed from the formal financial sector, the educated may be taking
advantage of such favourable terms.
5.4.5 Household Size
Household size has been captured in the literature as the total number of members in the
household. The household is commonly defined as people who share from the same pot.
Evidence by Yadav et al (1992) suggested that family size was the most decisive factor
(coefficient positive and significant at the 1% level) for borrowing from informal sources,
namely, moneylenders, and friends/relatives. Similar findings of the positive and significant
effect of household size were reported by Vaessen (2001) at the 5% significance level and
by Musinguzi and Smith (2000) with a t-value of 2.56. The implication is that households
with larger family sizes coupled with many children are under pressure to meet higher levels
of consumption expenditures (such as education of children and health care) and this
augments the demand for informal credit.
Findings by Baydas and Cuevas (1990) however suggested that credit demand was
negatively influenced by family size (at the 5% significance level). Family size had been
used as a proxy for labour size and so the interpretation of the result has to be done within
the context of labour demand. The rationale for the negative and significant coefficient for
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family size was based on the rationale that family labour acts as a substitute for hired labour
in the household production function. The larger the family size, the larger the available
family labour hence the lower the demand for hired labour. This implies reduced cash
expenses to pay for hired labour, which in turn reduces the demand for informal credit hence
the negative and significant coefficient.
5.4.6 Dependency ratio
Dependency ratio has been measured as the proportion of dependants in relation to total
active adults, where the dependants include children and the elderly. In effect dependency
ratio is a proxy for the income earning capacity of the household. The higher the
dependency ratio, the lower the income earning capacity of the household, and vice versa.
Evidence by Duong and Izumida (2002) suggested that the dependency ratio has a positive
and significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on the amount borrowed from the
informal sector. The argument in support of this result was that borrowing from the informal
sector was mainly for consumption smoothing. This was based on the observation that
families with many dependants were the poor, who could not meet their food requirements
in times of crisis. In addition, such poor families found it difficult or even impossible to
borrow from the formal sector to smooth their consumption. It was therefore argued that
informal credit reflected the demand for funds to improve the quality of life such as the
purchase of food, construction of new houses and buying new durable goods. This explains
the positive and significant relationship between the dependency ratio and informal credit
demand. Adugna and Heidhues (2000) also reported that the dependency rate has a positive
and significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on informal credit demand
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5.4.7 Off-farm Activities
Engagement in off-farm activities was captured as a dummy variable in most empirical
research. Baydas et al (1994) reported that involvement in off-farm activities positively and
significantly increases informal credit demand (at the 5% significance level). The argument
for this result was that establishment of off-farm activities would involve some cash outlay
which increases the demand for informal credit. Contrary to the above, Nagarajan et al
(1998) observed that the non-farm income variable has a negative and significant effect on
informal credit demand (at the 1% significance level). The argument for this result was that
non-farm income increases household income and opportunities for self-financing which in
turn reduces the demand for informal credit.
5.4.8 Health Status
Health status has been measured in the literature as either a continuous variable in terms of
the number of days lost to sickness or as a dummy variable (=1 if household member was
sick at the time of the survey, otherwise zero). Adugna and Heidhues (2000) found a
positive and significant relationship between the health status dummy and informal credit
demand at the 10% significance level. Zeller (1994) also found a positive and significant
relationship between the household health status (captured by the number of sick days) and
informal credit demand (at the 10% significance level). What these results highlight is that
poor health status increases the demand for consumption credit to finance health care needs.
5.4.9 Social Capital/network
Social capital is one of the determinants of informal credit demand identified in the
empirical literature. This has a lot to do with the lending methodology in the informal
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financial sector, which is not based on physical collateral. The social capital variable is
constructed in the literature as a binary variable. Zeller (1994) used the existence of an
ancestral burial ground within the region as a proxy for strong social relationships, which
was positive and significant at the 10% significance level. The implication of this result is
that the people with strong social networks have more friends and relatives to whom they
can easily go to ask for informal credit. Since lending in the informal sector is based on
mutual trust in terms of loan repayment, informal lenders feel more comfortable in dealing
with people with whom they have had a long social relationship. Even in the event of
default, it will be easier to use community leaders to enforce recovery instead of using the
formal courts oflaw. This approach can only be effective if both the lender and the borrower
are from the same community and have respect for the community leaders. This explains
why some informal lenders prefer to deal with their kin in informal financial transactions.
5.4.10 Cost of credit
The credit price variables, which are composed of financial costs (interest rates, fees and
commissions, transport costs) and non-financial costs (waiting time), which are incurred by
the borrowing households were missing from most of the empirical research, possibly on
account of the difficulty of collecting such information.
Evidence by Baydas and Cuevas (1990) suggested that the loan amount demanded was
positively and significantly influenced by the total cost of credit (at the 1% significance
level). This unusual result was explained by the way the total cost variable was constructed,
which included interest rates charged by the union and imputed transaction costs (proxied by
the opportunity cost of waiting time between application and receipt of the loan). The
imputed transaction costs contributed a significant proportion of the total cost of credit,
which was associated with the longer time taken to obtain larger loans, as the interest rate
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was the same irrespective of the loan amount. It was only the imputed transaction cost
component of the total cost that varied across borrowers, hence the positive relationship
between amount demanded and the total cost of credit.
The effect of informal interest rates on informal credit demand was analyzed by Bell et al
(1997) using an OLS model. The results suggested that informal credit demand is negatively
influenced by interest rates and quite inelastic, which is consistent with the theory of
demand where the quantity of a good demanded is inversely related to its own price. It
should be noted that the degree of sensitivity of credit demand by the poor to interest rates
continues to be a major debate in the development economics literature (Morduch, 1999).
Some scholars argue that credit demand by the poor is not very sensitive to interest rate
variations because interest costs are a small fraction of overall production costs, so poor
households can absorb high interest rates. According to this school of thought, what matters
to the poor is access to credit but not interest rates. Another school of thought argues that the
elasticity of credit demand with respect to interest rate is high, hence the need to keep
interest rates low so as to maximize the benefits to the poor. These seemingly opposing
views constitute the basis of arguments for and against subsidization of interest rates to the
poor. Those who oppose subsidization of interest rates tend to assume low sensitivity of
credit demand to interest rate, positive impacts of interest rates on returns, and negative
externalities of subsidized credit programs on other lenders. They therefore advocate
charging of full cost recovery interest rates (market rates). The other argument in favour of
market interest rates has to do with the high stock turn over (velocity) of small businesses.
The people who sell items on a regular basis (for example daily or weekly) can afford to pay
market interest rates than say farmers whose turnover is low. On the other hand, those who
support subsidization of interest rates assume high sensitivity of credit demand to interest
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rates, low or perhaps negative impacts of interest rates on returns, and small or beneficial
spillovers onto other lenders.
Kochar (1997) examined the effect of formal sector interest rates and choice of informal
credit. Empirical evidence suggested a positive and significant relationship between the
formal sector interest rate and the probability of access to informal credit (at the 5%
significance level). This result may be interpreted in the context of those households that
participate in both the formal and informal financial markets, where the borrower considers
not only the formal sector interest rates but also the associated transaction costs (financial
and non-financial). This may explain the positive relationship between formal sector interest
rates and informal credit demand.
5.4.11 Enterprise Characteristics
Enterprise characteristics (which include ownership structure, its size and profitability
levels) have also been cited in the literature as factors that explain the borrowers' credit
demand behaviour. Evidence by Baydas et al (1994) suggests that being an owner of an
enterprise has a positive and significant effect on credit demand (at the 10% significance
level). This implies that the owners are more likely to make more effective use of the loan
for business expansion.
Enterprise size has been measured by working capital requirements and business assets.
Evidence by Baydas and Cuevas (1990) suggested that credit demand is positively
influenced by working capital requirements (at the 1% significance level). The members
who had larger working capital requirements had to deposit more with the union so as to get
bigger loans, hence the positive coefficient. Baydas et al (1994) used business asset value as
a proxy for enterprise size, where there was an observed positive and significant relationship
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with informal credit demand (at the 1% significance level). By implication larger enterprises
tend to demand larger loans.
The magnitude of business profits is also argued to have a positive effect on credit demand.
This view is supported by Baydas et al (1994) where the coefficient for business profits was
positive and significant (at the 5% significance level). This result can be interpreted within
the context that business profits encourage entrepreneurs to undertake greater financial risk
through increased borrowing on condition they make profits from such investments. Of
course more risky projects promise higher profits, implying that for risk-neutral
entrepreneurs there will be increased demand for credit.
5.4.12 Household Liquidity
Household liquidity is one of the determinants of informal credit demand in empirical
research. Liquidity was measured in terms of the household holding savings (cash) or near
cash items that can easily be liquidated for loan repayment. InAdugna and Heidhues (2000)
study, liquid assets (captured by the number of small ruminants such as goats and sheep kept
by the household) had a positive and significant effect (at the 10% significance level) on
informal credit demand. Since these were poor rural households, the ruminants were the
main items that could easily be converted to cash within a short period of time. The higher
the liquidity of the household, the higher its creditworthiness, which serves as security for
the loan, hence increasing demand for informal credit.
Mohieldin and Wright (2000), who used household savings as a measure of liquidity, found
that it had a negative and significant effect (t-value -3.464) on the probability of borrowing
from the informal sector. The explanation for the result was that individuals might prefer to
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use their savings rather than borrow, as personal savings are a much cheaper source of funds
for investment.
5.4.13 Poverty Status
The poverty status of the household (defined relative to the reference poverty line against
which the household can be categorized either as being poor or non-poor), is one of the
determinants of informal credit demand in the empirical literature. A number of proxies for
poverty status have been developed in the literature and used as explanatory variables in the
informal credit demand models. In the Adugna and Heidhues (2000) study, poverty status
was proxied by the dummy for rented out land. It should be noted that renting out plots of
land was associated with being resource poor, a coping mechanism that was adopted by poor
households that did not have enough resources to effectively utilize all their land. The
income from the rented out plots could therefore act as a guarantee for loan repayment to the
informal lenders, which also reflected the interlinkage between the informal credit and land
markets. The practice of renting out of part of the land has a positive and significant effect
on informal credit demand (at the 10% significance level).
In the Zeller (1994) study, the poverty status (captured by the wage labourer dummy) had a
positive and significant effect on informal credit demand. The rationale is that it is the poor
who worked as agricultural wage labourers for the landlords, hence reflecting the
dependence of the poor on informal credit. Pradhan and Dinakar (1990) used different
proxies for poverty status that included the unemployment rate and land size. The results
suggested that regional consumption credit demand was positively and significantly
influenced by the rural unemployment rate, while credit demand is negatively and
significantly influenced by size of land holding. The higher the rural unemployment rate, the
higher the demand for consumption credit. The size of the land holding (measured as the
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proportion of households with land above 7.5 acres of land) was negatively correlated with
informal credit demand. The land size variable was used as a proxy for the poverty status,
where the non-poor were the ones with land above 7.5 acres. The conclusion was that it was
the poor who mainly demanded informal credit for consumption purposes, hence the
rationale for the negative and significant coefficient.
5.5 Conclusion
The motivation for this chapter was to identify (i) the key determinants of informal credit
demand from the empirical research done in LDCs, and (ii) the econometric models used in
the research.
The main models that were used by the reviewed studies were logit/probit models (which
are probability models where the dependent variable takes the value of one or zero), and
OLS/MLE models (where the dependent variable is the amount of credit demanded) with
explanatory variables being household socio-economic characteristics and other factors
(enterprise or village specific characteristics).
Empirical evidence suggests that informal credit demand is positively and significantly
influenced by the following variables: age, sex (male=l), dependency ratio, health status,
enterprise characteristics, poverty status, and formal sector interest rates. Informal credit
demand is negatively and significantly influenced by informal sector interest rates.
However the following variables were not conclusive in terms of their effect on informal
credit demand: household wealth, household liquidity, education level, family size, and off-
farm activities. The inconclusiveness of these variables is based on the fact that their
coefficients were reported to be significantly positive in some studies and yet in other
studies they were significantly negative.
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These results form the basis for the identification of the variables and specification of the
credit demand model for the current study (to be discussed in section 7.4.2.1). The next
chapter examines the factors that influence the informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour.
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CHAPTER 6: DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT RATIONING IN THE INFORMAL
FINANCIAL SECTOR
6.1 Introduction
The motivation for this chapter is to establish the significant determinants of informal
lenders' credit rationing behaviour from the empirical literature so as to form a basis for the
analytical work for the Ugandan case.
Credit rationing can be defined as a state in which the borrower is constrained in access to
credit at the prevailing market interest rates. The credit process involves two distinct stages.
In the first stage, the borrower who has a demand for credit decides how much funds to
apply for from a particular lender at the prevailing market price, which constitutes the
demand side (as discussed in section 5.2). In the second stage, the lender makes a financing
decision on each of the loan applications, thus constituting the supply side. The lenders
undertake the screening of potential borrowers based on observable characteristics so as to
minimize default risk, which influences their response to the client's loan demand. Firstly,
the lenders may fully grant the loan amounts demanded by the clients. Secondly, lenders
may partially grant the loan amount demanded by the clients (i.e. give less than amount
originally applied for). Thirdly, the lenders may completely reject the loan application. The
last two scenarios represent a state of the borrowers being credit rationed by the lenders
(Zeller, 1994:1895).
The lenders do not sell loan contracts to every willing buyer (borrower) at the prevailing
market price (interest rate) because of market imperfections and information asymmetry
problems which raise the probability of default risk. The interest rate as the price for credit
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therefore fails to play its market-clearing role of equating credit demand and supply, thus
giving rise to an equilibrium with credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 6.2 examines the theoretical
framework for credit rationing in terms of its causes, section 6.3 presents an overview of
relevant empirical studies on credit rationing, section 6.4 discusses the significant
determinants of informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour, and section 6.5 provides the
conclusions.
6.2 The Theoretical Framework for Credit Rationing
Credit markets are characterized by the probability of loan default (Hoff and Stiglitz,
1990:238), where default is defined as the inability to pay back the principal loan amount
plus accrued interest. The probability of default may be influenced by a number of factors
that include the expected returns of the project, the terms of the loan (interest rates, loan
period), market imperfections and borrower characteristics. These factors in turn influence
the credit rationing behaviour of lenders.
6.2.1 Expected Returns of Investment Projects
Kochar (1997:344) pointed out that the expected returns on the borrowers' proposed
investment projects playa key role in influencing the lenders' credit rationing behaviour.
The return to the project [R), defined as income net of operational costs, will be the
centerpiece of the lenders' financing decision criteria. Here the interest rate plays the role of
a screening device. If the expected return [R] is less than the principal loan amount [B] plus
interest [i), then the probability of default will be high [i.e. R < B(l +i)]. In such a scenario,
the optimal lenders' decision will be to either partially ration the borrower by granting a
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smaller amount than originally applied for or completely reject the loan application. It
should be noted that any default on the loan (either principal loan amount or accrued
interest) is a cost to the lender because it has to be written off against income. A typical
profit and loss account of an informal lender consists of the income side and the expenditure
side. Income comprises interest and commissions charged to the clients for loans granted.
The expenditure side consists of operational costs (such as transport, salaries and wages,
stationery, office rent), financial costs (that is interest paid on borrowed funds from either
the formal banks or the informal sector) and loan losses (that is bad loans whose probability
of recovery tend to zero and have to be written-off). The operational costs constitute usually
a small proportion of the informal lenders' total costs, hence the major cost components that
they must carefully control are financial costs and the risk of loan default.
Informal lenders have no control over the financial cost of funds (interest rates) that they
have to incur when they borrow from the banks or other informal lenders to capitalize their
portfolios. However they can effectively control the cost of default risk. Von Pischke et al
(1998:149) spell out the damaging effects that loan default can have on a lender. The
objective function of the lender is to minimize the probability of default risk through careful
screening of the clients' proposed investment projects using the market interest rate as the
benchmark. By discounting the net cash flow of the clients' proposed investment projects
using the market interest rate as the discounting factor, unviable projects can clearly be
identified through the computed internal rate of return (IRR). The IRR is the interest rate at
which the net present value (NPV) equals zero, which gives the project's break-even
position. If the IRR is less than the market interest rate, then the project is unviable. The
differences in expected returns to clients' investment projects partly explain why lenders
undertake credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981:395). The risk-return assessment of
potential projects enhances efficiency in resource allocation.
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6.2.2 Market Imperfections
Credit markets are characterized by imperfect information that disable interest rates from
playing a market-clearing role (Baydas et al, 1994:280). The classical view was that interest
rates would automatically equilibrate credit demand and supply. In the event that there was
excess demand for credit, it was postulated that the interest rate (as the price for credit)
would automatically adjust upwards to a new equilibrium level, thereby clearing the market.
This classical view was, however, contested by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981:393) who argued
that credit markets are characterized by information asymmetry, hence interest rates play
thedual role of being the price for credit as well as a screening mechanism. Information
asymmetry in credit markets arises because the potential borrowers have more information
about their potential risk of default than the lenders (Aleem, 1990:330). This is in an
environment in which such important information is not a public good. Information
asymmetry is compounded by the fact that in informal credit markets the credit histories of
borrowers are not documented and pooled. The costs of acquiring the required information
for the assessment of the creditworthiness of potential borrowers are very high, both in
terms of time and fmancial resources expended to gather and analyze it. The other
complication is the reliability of such information. If lenders collect that information from
the potential borrowers themselves, there is a tendency for the borrowers to give an
exaggerated view of their creditworthiness. This raises the need to validate such information
from other sources. On the other hand, if lenders try to collect that information from other
community members, there is a tendency for community members to withhold the true
information of the borrowing character of their fellow community member with whom they
share daily life, especially if the one soliciting such information is a stranger. It is for this
reason that members from within the same community can access the true information on
122
borrowers' characters informally through village gossip. This information asymmetry
raises the vulnerability of lenders to default risk. For this reason, lenders may not be
enthusiastic to charge market clearing interest rates but rather charge a lower than market
interest rate and ration credit. An increase in interest rates to the market equilibrium level
may result in adverse selection and moral hazard behaviour of borrowers, both of which
may negatively affect the lenders' returns on the loans.
First, the interest rate is a cost to the borrower. Even in the case of symmetric ex-ante
information (where both the lender and the borrower have perfect information on the
expected return on the proposed investment project), an increase in the interest rate has the
potential effect of reducing the returns on the borrowers' investment projects by the same
proportion, other factors constant (Levacic and Rebmann, 1982:239). This automatic
upward adjustment of equilibrium interest rates may lead to loan default because the
revenues generated may not be sufficient to service the loan obligations (that is principal
loan amount plus accrued interest). The net profit [n] to the borrower is a function of returns
[R] and the interest rate [i], which demonstrates a negative correlation between net profit
and the interest rate. This scenario holds true for safe and low risk projects that only earn
normal profits, such that an increase in interest rates renders them unviable, thus increasing
the probability of default. With the consideration of not destabilizing supposedly safe
projects, which in tum translates into a higher probability of default, lenders may opt to
charge less than equilibrium interest rates and rather ration credit by means of non-price
mechanisms.
Secondly, an increase in interest rates to equilibrium levels that clear the market may lead to
a higher probability of default to the lender due to the adverse selection effect. Adverse
selection is where borrowers with safe (and low default risk) projects which earn normal
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profits decide to opt out of the credit market in the face of increasing interest rates, while
more risky projects with potentially higher returns but with a higher probability of default
are attracted into the market. Due to the information asymmetry problem in credit markets,
,
only the borrowers have perfect knowledge about the risk profiles of their projects, but the
lenders do not. An increase in the interest rate therefore results in the adverse selection
problem that affects the risk composition of the portfolio and in turn affects the returns to
the lender. The expected return to the lender is postulated to be a decreasing function of the
riskness of the loan. An increase in the interest rate increases the probability of attracting
projects with a high probability of default, which in turn reduces the profitability of lending
operations.
Thirdly, an increase in interest rates may also create a moral hazard problem, which is
where the increase in interest rates influences the behaviour of borrowers with low risk
projects to shift to high-risk projects that promise higher returns but with a high probability
of default. While the lenders' decisions to grant loans may have been based on the
assessment of the safe projects, an increase in interest rates will influence borrowers to shift
from low risk to high-risk projects after receiving the loans. This will be due to the fact that
borrowers will find it difficult to continue to service the loans at the high interest rates using
the marginal returns from the safe projects. However the switch from safe to risky projects
increases the probability of default to the lender, thus reducing the returns on loans. For this
reason, lenders faced with information asymmetry and lack of control over actions of the
borrowers tend to design credit contracts that will induce borrowers to take actions that
enhance the likelihood of repayment and also attract low risk borrowers. The lenders may
therefore find it optimal to charge lower than equilibrium interest rates to maximize profits
and use non-price mechanisms to ration credit (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990:238).
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The lenders may also charge lower than equilibrium interest rates as an incentive to the
borrowers to bear the risks of loan default on behalf of the lender (Stiglitz, 1990:360). This
is particularly true if the lender uses a joint liability contract where the members of the
group are jointly responsible for the repayment of the loan. The cosigners may be motivated
if they are sufficiently compensated with financial incentives (i.e. margin between the actual
and market interest rates). For this reason, lenders may charge lower than equilibrium
interest rates so as to provide an incentive mechanism for cosigners to bear the additional
costs of screening borrowers and default risk. The lender therefore maximizes profits at a
lower than equilibrium interest rate with credit rationing because of lower probability of
default. Cosigning also increases the effective collateral behind a loan. So at a given interest
rate, the lender rations credit demand.
6.2.3 Borrower Characteristics
Kochar (1997) developed a theoretical framework for informal sector credit rationing. The
informal lender's supply curve was postulated to be upward sloping which is consistent with
any model with a probability of default, such that an increase in the loan amount increases
returns on condition the default risk increases less than proportionately. This implies that the
lender's opportunity cost increases with the expected increase in income as the loan amount
increases, thus inducing the lender to increase the interest rate. The supply schedule was
expressed as:
B = B(i, A) (16)
Where:
B = Loan amount supplied by an informal lender
i = Interest rate charged by the informal lender to maximize profits
X =Household characteristics.
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The supply schedule therefore specifies all the combinations of (i, B) offered to a household
with X characteristics, which affect the returns to the loan. On the other hand, the household
demand curve for credit is downward sloping and the household's objective is also to
maximize profits (by minimizing borrowing costs):
Max x = x(i, B), I;<O,/B>O (17)
Subject to
i = i(B)
B>O
Where:
x = household profits
I; = bxlbi
/B = bxlbB
The demand and supply schedules demonstrate two kinds of credit rationing. First, given the
household characteristics (X), the informal lender fixes the interest rate (i) and the maximum
loan amount (B) that can be accessed by the particular household. If the loan amount
demanded by the household (say M) at the given interest rate (i) exceeds the amount that the
informal lender is willing to supply (B), then the particular household is credit rationed. This
implies that the household is not free to borrow any amount of money at the prevailing
interest rate. Secondly, the upward sloping supply curve also implies that credit can be
available for risky borrowers at very high interest rates. But given the household's rational
profit maximization behaviour, the interest rate charged by the informal lender will
determine whether the household will accept the loan or not. If the interest rate exceeds the
rate at which the household will maximize profits, then the rational household will find that
it is not optimal to borrow as the marginal cost of the loan (bilbB) exceeds the marginal
revenue from the loan (bxlbB), hence being credit constrained. The interest rate as a price
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can therefore be used both as a credit rationing device (high interest rates charged to high
risk borrowers) and an incentive to pay (low interest rates charged to low risk borrowers).
The specific borrower characteristics that influence the informal lenders' credit rationing
behaviour include strength of previous business relationships, borrowers' reputation in the
market, borrowers' acceptance of interlinked credit contracts, borrowers' debt-service
capacity and borrowers' wealth status. Aleem (1990:333), in a study of informal market
lenders and their clients in Chambar, Pakistan, argued that informal lenders mainly use their
established relationship with borrowers as a screening and credit rationing mechanism.
Lenders do not generally entertain loan requests from people who have not had previous
dealings with them either in form of the sale of harvested output through them or purchase
of farm inputs. The longer the period of the previous business relationship, the lower will be
the probability of the borrower being credit rationed. This is due to the fact that these
business relationships provide the lender with important information about the potential
borrower, including his marketable surplus and the way he conducts business. Bell (1990:
312) further pointed out that because it takes a long period to build a relationship with
informal lenders (a minimum of one year), borrowers tend to stick to particular informal
lenders so as to avoid the long screening process and high probability of loan applications
being rejected by new lenders. In effect the borrowers will incur a high opportunity cost in
trying to switch to other lenders.
Siamwalla et al (1990:278), in a study of households and moneylenders in Nakhon
Ratchasima Province in Thailand, indicated that 83% of the households borrowed only from
one informal source and 72% of informal sector borrowers in the National Survey had not
attempted to borrow from other informal lenders during the past three years. In addition the
borrowers took up to seven years to build creditworthiness with a particular informal lender,
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hence making switching lenders very costly. Hoff and Stiglitz (1990:238) called this the
relationship-specific social capital built between the informal lender and the borrower that is
used as a non-price mechanism for credit rationing. Though switching between informal
lenders does take place, borrowers have to do it very carefully to minimize opportunity costs
and the risk of losing access to credit from their current sources. Aleem (1990) also
observed that informal lenders rejected more than 50% of new loan applications, which
provides a disincentive for borrowers to switch between different informal lenders for fear
of losing access to credit.
The reputation of the potential borrower is another important yardstick that influences
informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour (Siamwalla et al, 1990: 281). Since loans in the
informal financial sector are mainly character loans (i.e. not backed by any collateral
security), the borrowers' reputation is of significant importance to the informal lender. For
this reason informal lenders invest both financial resources and time to gather information
about potential borrowers from people known to them both in the market place and the
villages where the borrowers reside. The reputation of the borrower determines the
probability of willful default, where someone deliberately refuses to pay the loan even if
he/she has the means to. The probability of willful default, which reflects the intrinsic
character of the potential borrower, may be assessed through how he/she has performed in
the repayment of loans borrowed from other people. Aleem (1990:335) estimated that
informal lender's screening costs in Pakistan were worth one day of the lenders' time and
approximately $2.02 in transportation costs. As already stated, the significant information
gathering costs are due to information asymmetries in credit markets in which credit
histories are not recorded and not publicly available. The strict vetting of potential
borrowers based on information on their reputation is intended to minimize the default risk,
hence borrowers with poor reputations will more likely be credit rationed.
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The informal lenders' assessment of the borrowers' debt service capacity and household
wealth also influence the probability of their being credit rationed (Zeller, 1994:1896). The
debt-service capacity is computed as outstanding debt expressed as a proportion of total
household income. Informal lenders gather information on the outstanding loan obligations
of potential borrowers from the different sources (both formal and informal) and compare
this to their income levels. If the debt-income ratio is greater than one, then the potential
borrower is more likely to be credit rationed because of the low repayment capacity.
However the composition of the borrowers' outstanding debt is of significance to the
informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour. If the biggest proportion of the outstanding
debt is from the formal financial sector, the informal lender may not be threatened as he has
a higher chance of recovering his money as compared to the formal lender. In such a
scenario the potential borrower may be less credit rationed. However the probability of
being credit rationed may be high if the potential borrower's outstanding debt obligations
are mainly from other informal lenders. Household wealth gives an indication of the
borrowers' repayment potential, with wealthier households being rated as being more
creditworthy and less likely to be credit rationed.
The borrowers' acceptance of interlinked credit contracts also determine their likelihood of
being credit rationed (udry, 1990:252). As discussed in section 3.3.2, an interlinked credit
contract effectively reduces the probability of default to the informal lender. This is because
the interlinked credit contract acts as a disguised form of collateral that reduces the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems where contractual terms in one transaction influence
the borrower's behaviour in another. The interlinked credit contract also provides an added
incentive for the borrower to repay the loan. Potential borrowers therefore have a choice of
either accepting or rejecting the terms of the interlinked credit contract. The borrowers'
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acceptance of interlinked credit contracts will depend on the magnitude of the opportunity
costs imposed on them by the terms of the contract. The opportunity costs may include
being paid lower than market prices in the product market for agricultural output marketed
through the trader-informal lenders, accepting less than market wage rates in the labour
market for work done for landlords who also double as informal lenders, and assigning land
user rights to the informal lenders in the land market. It should be noted that informal
lenders design the interlinked credit contracts with the objective function of maximizing
their profits. The potential borrowers respond to the terms of the interlinked credit contract
by either accepting or rejecting them. Borrowers who accept the terms of the interlinked
credit contracts are less likely to be credit rationed in the informal financial sector.
Bell (1990: 312) argued that there is an effective enforcement mechanism for interlinked
credit contracts through co-operation among informal lenders. If a borrower tried to sell
his/her agricultural output through another dealer, then that informal lender would deduct
the loan plus interest and pass it over to his/her fellow informal lender whom the borrower
was trying to dodge. The ease of enforcing the interlinked credit contracts explains why
those borrowers who accept them are less likely to be credit rationed.
Atieno (1998) also investigated the credit rationing behaviour of lending institutions (formal
and informal) based on household survey data from Western Kenya. The results suggested
that there was no evidence of credit rationing behaviour by friends/relatives and group
lending programs.
6.3 Overview of Empirical Studies of Credit Rationing
As discussed in section 5.3.1, the selection of the empirical studies was motivated by their
relevance to a developing country context. Similar probability models (logit/probit) and
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models as pointed out in section 5.3.2, have also been
applied in the investigation of the informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour. The current
study however uses the Heckman Probit model with sample selection for empirical work on
credit rationing (further discussed in section 7.4.2.2). For the ProbitiLogit models, the
dependent variable was the probability of being credit rationed [=1 if credit rationed,
otherwise zero}, with explanatory variables mostly being household socio-economic
characteristics. For the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models, the loan amount supplied by
the lender was the dependent variable. The rationale for the use of the OLS model was that
the factors that influence the amount of credit supplied also influence the lenders' credit
rationing behaviour.
Some studies had investigated both informal credit demand and rationing (Baydas et al,
1994; Zeller, 1994; Bell et al, 1997) (see section 5.3.2). Only the main findings of those
studies are highlighted in this section. Zeller (1994) found that the probability of being
credit rationed is positively and significantly influenced by age, debt-income ratio and
education level. The total value of assets owned by the household significantly reduces the
probability of being credit rationed. Bell et al (1997) found that interlinked credit contracts
and visible household assets positively and significantly influenced the amount of credit
supplied by informal lenders, thereby reducing the probability of being credit rationed.
Baydas et al (1994) observed that the amount of informal credit supplied is positively related
to interest rates, the loan period, business profits and education level.
Models of access to informal credit were estimated by Zeller et al (1994) and Vaessen
(2001). Access to credit is interpreted as a supply side phenomenon of the credit market on
the grounds that it is the lender who decides whether the borrower accesses credit or not. As
pointed out earlier, borrowers can either be totally credit rationed (if their loan applications
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are completely rejected), or partially rationed (if amounts supplied by the lenders are less
than amounts initially applied for) or not rationed at all (if full amount of credit demanded is
granted.
Vaessen (2001:16), in a study of accessibility of rural credit in Northern Nicaragua with
specific reference to credit from Fondo de Desamorroll Local (FDL) rural bank, also
estimated a logit model. FDL is a non-government organization specializing in the provision
of financial services in rural Nicaragua, hence part of the informal financial sector. This
study argued that access to credit could be influenced by both the lender and household
characteristics. At the institutional level, the lender takes decisions on the target group
(either women or men or both), the selection criteria of clients, the geographic area of
operation, and the features of financial products to be provided to address sustainability
concerns, all of which influence credit supply. At the household level, being part of the
specific target group or living in the targeted geographical area influences credit access. The
financial product features (loan amount, loan period, interest rate, frequency of repayment)
also affect household access to credit from particular informal sources, dependent on the
availability of alternative sources. The logit regression results based on a sample of 178
households suggested that informal credit access is positively and significantly influenced
by education level, family size, off-farm activities, and access to a network of information
and recommendation.
Zeller et al (1994) used a probit model to estimate the factors that influence the probability
of access to credit from the Gambian Co-operative based on data from 750 farmers. The
Gambian Co-operative falls under the category of informal financial institutions since it is
not under the direct supervision of the Central Bank. The results by Zeller et al (1994)
suggest that age and household income have significant positive effects on the probability of
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informal credit access, while being female has a negative and significant effect on credit
access.
6.4 Determinants of Informal Lenders' Credit Rationing Behaviour
6.4.1 Age
Evidence by Zeller (1994:1903) suggested that age has a positive and significant effect (at
the 5% level) on the probability of being credit rationed. The intuition behind these results is
that older individuals are more likely to apply for bigger loan amounts, which increases their
probability of being credit rationed. Zeller et al (1994) reported a positive and significant
effect of age (with a t-value of 2.91) on the probability of informal credit access, as older
persons who control household resources may be rated to be more creditworthy.
6.4.2 Gender
In the Zeller et al (1994) study, being female had a negative and significant effect (with a t-
value of -5.98) on credit access. This particular result reflected discrimination against
women in the credit market. However the reasons that were adduced to explain this result
were that membership in the credit union was male dominated and that as per the culture of
the particular communities that were investigated, the men were regarded as representatives
of the households. For this reason, there was no discrimination against women since the men
in the credit market effectively represented them. This argument was supported by Baydas et
al (1994) who reported that being male did not have any significant effect on access to
credit.
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6.4.3 Education Level
Vaessen (2001) showed that informal credit access is positively and significantly influenced
by education level (at the 1% significance level), possibly on account of increasing returns
to investment as a result of education. Zeller (1994) reported that education level had a
positive and significant effect (at the 10% significance level) on the probability of being
credit rationed. The argument for this result may be that what is critical to the informal
lender is the character of the borrower in terms of trustworthiness in servicing debts, which
may not be correlated with education level. In addition since law does not regulate
transactions in the informal financial sector, the more educated borrowers may even turn out
to be willful defaulters since they can challenge the informal lenders in the courts of law.
The results by Baydas et al (1994) suggested that the amount of credit supplied is positively
and significantly influenced by the level of education (at the 5% significance level), which
was a sharp contrast to the findings by Zeller (1994). The argument that was adduced by
Baydas et al (1994) to explain their result was that the educated are more likely to get loans
because they demand larger loans. In addition the institution preferred to give larger loans in
order to minimize transaction costs.
6.4.4 Repayment capacity
The repayment capacity of the household may be captured by wealth, debt-income ratio,
engagement in off-farm activities, and expected business profits. Zeller (1994) used the
debt-income ratio, also referred to as the leverage ratio, as a measure of the households' debt
repayment capacity. The higher the debt-income ratio, the higher will be the exposure to
default risk and the higher will be the probability of being credit rationed. Empirical results
suggested a positive and significant relationship between the probability of being credit
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rationed and the debt-income ratio (at the 10% significance level). The implication of this
result is that informal lenders equipped with information on the incomes and indebtedness of
their potential clients use it as a screening and non-price credit rationing mechanism. It
should be noted that it is the magnitude of the informal debt that is of significance to the
informal lender because it can adversely affect the repayment ofhislher loan. The size of the
households' formal sector debt is not much of a worry to the informal lender because he has
superior mechanisms of getting the first claim on the borrower's resources for loan
repayment, while the residual will go to the formal lender. Households with high informal
debt-income ratios have a higher probability of default, hence they are more likely to be
credit rationed in the informal sector.
Zeller et al (1994) observed that household per capita income (which is an indicator of
repayment capacity) had a positive and significant effect (with t-value of 2.00) on the
probability of informal credit access. The possible explanation for this result may lie in the
way the co-operative movement operates. The Co-operative Union is a membership
organization where the maximum amount that can be lent to a member is a multiple of the
members' savings with the Union. It is thus more likely that the wealthier households save
more with the Union, which increases their likelihood of accessing larger loans (because
they have higher repayment capacity) as compared to the poorer households. This may
explain the significant positive relationship between household per capita income and the
probability of access to credit, thus reducing the probability of being credit rationed.
In the Vaessen (2001) study, off-farm activities, which was captured by the trader dummy as
a proxy for repayment capacity, had a positive and significant (at the 10% significance
level) on the probability of credit access. The argument in support of this result was that
from the institutional side, off-farm activities were preferred (as compared to agricultural
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activities) due to their high turnover so as to service the short-term loans. The clients who
were engaged in off-farm activities were perceived by the institution to have a higher
repayment capacity as compared to agricultural households with high income variability due
to exogenous production and price shocks. The strategy of lending mainly to off-farm
activities was adopted by the institution to achieve financial sustainability.
Vaessen (2001) also used the agricultural wage labourer dummy as a proxy for repayment
capacity. The results suggested a negative and significant relationship between being an
agricultural wage labourer and access to informal credit (at the 5% significance level). The
argument was that being an agricultural labourer is a reflection of a lower repayment
capacity, as it is the poor who mainly work as agricultural wage labourers.
The value of visible assets can also be argued to be a measure of the borrowers' repayment
capacity. The higher the value of the visible assets, the lower will be the probability of being
credit rationed as the assets can easily be liquidated to recover the loans. Evidence by Zeller
(1994) suggested that the total value of assets owned by the household has a negative and
significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on the probability of being credit rationed.
The argument is that the wealthier households are perceived to have a high repayment
potential by the informal lenders, hence they are less likely to be credit rationed. Informal
lenders can liquidate the borrowers' assets to recover their loans in case of default.
Bell et al (1997) also found a positive and significant relationship between visible assets and
the amount of credit supplied by informal lenders. Intuitively these results are consistent
with those reported by Zeller (1994), as the household factors that positively influence the
quantity of credit supplied by lenders implicitly reduce the probability of such households
being credit rationed.
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One of the factors that influence the lenders' credit rationing behaviour is the expected
return on the enterprises that are seeking financing. The expected returns are closely
associated with repayment capacity. The higher the expected profits, the lower will be the
exposure to default risk and the lower will be the probability of being credit rationed.
Evidence by Baydas et al (1997) suggested that business profits have a positive and
significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on informal credit supply, implying that the
more profitable businesses are less likely to be credit rationed. The results also suggest that
informal lenders base their lending decisions on the profitability of the proposed business to
be financed.
6.4.5 Social Capital/Network
Vaessen (2001) observed that access to a network of information and recommendation had a
positive and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on access to informal credit.
The argument is that the network of information and recommendation acts as a screening
mechanism within the framework of information asymmetry so as to overcome adverse
selection and moral hazard problems. The requirement for potential clients to be
recommended or guaranteed by existing clients acts as social collateral, which is more
important than physical collateral for institutions that specifically target the poor. Poor
households, when applying for a loan, have to depend on their reputation with and
recommendation by current clients of the micro finance institution as compared to well-off
households. This explains the positive and significant relationship between credit access and
household access to the network of information and recommendation. By implication those
clients who have access to network information and guarantee are less likely to be credit
rationed.
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Empirical evidence by Kochar (1997) suggested that the probability of access to informal
credit is positively and significantly influenced (at 5% level) by the social security dummy
(=1 if personal guarantees were given for informal loan). This result may be explained in
terms of personal guarantees serving as alternative collateral that is valued by informal
lenders. The guarantors will undertake to monitor and put pressure on the borrowers to
ensure full repayment of the loans to the lenders, thus minimizing loan default. The
guarantors will be motivated to do this because they are under obligation to pay up the loans
in case of default. The guarantee arrangement also enables the lenders to minimize
transaction costs, thereby maximizing profits from lending operations. For this reason the
clients who have access to a personal guarantee (which is a form of social capital) are less
likely to be credit rationed.
6.4.6 Interlinked Credit Contracts
Bell et al (1997) found that tied-credit positively and significantly influenced the supply of
credit from the informal financial sector (t-value 2.76). The tied-credit dummy captured
whether the credit contract was interlinked. It should be noted that Bell et al (1997) used the
OLS method where the dependent variable was the amount of loan supplied and the
independent variables being household characteristics. What these results imply is that
borrowers' acceptance of interlinked credit contracts, which involve marketing the crops
through the informal lenders, reduce their probability of being credit rationed.
6.4.7 Interest Rates
On the credit supply side, there is a positive relationship between the amounts of credit
supplied and interest rates. Interest rates play a dual role of price and an incentive
mechanism and so the lenders may not charge equilibrium market interest rates. To
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minimize the adverse incentives and moral hazard problems that are associated with high
interest rates, lenders may choose to ration credit at a given interest rate. Empirical results
by Baydas et al (1994) suggested that the amount of credit supplied is positively and
significantly influenced by interest rates (at the 1% significance level). This result conforms
to the theory of supply, where the quantity of a good or service supplied is positively related
to its own price. There was however no inference that could be derived regarding how the
interest rates charged by the informal lenders may influence their credit rationing behaviour.
6.4.8 Family Size
Evidence by Vaessen (2001) suggested that family size has a positive and significant effect
(at the 5% significance level) on informal credit access. By implication the larger
households are less likely to be credit rationed in informal credit markets, though no
explanation was given for the result. But it can also be argued that a rational lender would
perceive large households to have lower repayment capacity, which increases their
probability of being credit rationed.
6.4.9 Loan Periods
The loan period may have either a positive or negative relationship with credit supply. Short
loan periods may have high transaction costs relative to long term loans, which could
negatively affect the institutions' ability to attain financial sustainability. In this light the
lenders may prefer to give larger loans for longer periods, hence a positive relationship
between credit supply and loan period may be observed. On the other hand, short loan
periods may guarantee higher effective interest rates to lenders through fees and
commissions that are charged on every loan cycle. These include loan processing and
commitment fees that are fixed proportions of the loan amount. Assuming we have two
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categories of lenders: Category A (who lend for short loan periods of four months) and
Category B (who lend for longer loan periods of twelve months), Category A lenders will be
able to earn commissions and fees three times in a year while Category B lenders can only
earn it once. From this point of view, the institution may prefer to extend short-term loans
so as to realize high effective interest rates to enhance attainment of fmancial sustainability.
In this scenario one would expect to observe a negative relationship between credit supply
and loan period. Evidence by Baydas et al (1994) suggested that the loan period (measured
in months) had a positive and significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on amount
supplied, which was explained by the lenders' preference to disburse longer-term loans to
reduce transaction costs. Again, there was no logical relationship that could be derived
between loan periods and informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter had set out to identify the key variables that influence the informal lenders'
credit rationing behaviour from the empirical literature so as to give a rational basis for
selection of variables and econometric models to be adapted by the current study. Some of
the studies (Baydas et aI, 1994; Bell et aI, 1997) estimated informal supply models using the
OLSIMLE techniques, where the dependent variable was the amount of loan received.
Others (Zeller et aI, 1994; Vaessen, 2001) had estimated logit models for informal credit
access where the dependent variable was a binary variable (=1 if accessed credit). The
determinants of informal credit rationing had to be inferred from such models based on the
rationale that the household characteristics that positively and significantly influence the
amount of credit supplied (or access to credit), can be argued to have a negative and
significant effect on the probability of households' being credit rationed. For models that
had estimated direct credit rationing (Zeller, 1994), the interpretation of the coefficients was
direct.
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Empirical evidence suggests that informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour is negatively
and significantly influenced by sex (on account of males controlling more of the household
resources thus being more creditworthy), perceived repayment capacity, social capital
(guarantee arrangements), and interlinked credit contracts. Repayment capacity is captured
in various studies by different kinds of variables which include household wealth, asset
values, debt-income ratio, engagement in off-farm activities, and expected business profits.
The higher the repayment capacity, the lower the loan default risk, and the lower the
likelihood of being credit rationed. The guarantee arrangements and interlinked credit
contracts enable informal lenders to resolve the information asymmetry problems inherent in
credit markets.
Though household size was reported to have a negative and significant effect on the lenders'
credit rationing behaviour, there was no rational basis for the result. Age and education level
have inconclusive effects on the informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour (as their
coefficients were positive and significant in some studies, while being negative and
significant in others).
The next chapter examines the methodology used in the analysis of determinants of credit
demand and credit rationing in Uganda's informal financial sector.
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CHAPTER 7:METHODOLOGY
7.1 Introduction
From the survey of literature on the determinants of credit demand and credit rationing in
chapters 5.4 and 6.4 respectively, a number of variables and econometric models that had
been used in empirical work were identified. Given the fact that this study uses secondary
data from the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 1999/2000 that was collected by
the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), it is important to first examine the data set to see
which significant variables that had been identified in the empirical literature can be
extracted from the existing data. Secondly, some variables had been captured differently by
the different studies and so the decision of how particular variables will be specified will
depend on how the instruments for the UNHS 1999/00 survey had been constructed. So an
examination of the kinds of questions that had been asked and the kind of responses that had
been expected becomes critical. Thirdly, not all the econometric models that were identified
in the literature survey can be estimated, for obvious data problems. A review of the existing
data set therefore guides the selection of the most appropriate model to apply to the current
study.
The issues discussed above provide the relevance of this chapter to the study. The
organization of the rest of the chapter is as follows: section 7.2 presents the data sources and
the sampling technique that had been used by UBOS, section 7.3 discusses how the
variables for the study were measured, section 7.4 gives the specifications of the
econometric models and the rationale for their selection, and section 7.5 provides the
conclusions of the chapter.
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7.2 Data Sources
The study used the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) data set for 1999/2000
from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) with a sample size of 10,692 households. This
is a credible data set that was collected with technical support by the World Bank. A multi-
stage stratified random sampling technique with probability proportionate to size was used
by UBOS to draw the sample based on the 1991 census as the sampling frame. Each district
was stratified into enumeration areas categorized as urban, other urban and rural. The first
stage of sampling involved the selection of enumeration areas. The second stage was the
sampling of households, where production and socio-economic aspects were taken into
account in sample selection to ensure that it was representative. Households in enumeration
areas were stratified according to acreage of agricultural production and socio-economic
activities and a proportional sample of 10 households was randomly sampled per
enumeration area.
7.3 Construction of Variables for the study
The variables that were used for the study were those identified in the literature review (in
sections 5.4 and 6.4), and for which data was available in the UNHS 1999/2000 data set.
The detailed description of how the variables used in the study were constructed is herein
given below (with abbreviations for the respective variable names in brackets):
(i) Age of borrower (age): Section 2 of the UNHS 1999/2000 socio-economic survey
questionnaire provides detailed demographic information (including age and sex) for all
household members. The variable age was measured in years.
(ii) Sex of borrower (sex): This was constructed as a binary variable (=1 if male, otherwise
zero).
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years.
(iv) Highest education level (edh): This variable was measured in number of completed
years of schooling.
(v) Health status of household (sic): This was proxied by the number of days lost by the
household due to sickness of its members. This was derived from section 3 of the
questionnaire which had asked the following specific questions: Did you fall sick in the
last 30 days? If yes, what sickness or injury did you suffer from? What was the number
of days lost due to sickness or injury?
(vi) Migration status of household head (mig): This was derived as a binary variable (=1 if
household head migrated to current location, otherwise zero), which was generated from
section 5 (A) of the questionnaire.
(vii) Household expenditure (exp): The expenditure approach was used to compute
household expenditure to proxy for income. The rationale is that expenditure
information tends to be more reliable than the income data. Because of a number of
factors (such as fear of taxation), respondents tend to understate their incomes. Section 7
of the questionnaire captured information on consumption expenditure on various items
as follows: Section 7(A) Household food and beverages expenditure in last 7 days,
Section 7(B) Household non-durable goods expenditure in last 30 days, Section 7 (C)
Household semi-durable goods and services expenditure during last 365 days, Section 7
(D) Household non-consumption expenditure during last 12 months. The household
consumption expenditure from the different sections was annualized and summed to get
an estimate of total household expenditure (exp). For durable goods, the whole value of
the purchased good was not included in the expenditure computation. It was only the
(iii) Dependency ratio (depr): This was constructed following World Bank (2002) using the
following formula: (a + b)/c, where a = number of children aged below 15 years; b =
number of adults aged above 65 years; c = number of adults aged between 15 to 65
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portion of the durable asset utilized by the household over a period of one year that was
included. This was proxied by the annual depreciation value of the asset and the
opportunity cost in terms of foregone income on funds used for the purchase of the
durable asset. For annual depreciation value of the durable good, the straight-line
method was used, which was derived as the depreciation factor multiplied by the cost of
the durable asset. The annual depreciation factor was generated as the inverse of the
useful life of the asset (e.g. if the life span of the asset was 4 years, then the depreciation
factor was 0.25). The opportunity cost on the other hand was derived as interest income
lost by funds tied up in the purchase of the asset, assuming that the funds were invested
at interest bearing fixed deposits (at the average Treasury Bill rate 10%per annum). The
total annual household expenditure was converted to United States dollars (Exchange
rate US$1 = Uganda Shillings 1,800). To generate per adult equivalent household
expenditure, adult equivalents were generated following World Bank (2002) as follows:
AE = 1 + 0.7(NJ -1)+ 0.5N2 (10)
Where
AE = Adult Equivalent
NJ = Number of adults aged 15 or above
N2 =Number of children aged less than 15.
The household expenditure per adult equivalent ("hexp) was derived as total household
expenditure (exp) divided by adult equivalents (AE).
(viii) Value of Household assets per adult equivalent (astva): Section 10(A) of the
questionnaire gave the various assets owned by the household in terms of both the
quantity and current value. The different assets included household assets,
livestock/poultry, and enterprise equipment. The variable (astva) was derived as a
summation of the current values of all assets owned by the household measured in
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United States dollars (Exchange rate US$l = Shillings 1,800) and divided by adult
equivalent.
(ix) Land size per adult equivalent (lan): This was the total land owned by the household
(measured in acres) divided by adult equivalent.
(x) Credit Demand Variables: Section 10 (B) gave the borrowing status of all adult
household members from both the formal and informal financial sectors. The specific
questions that were asked by the survey were: Have you ever appliedfor a loan? If yes,
from what source? The codes for source included: O=bank, 1=co-operative credit
societies, 2=government agencies, 3=non-government organizations, 4=commercial
firms, 5=money lenders, 6=employer, 7=relativeslfriends, 8=community funds,
9=others. As already mentioned in chapter 4.2, from the options listed above it is only
the banks that were regulated by the Bank of Uganda under the Financial Institutions
Statute (FIS) 1993 at the time of the UNHS 1999/2000 survey. The rest of the options
for source fell in the unregulated informal financial sector. The Microfmance Deposit-
Taking Institutions Act (2003) that was discussed in section 4.3.5 was only promulgated
into law in May 2003 and is in the process of being implemented. The variable for
general" credit demand (level) was constructed as a binary variable (=1 if a borrower
applied for credit from either the formal or informal financial sector, otherwise zero).
The informal credit demand variable (boro) was generated as a binary variable (=1 if
borrower applied for an informal sector loan, otherwise zero). The variable boro took
the value of one if the source was co-operative credit societies, government agency'",
non-government organizations, commercial firms, moneylenders, employer,
relatives/friends, community funds, others and zero if the source was a bank. The
variables for loan amounts demanded and supplied from the general credit market
(irrespective of whether source was formal or informal sector) were ammo and recivo
9 General refers to the whole credit market (both the formal and informal financial sectors)
10 Government Agency refers to institutions that managed Government credit schemes such as Entandikwa, Poverty
A lleviation Project loans, and were not part of the regulated financial sector.
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respectively expressed in dollars. The variables for loan amounts applied for and
received from the informal financial sector were labeled as infdd and infss respectively
expressed in dollars.
(xi) Credit Rationing Variables: Section 10(B) also gave the loan amounts applied for by
various household members from the various sources and the amounts received. The
variable lessmo which captured being credit rationed in the general credit market was
constructed as a binary variable (=1 if loan amount received was less than loan amount
applied or the loan application totally rejected in the formal or informal financial
markets, otherwise zero). The variable for informal financial sector credit rationing
(ration) was also constructed as a binary variable (=1 if amount received from the
informal financial sector source was less than amount applied for or application totally
rejected, otherwise zero).
(xii) Loan Period: This was measured in number of months.
(xiii) Regional and Rural/urban Dummy variables: For regional decomposition of the
sample, the regional dummies took the value of one if the household was located in a
specific region, otherwise zero. The regional dummy variables were labeled as follows:
central region (reg1), eastern region (reg2), northern region (reg3), and western region
(reg4). The rural/urban dummy (urba) took the value of one if urban, otherwise zero.
(xiv) Missing Variables: The following variables were not captured by the UNHS 1999/2000
survey and could not be incorporated in the analytical work: savings, interest rates and
commissions charged by financial institutions for loans, transaction costs incurred by
borrowers (such as transport costs, waiting time), and specific repayment difficulties
encountered.
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7.4 Analytical Techniques
7.4.1 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Descriptive statistics (means, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and number of
observations) for the defined variables for the entire sample were generated and are
presented in Appendix 1. The informal sector borrowers were then separated and
decomposed by region, rural/urban residence and informal lender category where Analysis
of Variance (ANOV A) was used to test the differences of means of all the variables for
borrowers in the various categories following Billingsley et al (1986). The hypotheses tested
was that the borrowers from the various categories have the same mean characteristics:
Ho: JJ.i I = JJ.i2 = JJ.IJ ... = JJ.ik ••.•.••••••••...•..•••••••••...•••..•..•...•• (11)
HI: JJ. if =1= JJ. i2 =1= JJ.ts .. .=/= JJ. ik •••••..•.•••••••.•.•.••••...•..•.•••••.•...•• (12)
where JJ.ik = mean of the ith variable (ageh, sex. etc) for households in the kth category. The
number of categories (k) varied according to the decomposition parameter as follows:
regional decomposition (k = 4), rural-urban decomposition (k = 2), informal lender
decomposition (k = 4). The ANOV A F statistic for each variable was computed as follows:
Fu.vl.v2 =SBISw (13)
Where:
(F significance level
vl = Numerator degrees of freedom, equal to (k-1), where k= number of categories.
v2 = Denominator degrees of freedom, equal to (nT - k), where nT= total sample size
S B = Between-group variance
Sw= Within-group variance
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7.4.2 Econometric Model Estimation
7.4.2.1 Credit Demand Models
The study used four main estimation techniques: the logit model for the probability of credit
demand, the Heckman probit model with sample selection for the probability of credit
rationing, the Heckman two-step selection model for the value of credit demanded and
supplied, and the multinomiallogit model for the choice between formal and informal sector
credit (using those who had not applied for any credit as the reference category), and choice
between informal institutions (using the relatives/friends/community funds as the reference
category).
The logit model was used to estimate a behavioural model for household credit demand,
where demand was captured by the probability of applying for a loan, given the relevant
socio-economic characteristics. In a logit model, the outcome variable is discrete
dichotomous in nature (Kennedy, 1992; Greene, 2000), where the probability, p, that a
borrower demands a loan is given by:
p = e z/(1+ eZ) ...•...•.•......••..•...•.•••.......••...•........•....•..••. (14)
Central to the use of logistic regression is the logit transformation of p given by Z
Z = In[p/(l-p)] (15)
Where
z = Uo+ LUjXj + Ilj (16)
Where Uj are the regression parameters, Xi are the household socio-economic variables
(independent variables) and J-li is the error term.
When borrowing is perceived as a decision-making process, then it starts with an individual
either having a demand for credit or not. It is only those individuals who have demand for
credit who decide to apply for credit, and those who do not have demand for credit will not
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apply (Zeller, 1994). Two separate logit models were estimated for the general credit
demand and informal credit demand with dependent variables being level and boro
respectively, over the same set of explanatory variables. The analysis was done at the
national, regional and rural/urban levels. The specific explanatory variables in vector X that
were included in the credit demand model are listed in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Explanatory Variables for Credit Demand Model
Variable Definition and unit of Expected sign Economic intuition for
name measurement of coefficient expected result
age Age of borrower, measured in Positive for Older members control
years both formal household resources,
and informal hence have capacity to pay
credit
sex Sex of borrower (=1 if male, ?? Undefined a priori
otherwise zero)
depr Dependency ratio Positive for Higher dependency ratio
both formal increases demand for
and informal consumption credit such
credit as education for children
edh Highest education level of Positive for Education increases
borrower, measured in number of both formal returns from capital
completed years schooling and informal
credit
sic Health status of the household, Positive for Poor health status
measured by the number of sick both formal increases demand for
days lost by household due to and informal credit for heath care
sickness credit financing to maintain the
productive capacity of the
labour force
mig Migration status of household ?? Undefined a priori
head (=1 if household head
migrated to current location,
otherwise zero)
hhexp Total household expenditure (in Negative for Households with higher
US$) informal income can use their own
credit savings and/or borrow
bigger and cheaper credit
from the formal banks
astva Total value of household assets Negative for Households endowed with
(in US$) informal assets can pledge them to
credit banks for bigger loans
Ian Total household land holding (in Negative for Same as above
acres) informal
credit
Two multinomial logit models were also estimated. The first was to determine the factors
that influence the choice between formal and informal credit, using those that did not apply
for any credit as the reference category. The second multinomial logit model estimated the
factors that determine the borrowers' choice of informal institutions, with relatives Ifriends I
community funds as the reference category.
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The Heckman two-step selection model for the amount of credit demanded was specified as
follows:
Qd = Yo+ 2:YiXi + e., select ( Qd = 'Vo + 2: 'ViK, + Ili ) (17)
Where
Qd =Yo+ 2:YiXi+ Ei is the model of interest
Qd = 'Vo + 2: 'ViK, + Ili is the selection model
Qd = Total value of credit applied for
Xi = Vector of socio-economic characteristics
K, = Subset of the vector of parameters in vector Xi
Yo , 'Vo= constant terms
Yi. 'Vi =Vector of coefficients
Ei = error term
The rationale for estimating the Heckman Selection model was to validate the results from
the logit regressions, as well as to model the volume/amount of credit demand. Given the
fact that sample selection took place in terms of some individuals not demanding any credit,
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method would have given biased parameter
estimates of the amounts of credit demanded (Heckman, 1976:475). Heckman has shown
that this is tantamount to a missing variable problem. The Heckman two-step selection
model involved the specification of the model of interest based on some underlying
economic theory and the selection model whose variables have the likelihood of influencing
the outcome observed. The dependent variable for both the model of interest and the
selection model was the value of credit demanded, with explanatory variables being socio-
economic characteristics. The rationale for the use of the Heckman two-step selection model
is that the dependent variable for the model of interest is not always observable for cases
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where the amount of credit demanded is zero. The dependent variable for the ith observation
is only observable if ('Vi K, + !li »0, where Ei~N(O,l), !li ~N(O,l), corrre., !li) = P and p '# O.
By implication, only observations whose dependent variables were observable (i.e. people
who did apply for credit) were selected into the model of interest. The test for the unbiased
parameter estimates is based on whether the error terms of the model of interest and the
selection model are correlated (p). The diagnostic statistics for the Heckman two-step
selection model are discussed in detail in section 9.2.
7.4.2.2 Heckman Probit Model with Sample Selection for Credit Rationing
As argued in section 6.2, the lender makes a decision whether to ration credit demand or not
based on his analysis of the borrower's socio-economic characteristics, plus any other
available information on the borrower's behaviour. The Heckman probit model with sample
selection was used to analyze the factors that influence the lenders' credit rationing
behaviour. The Heckman probit model with sample selection involved the specification of
the model of interest and the selection model. For the model of interest, the dependent
variable was the probability of being credit rationed either in the whole credit market or
specifically in the informal financial sector. The dependent variables were lessmo (=1 if
credit rationed in the whole credit market i.e. formal or informal, otherwise zero) and ration
(=1 if credit rationed in the informal financial sector, otherwise zero) which were regressed
over the same independent variables (Xi). For the selection models, the dependent variable
was the probability of applying for the loan. For the whole credit market rationing model,
the dependent variable for the selection model was level (=1 if applied for credit in the
formal or informal financial sector, otherwise zero). For the informal financial sector credit
rationing model, the dependent variable for the selection model was boro (=1 if applied for
informal credit, otherwise zero). The rationale for this specification was to avoid modelling
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those who had not applied for any credit, as such persons were not credit rationed by
financial institutions (formal and informal) but were self-credit rationed (Heckman, 1976).
The specification of the Heckman probit model with sample selection for informal credit
rationing was as follows:
Prob(ration) = ~o+ L~j Xi+ Ej, select (boro = no + L n j K, + Ej ) (18)
Where:
Prob(ration) = ~o + L~j Xi+ Ej is the model of interest
Prob(boro) = no + L n j K, + Ilj is the selection model
ration = the probability of being credit rationed (ration =1 if borrower was credit rationed
in informal sector, otherwise zero)
boro = the probability of applying for an informal loan (boro =1 if borrower applied for
informal loan, otherwise zero)
~o, no = constant terms
~j, n j = vector of coefficients
X; = Vector of household socio-economic characteristics
K, = Sub-set of the socio-economic characteristics vector, X,
Ej.!J1 = error terms
Again, the dependent variable for the model of interest is not always observable. The
dependent variable for the jth observation is only observable if (OJ K, + Ilj »0, where
Ej -N(O,l), Ilj -N(O,l), corns, .Ilj) = P and p '# 0.
The specific explanatory variables included in the vector X for both the informal sector and
broader sector credit rationing models are listed in Table 7.2.
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T bI 7 2 E t v 0 bI f th C dit R ti Mdla e 0 : xprana ory ana es or e re I a IOOlDg o e
Variable Expected Economic intuition
name sign of
coeJjjcient
age Positive Older households are more likely to apply for
larger amounts, thereby being credit rationed by
informal lenders
sex ?? Undefined a priori
educ Positive Education and literacy levels do not necessarily
improve the loan repayment behaviour. The
educated people are more informed of their legal
rights and hence the probability of defaulting may
be high, as informal lenders lack legal enforcement
rights. All such matters have to go through the
inefficient and corruption-ridden courts of law
which favour the defaulter. For that reason the
educated/literate households are more likely to be
credit rationed
sic Positive Households with poor health status have a low
repayment capacity, hence more likely to be credit
rationed
mig ?? Undefined a priori
inc Negative Households with higher income, assets and land
as tva holding exhibit a high repayment potential, as
Ian recoveries can be effected through liquidation of
such assets, hence less likely to be credit rationed
The Heckman two-step selection model was also used to analyze the factors that influence
the amount of credit supplied by lenders. The specification of the Heckman two-step
selection model for the amount of informal credit supplied is as follows:
Where
Qs = 00+ LOi Xi+ Ei is the model of interest
Qs = <P 0 + L <P i K, + J..Li is the selection model
Qs = Total value of credit supplied
Xi =Vector of socio-economic characteristics
K, = Sub-set of vector of socio-economic characteristics, Xi.
00 , <Po = Constants
Oi , <Pi = Coefficients
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ei , J.!i= error terms
As discussed earlier, the dependent variable of the model of interest is not always
observable. The dependent variable for the ithobservation is observable on condition that
(<PiKi+J.!i»O, where Ei~N(O,I), J.!i~N(O,I), corr(Ei,J.!i)= p and p # O.
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter had two main motivations. The first objective was to construct the variables
which were identified as key determinants of informal credit demand and credit rationing in
sections 5.4 and 6.4 respectively from the UNHS 1999/00 data set. The second objective
was to explicitly specify the econometric models to be used for estimation of determinants
of informal credit demand and credit rationing in Uganda.
The conclusion from this chapter is that most of the data needed to construct the variables of
interest was captured by the UNHS 1999/00 survey. The specific socio-economic variables
which were constructed included: age, sex, dependency ratio, health status (proxied by
number of sick days), migration status, household expenditure, value of household assets.
The loan characteristics captured by the survey included the different sources of credit
(formal and informal), the loan amounts applied for, the loan amounts received, and the loan
period. Based on information of loan amount demanded and received, the variable for being
credit rationed was constructed. However the survey did not capture information on the
price variables for credit such as interest rates and commissions charged by the lenders, and
the transaction costs incurred by the borrowers (such as transport costs, waiting time to
receive a loan).
With regard to analytical techniques, the conclusion was that it is more appropriate to use
different techniques. The ANOYA technique was used for analysis of the descriptive
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statistics of the variables of interest, which results are discussed in chapter 8. The different
econometric models that are selected for empirical work for the current study include: the
logit model for estimation of the determinants of the households' borrowing behaviour, the
Heckman probit model with sample selection for estimation of the determinants of informal
lenders' credit rationing behaviour, the Heckman two-step selection model for estimation of
the determinants of the value of credit demanded and supplied, and the multinomial logit
model for estimation of factors that influence the borrowers' choice between formal and
informal credit, and choice between informal institutions. The selection of the different
econometric models was motivated by the need to generate plausible results and control for
sample selection bias (which specifically relates to the choice of the Heckman two-step
selection models, and the Heckman probit models with sample selection). The econometric
results of the study are presented in chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 8: EMPIRICAL RESULTS - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
8.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the descriptive statistics of the variables of
interest. This is a bivariate analysis, which gives some indications of the relationships
between the variables of interest. The limitation of the bivariate analysis, however, is that it
cannot give the exact relationships between credit demand or credit rationing variables and
the rest of the variables, which can only be provided by the multivariate analysis whose
results are discussed in chapter 9. The variables of interest that influence informal credit
demand and credit rationing were identified in sections 5.4 and 6.4 respectively, and are
measured as discussed in section 7.3. The ANOVA technique, referred to in section 7.4.1,
was used to analyze the mean differences of the variables of interest across various
categories (namely credit status, regional and rural/urban categories).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.2 analyzes the credit status of the
sample, which examines whether the respondents applied for credit or not, and the source of
credit if any. Section 8.3 discusses the socio-economic characteristics of the sample, and
section 8.4 presents the conclusions of the chapter.
8.2 Credit Status of Sample
The analysis was done at the individual level comprising of adults!' who had provided
information related to credit transactions. The sample was analyzed by region, residence and
credit status using unweighted data of UNHS 1999/2000. The four regions that were used
for analysis were constituted as follows: Central Region (12 districts), Eastern region (12
districts), Northern Region (10 districts) and Western Region (12 districts). The residence
IIAdults are those aged above 18years as stipulated by the Ugandan laws.
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status dummy was used to decompose households into either rural or urban (= 1 if
household resides in urban area, otherwise zero). The different informal financial
institutions earlier discussed in section 3.4 were classified into four main categories as
follows: Category 1 (Cooperative credit societiesINGOs), Category 2 (Money
lenders/Commercial firms), Category 3 (Relatives/friends/community funds/employers), and
Category 4 (Government Agencies).
There were a total of 22,932 adults who were covered in the UNHS 1999/2000 survey. The
credit status captured whether the respondent ever applied for a loan or not, and the source
of credit if they ever applied. The credit status variable separated the sample into two broad
categories: the borrowers and non-borrowers. The borrowers were further categorized by
the source of credit: formal sector (banks) and informal sector.
The results tables have been organized in such a way that the observations are presented by
row (which gives the row percentages) and by column (which gives the column
percentages). The motivation for this style of presentation is that it allows the analyst to
make between-group and within-group comparisons. For between-group comparisons, the
row percentage is used, while the column percentage is used for within-group comparisons.
8.2.1 Non-borrowers
At the national level, 90.3% of the respondents had not applied for any credit during the last
12 months prior to the survey. At the regional level, northern region had the highest
proportion of respondents who had never applied for loans (98.8%) followed by the central
region (91.6%). At the rural/urban level, the proportions of those who had not applied for
credit were 90.7% and 88.8% for the rural and urban sectors respectively (see Table 8.1).
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Table 8.1: Credit Status of Sample by National, Region and Rural/Urban"
Credit Region Sector National
Status
Never Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural Total
Applied 5,757 5,484 3,665 5,802 4,227 16,302 20,708
27.8% 26.5% 17.7% 28.0% 20.6% 79.4% 100.0%
91.6% 88.7% 98.8% 88.0% 88.8% 90.7% 90.3%
Bank 36 13 11 49 69 38 109
33.0% 11.9% 10.1% 45.0% 64.5% 35.5% 100.0%
0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 0.7% 1.5% 0.2% 0.5%
Informal 494 687 190 744 463 1,633 2,115
23.4% 32.5% 9.0% 35.2% 22.1% 77.9% 100.0%
7.8% 11.1% 4.9% 11.3% 9.7% 9.1% 9.2%
Total 6,287 6,184 3,866 6,595 4,759 17,973 22,932
27.4% 27.0% 16.9% 28.8% 20.9% 79.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The reasons for not applying for credit were also analyzed by region and rural/urban
location (see table 8.2). At the national level, the four main reasons cited were: that they
did not need credit (44.9%), did not know where to apply (18.9%) and did not have required
security (17.8%). A regional level analysis suggested that the highest proportion of those
who did not need credit was from northern region (52.5%) and lowest in eastern region
(38.0%). Lack of knowledge of where to apply and non-availability of supply as being
reasons for not applying had a similar regional distribution where the problem was more
pronounced in northern region and lowest in eastern region. However lack of the required
security as a constraint to applying for credit was more prevalent in eastern region (26.1 %),
while the argument of interest rates being too high was dominant in central region (5.3%).
The rural/urban decomposition suggested that the main reasons for not applying for credit
within the rural sector included no need for it (43.2%), lack of knowledge where to apply
(20.5%) and lack of security (17%). Within the urban sector, the main factors for not
applying for credit included: not needed (50.8%), lack of security (20.7%) and lack of
knowledge where to apply (13.3%).
12 Because of some missing urban/rural values, the rows do not all add up.
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Table 8.2: Reasons for not Applying for Credit by National, Region, and Rural/Urban"
Reason Region Sector National
Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural Total
Does not 2,359 2,045 1,889 2,847 2,109 6,921 9,140
need 25.8% 22.4% 20.7% 31.2% 23.4% 76.6% 100.0%
Credit 41.5% 38.0% 52.5% 50.2% 50.8% 43.2% 44.9%
Does not 1,026 903 777 1,142 551 3,288 3,848
know 26.7% 23.5% 20.2% 29.7% 14.4% 85.7% 100.0%
where to 18.1% 16.8% 21.6% 20.1% 13.3% 20.5% 18.9%
apply
No 583 553 493 603 246 1,978 2,232
supply 26.1% 24.8% 22.1% 27.0% 11.1% 88.9% 100.0%
available 10.3% 10.3% 13.7% 10.6% 5.9% 12.4% 11.0%
locally
Does not 1,216 1,048 312 678 860 2,713 3,614
have 33.7% 39.0% 8.6% 18.8% 24.1% 75.9% 100.0%
required 21.4% 26.1% 8.7% 12.0% 20.7% 17.0% 17.8%
security
Interest 300 135 74 278 239 542 787
too high 38.1% 17.2% 9.4% 35.3% 30.6% 69.4% 100.0%
5.3% 2.5% 2.1% 4.9% 5.8% 3.4% 3.9%
Other 196 344 56 124 148 567 720
27.2% 47.8% 7.8% 17.2% 20.7% 79.3% 100.0%
3.5% 6.4% 1.6% 2.2% 3.6% 3.5% 3.5%
Total 5,680 5,388 3,601 5,672 4,153 16.009 20,341
27.9% 26.5% 17.7% 27.9% 20.6% 79.4% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The analysis of reasons for not applying for credits brings to the fore interesting findings.
First, there is limited utilization of credit both in the rural and urban areas. This tends to
agree with Adams and Nehman (1979) who argued that there is limited credit demand
among the poor due to lack of profitable investment opportunities. In the case of Uganda,
the poor reside in the rural and peri-urban areas. Secondly, there is a lack of market
information on available credit opportunities, especially among the rural population. This is
reflected in two of the reasons given for not applying for credit, namely not knowing where
to apply and no supply available locally. It is for this reason that Bagachwa (1995: 44)
advocated policies for provision of market information and infrastructural support services
to enhance financial sector development.
13 Because of some missing urban/rural values, the rows do not all add up.
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Thirdly, lack of required security also featured as a constraint to applying for credit. This
could be particularly true for bank credit where collateral is a pre-requisite for any
borrowing, hence contributing to financial market segmentation. The poor with no credible
collateral are denied access to formal bank credit. It is against this background that policies
for formal sector banks to use collateral substitutes such as joint liability contracts are
advocated (Reindinger, 1994). These policies will not only increase access by the poor to
formal credit but also reduce the formal bank's transaction costs for dealing with small
borrowers.
Fourthly, the interest rate was not rated as a significant constraint to applying for credit.
Only 3.9% of those who did not apply for credit cited a high interest rate as the constraint.
Even within the rural sector, only 3.4% reported the high interest rate as the constraint for
not applying for credit. What these results seem to confirm are the arguments by Rhyne and
Otero (1992) that what is more critical to the poor is access to credit but not the interest rate.
The poor can pay high interest rates as long as they have access to convenient and flexible
credit products that meet their needs. However information on interest rates was not
captured in the UNHS 1999/2000 survey so it was not possible to empirically test this
hypothesis.
8.2.2 Bank borrowers
At the national level, only 0.5% of respondents had applied for bank credit. The results
suggest limited access to formal sector credit. The regional analysis suggests that the highest
proportion of respondents that applied for bank credit was from western region (0.7%) and
lowest in eastern region (0.2%). Within the rural sector, only 0.2% of the respondents
applied for bank credit, as compared to 1.5% of those in the urban sector (see table 8.1).
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These results corroborate empirical findings that banks have an urban bias (Adams and
Nehman, 1979). By being located in the urban areas, the formal banks tend to serve mainly
the interests of the urban sector. The high borrowing costs associated with formal bank
credit plus the use of collateral as a rationing device may explain the limited accessibility to
formal bank credit by the rural people. The limited access to bank credit may also be
explained by the financial sector reforms which led to the closure of some banks and/or
bank branch networks as discussed in section 4.3.2, which made credit even more
inaccessible especially in rural areas. This compounded the already existing problem of
collateral requirements.
From the policy perspective, the challenge is how to increase access to formal sector credit
by especially smaller borrowers. This is based on the rationale that improved access to credit
can enable poor households to improve their welfare by undertaking some investment
projects and also human capital formation (through education loans) that enhances future
productive capacity. Schoombee (2000:754) identified a number of policy options that could
be used to get the banks to extend credit to the small borrowers. These include the use of
non-market oriented or market oriented monetary and financial policies. The non-market
monetary and financial policies include the control of interest rates and redirecting credit
legislation or creation of specialized public sector banks to deliver subsidized credit to
specific sectors (such as agriculture, small industry and housing). As argued in sections
3.2.1 and 4.3.1 and also by Schoombee (2000), non-market oriented policies are inefficient
and result in the sub-optimal allocation of resources. In addition, directed credit
programportfolios are usually characterized by poor repayment rates and worsen the income
inequality between the rich and the poor. This is because the richer households have more
access to subsidized credit than the poor. For these negative distributional effects plus their
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negative effects on financial sector development, non-market policies are not the optimal
policy choices to increase small borrowers' access to formal sector credit.
Market oriented monetary and financial policy instruments include the provision of
incentives to banks to reduce the cost of default risk as well as transaction costs associated
with lending small amounts at a time. These incentives include credit guarantee schemes
which act as alternative collateral to cover against default risk losses, and time-bound grants
andlor subsidies. However Schoombee (2000) argued that care must be taken in the design
and implementation of guarantee schemes in terms of determining the risk-sharing ratio
between the fund and the banks, clarity of rules and regulations regarding the handling of
claims. If the fund's share of the risk is high, then a moral hazard problem may emanate
from the banks by selecting high-risk borrowers. The incentives will provide the banks with
the necessary motivation to extend their services to smaller borrowers with minimal
negative effects on financial sector development, which is the fmancial systems approach to
development finance. This was the basis upon which the Microfinance Capacity Building
Fund (MCAP) of the Microfinance Outreach Plan (MOP) referred to in section 4.3.5 was
designed to motivate best practice MFIs to extend their services to remote rural areas with
no access to banking services.
8.2.3 Informal sector borrowers
The informal financial sector constitutes one of the most important sources of credit. At the
national level, 9.2% of the respondents had applied for informal sector credit. Within the
regions, western region still ranked highest with the highest proportion respondents who
applied for informal credit (11.3%), followed by eastern region (11.1%) and least in the
northern region (4.9%). The rural-urban decomposition reveals that 9.7% of the urban
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respondents applied for informal sector credit as compared to 9.1% of the rural respondents
(see table 8.1).
The identified informal financial institutions from the survey included relatives and friends,
community funds, moneylenders, commercial firms, government agencies, NGOs, co-
operative savings and credit societies and employers (See table 8.3).
Table 8.3: Source of Informal Credit by National, Region, and Rural/Urban"
Source Region Sector National
Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Co- 26 18 13 103 27 129 160
operative 16.3% 11.3% 8.1% 64.4% 17.3% 82.7% 100.0%
Societies 5.5% 2.7% 7.3% 14.4% 6.1% 8.2% 7.9%
Government 46 67 45 80 44 190 238
Agency 19.3% 28.2% 18.9% 33.6% 18.8% 81.2% 100.0%
9.8% 10.0% 25.1% 11.2% 10.0% 12.1% 11.7%
NGOs 137 124 70 32 134 221 363
37.7% 34.2% 19.3% 8.8% 37.8% 62.3% 100.0%
29.2% 18.6% 39.1% 4.5% 30.4% 14.1% 17.9%
Conunercial 3 6 0 9 7 11 18
Firm 16.7% 33.3% 0.0% 50.0% 38.9% 61.1% 100.0%
0.6% 0.9% 0.0% 1.3% 1.6% 0.7% 0.9%
Money 6 3 6 76 12 79 91
Lender 6.6% 3.3% 6.6% 83.5% 13.2% 86.8% 100.0%
1.3% 0.5% 3.4% 10.6% 2.7% 5.0% 4.5%
Employer 9 6 4 3 14 7 22
40.9% 27.3% 18.2% 13.6% 66.7% 33.3% 100.0%
1.9% 0.9% 2.2% 0.4% 3.2% 0.5% 1.1%
Relatives, 228 424 27 241 179 739 920
Friends 24.8% 46.1% 2.9% 26.2% 19.5% 80.5% 100.0%
48.6% 63.5% 15.1% 33.6% 40.6% 47.0% 45.3%
Conununity 11 17 13 160 19 182 201
Funds 5.5% 8.5% 6.5% 79.6% 9.5% 90.6% 100.0%
2.4% 2.5% 7.3% 22.3% 4.3% 11.6% 9.9%
Other 3 3 1 13 5 15 20
15.0% 15.0% 5.0% 65.0% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 1.8% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0%
Total 469 668 179 717 441 1,573 2,033
23.1% 32.9% 8.8% 35.3% 21.9% 78.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
At the national level, friends/relatives constituted the major source of informal credit
(45.3%), followed by non-government organizations (17.9%) and government agencies
(11.7%). Both within the regions and the rural/urban sectors, the most important sources of
14 Because of some missing urban/rural values, the rows do not all add up.
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credit were friends/relatives, and NGOs. These results agree with Bagachwa (1995) who
found that most of the informal credit in Tanzania was from friends and relatives.
8.3 Socio-economic characteristics of sample
Analysis of variance (ANOVA), discussed in section 7.4.1, was used to analyze the
differences of means of socio-economic variables for the respondents by the various
categorization variables (i.e. region, residence and category oflender). The F-statistics of the
ANOVA test are presented in the tables below. The interpretation of the significance of the
ANOVA results is based on the magnitude of the F-value. If the F-value is equal to or
greater than two (2), then there are significant differences in the mean of the particular
variable across the specified categories.
8.3.1 Age, Gender and Household size of Sample by Credit Status
8.3.1.1 Age
At the national level, the mean age of the respondents was 36.75 years. Bank borrowers had
a higher mean age (40.83), with those who had not applied for any credit having the smallest
mean age (36.56). The mean age difference between the three categories (i.e. non-
borrowers, bank and informal sector borrowers) was statistically significant with an F-value
of 15.94. The within-region analysis also revealed the same pattern with bank borrowers
having a higher mean age in three regions namely central, eastern and northern. However,
in the western region the informal sector borrowers had a higher mean age (40.19).
Eastern region generally had the oldest respondents (37.29) and northern region the
youngest respondents (36.33). The rural/urban decomposition reveals that the rural
respondents have a higher mean age (37.72) as compared to the urban respondents (33.31).
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Bank borrowers from both the rural and urban sectors still have a higher mean age as
compared to the other two categories (see table 8.4). The conclusion from these results is
that relatively older people borrow from banks. This may be explained by the fact that older
people are more likely to have assets that can be tendered as security to the banks.
Table 8.4: Mean Age, Gender and Education Level of Sample by Credit Status
Mean Age (in years
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never 36.23 37.26 36.23 36.45 32.92 37.57 36.56
Applied
Bank 42.58 44.15 38.91 39.08 39.29 43.34 40.83
Informal 37.23 37.33 38.21 40.19 35.96 39.08 38.39
Total 36.34 37.29 36.33 36.89 33.31 37.72 36.75
F-ratio 3.60 1.13 1.66 18.55 17.19 8.36 15.94
Gender Proportion (Male= 1)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45
Applied
Bank 0.78 0.62 1.00 0.61 0.62 0.84 0.71
Informal 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.53 0.66 0.63
Total 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47
F-ratio 27.92 48.90 17.91 40.56 7.74 138.75 132.65
Mean Education Level (in years)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never 5.60 4.84 3.82 4.60 7.31 4.11 4.80
Applied
Bank 10.81 6.92 10.00 10.06 10.30 9.08 9.93
Informal 6.25 6.03 6.36 5.18 8.14 5.12 5.81
Total 5.69 4.97 3.96 4.71 7.43 4.21 4.92
F-ratio 34.04 26.33 49.90 49.52 22.19 85.39 137.77
8.3.1.2 Gender
As earlier stated, the sex of the respondents was captured by a dummy variable (=1 ifmale,
otherwise zero) and the F-ratios indicate that sex ratios differ significantly by borrowing
status. At the national level, 47% of the respondents were male. Men were more likely to
apply for bank and informal credit than women. The proportions of male borrowers in the
bank and informal sectors were 71% and 63% respectively (See table 8.4). Women were
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more predominant in the category of those who had not applied for any credit (55%). The
within region analysis also revealed gender differences in access to credit. There was male
dominance in access to credit from both formal and informal sectors (> 60%) in all the
regions. What was more interesting was that all bank borrowers in the northern region were
men. The rural/urban decomposition portrays the same trend of male dominance in access
8.3.1.3 Education level
At the national level, the mean education level (measured in completed years) was 4.92 (see
table 8.4). This implies that the respondents attained primary education level on average.!"
The bank borrowers had the highest mean educational level (9.93), with the non-borrowers
having the lowest mean educational level (4.8). On a regional basis, respondents from
central region had the highest education level (5.69) and northern had the lowest (3.96).
Urban respondents had a higher mean education level (7.43) as compared to the rural ones
(4.21). Both the regional and rural-urban decomposition portrayed the same trend with the
bank borrowers having the highest mean education level, followed by informal sector
borrowers and least among the non-borrowers.
Within the informal financial sector, the mean educational level was 5.81. This implies that
they had not even completed primary level. Informal borrowers in the northern region had
the highest mean educational level (6.36) with western region having the least educated
IS The male dominance in both the formal and informal credit markets may be a reflection of traditional culture where
the men are the representatives of households (Zeller et al, 1994). The inequality in property rights by gender may also
explain why men, who mainly control household assets, have more access to formal credit. In the case of Uganda, the
proposed Domestic Relations Bill (DRB) of 2004 is expected to promote gender equality in household resource
ownership.
/6 Uganda's current educational system is structured such that one requires seven years to complete primary level, six
years for secondary level (ordinary and advanced level), and between three to five years for University degree courses.
The tertiary institutions mainly take students after secondary education for certificate and diploma courses that take on
average two years.
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informal sector of borrowers (5.18). The urban informal sector borrowers had a higher mean
educational level (8.14) than the rural borrowers (5.12).
In conclusion, the results suggest that informal sector borrowers had a lower educational
level as compared to bank borrowers. Within the informal sector, northern region had the
highest educated borrowers and the least educated in the western region. Informal
borrowers located in urban areas had a higher education level than those in the rural sector.
The high education level of bank borrowers suggests that access to formal credit may be
influenced by level of education. This may be explained by the complex formal bank
procedures, which require some level of education to be able to comprehend.
8.3.2 Household size, Dependency ratio and Migration status
8.3.2.1 Household size
At the national level, the mean household size was 6.38, with the bank borrowers having the
highest mean (6.92) and the informal sector borrowers having the lowest mean (6.13) (See
table 8.5). The regional analysis suggests that the respondents from the eastern region have
the highest mean household size (6.64), with the northern region having the lowest (6.14).
The bank borrowers have the higher mean household sizes as compared to informal sector
borrowers in all the regions, with the exception of the western region. Amongst informal
sector borrowers, those from the western region had the highest household size (6.27) and
those in the central region the lowest (5.74). Within the regions, the F- ratio indicates no
significant differences in household size by borrowing status in northern region.
The rural-urban analysis suggests that rural respondents have a higher mean household size
(6.44) than urban respondents (6.14). Within the rural sector, bank borrowers have the
highest mean household size (8.16). The conclusion from this evidence is that bank
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borrowers have higher mean household sizes. Within the informal financial sector, western
region and the rural sector have the highest mean household sizes.
Table 8.5: Mean Household Size, Dependency Ratio, and Migration of Sample by
Credit Status
Mean Household Size
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never 6.29 6.68 6.14 6.40 6.24 6.44 6.40
Applied
Bank 8.17 8.31 7.18 5.57 6.14 8.16 6.92
Informal 5.74 6.23 6.22 6.27 5.22 6.39 6.13
Total 6.25 6.64 6.14 6.38 6.14 6.44 6.38
F-ratio 7.82 4.77 0.56 2.43 11.59 4.64 6.17
Mean Dependency Ratio
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.47
Applied
Bank 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.43 0.43 0.53 0.46
Informal 0.45 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.51 0.49
Total 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.47
F-ratio 0.74 3.05 0.89 5.89 1.62 5.89 5.06
Mean Migration Level (=1 ifrnigrated)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never 0.55 0.38 0.32 0.35 0.68 0.33 0.41
Applied
Bank 0.69 0.46 0.64 0.53 0.70 0.37 0.59
Informal 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.32 0.74 0.33 0.42
Total 0.55 0.39 0.32 0.35 0.68 0.33 0.41
F-ratio 1.74 9.61 4.60 4.99 3.58 0.15 8.25
8.3.2.2 Dependency ratio
As discussed in section 7.3, the dependency ratio was computed as the ratio of children and
the aged to the active adults within a household. 'At the national level, the mean dependency
ratio was 0.47, with informal sector borrowers having the highest (0.49) and bank borrowers
having the least (0.46). The results of the regional disaggregation suggest that dependency
ratios differ significantly across borrowing status categories in only two regions, namely,
eastern and western. Bank borrowers have lower dependency ratios than informal sector
169
borrowers (See table 8.5). The rural-urban analysis suggests that the rural sector has a
higher dependency burden (0.5) than the urban sector (0.4), but within the latter the F-ratio
indicates no significant differences across borrowing categories.
Within the formal sector, borrowers from eastern and northern regions had the highest mean
dependency ratio (0.51) as compared to western region with the lowest (0.43). Similarly
within the informal sector, borrowers from eastern region and the rural sector had the
highest dependency ratio (0.51).
In summary, bank borrowers generally have lower a dependency ratio as compared to
informal sector borrowers. Within the informal financial sector, eastern region has the
highest dependency ratio. Informal borrowers in the rural sector have higher dependency
ratios than to those in the urban sector.
8.3.2.3 Migration status
As explained earlier, the migration status variable was a dummy (=1 if migrated, otherwise
zero)'. Generally the reported proportions of migration are high, which may be associated
with the ambiguity of the question that had been asked in the survey instrument: "Has
(name) always lived in this village? If no, state year in which arrived" It is most probable
that female respondents misinterpreted this question. According to the prevailing marriage
practices, a woman who gets married leaves her parents' home and goes to live with her
spouse. It is not clear how the women married outside their villages of birth interpreted this
question, that is, whether they perceived themselves as immigrants into the villages of their
spouses or not. For this reason this particular result has to be interpreted with caution.
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At the national level, 41% of all the respondents were irrunigrants(see table 8.5). Migration
was more pronounced among the bank borrowers (59%) and lowest among the non-
borrowers (41%). Between the regions analysis suggests that central region had the highest
proportion of immigrants (55%) and northern region the least (32%). The civil war that has
been raging in Northern Uganda ever since Museveni's government came into power in
1986 may explain minimal migration into this region.
In addition, migration is usually motivated by the search for economic opportunities such as
employment. Central region hosts the capital city, which has most industrial establishments.
This may explain the heavy migration into the central region. Interestingly, though, this is
the only region where migration status appears not to differ significantly by borrowing
status. The rate of migration among bank borrowers is higher than among informal sector
borrowers in all regions, except eastern. The rural/urban categorization revealed that there
was greater migration into the urban sector (68%) as compared to the rural sector (33%).
This is consistent with rural-urban migration theories, which highlight the economic and
infrastructural disparities between the two sectors as major explanation (Todaro, 1997:215).
Within the urban sector, migration was highest among informal sector borrowers. But
noteworthy is that migration status did not appear to vary significantly by borrowing status
in rural areas. However, within the informal sector, the same trend of a high proportion of
immigrants being in the central region and urban sector was evident.
In summary, high migration was predominant among bank borrowers as compared to
informal borrowers in all regions. The migration pattern was mainly from the rural to the
urban sectors. Amongst the informal sectors borrowers, migration was the highest into the
central region and the urban sector.
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8.3.3 Household Expenditure, Assets and Land
8.3.3.1 Household Expenditure per adult equivalent (US$)
Household expenditure was used as a measure of household welfare. At the national level,
the mean expenditure per adult equivalent was US$ 224.99 per annum (see table 8.6). The
result for the between region analysis revealed that central region was the wealthiest region
with a mean expenditure of US$ 316.12, followed by western region (US$ 210.7), and
northern region as the poorest (US$ 134.07). Bank: borrowers had a systematically higher
mean expenditure than informal sector borrowers in all the regions. The rural-urban divide
also showed the urban sector being better off than the rural sector with mean expenditure of
US$ 431.3 and US$ 167.01 respectively. These findings are consistent with MFPED
(2003: 102), which observed that there are widening inequalities between the rural and urban
areas and inter-regionally, with the northern region lagging behind the rest of the country,
followed by the eastern region.
Bank: borrowers had the highest mean expenditure ofUS$ 645.3 and non-borrowers had the
lowest (US$ 220.97). Within the informal financial sector, the overall mean household
expenditure was US$ 242.75. The regional distribution of the mean household expenditure
for informal sector borrowers follows the national trend with those from the central region
being the wealthiest (US$ 338.92) and those from northern region being the poorest (US$
181.04). Informal sector borrowers from the rural areas were poorer (US$ 183.78) than
those in the urban areas (US$ 432.69). It is noteworthy that the expenditure per adult
equivalent varies significantly across borrowing categories by region and rural/urban.
In summary, bank borrowers are wealthier than informal sector borrowers. On a regional
level, the respondents from the central were the wealthiest, followed by those from western,
eastern and those from northern being the poorest. The urban respondents were wealthier
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than the rural ones both at regional and rural/urban levels. Those who had not applied for
any credit 12 months prior to the survey had lower mean expenditure as compared to bank
and informal sector borrowers.
Table 8.6: Mean Household Expenditure, Assets and Land Size per Adult Equivalent
Mean Household Expenditure per adult equivalent (US$)
Credit Status Region Sector National
Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never Applied 311.93 203.48 130.60 204.30 425.53 164.91 220.97
Bank 673.25 510.97 477.25 698.14 775.54 345.03 645.30
Informal 338.92 206.15 181.04 228.46 432.69 183.78 242.75
Total 316.12 204.42 134.07 210.70 431.30 167.01 224.99
F-ratio 13.96 5.93 22.43 122.34 13.15 30.77 100.10
Mean Household Assets per adult equivalent (US$)
Credit Status Region Sector National
Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never Applied 71.43 36.11 22.49 59.43 124.71 30.58 50.06
Bank 135.31 81.93 185.06 357.82 316.87 53.28 233.99
Informal 40.92 25.22 21.28 39.48 54.61 26.88 33.55
Total 69.40 34.99 22.89 59.39 120.68 30.29 49.41
F-ratio 0.88 1.85 13.59 13.21 3.93 0.65 14.11
Mean Land Size per adult equivalent (in acres)
Credit Status Region Sector National
Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Never Applied 1.93 0.88 1.60 0.93 1.41 1.27 1.29
Bank 3.04 1.73 0.70 2.13 2.56 1.54 2.31
Informal 2.07 0.78 1.34 2.08 4.58 1.21 1.63
Total 1.95 0.87 1.59 1.07 1.74 1.27 1.32
F-ratio 0.07 1.75 0.12 2.33 2.02 0.04 0.82
8.3.3.2 Household Assets per adult equivalent (US$)
Household assets per adult equivalent vary significantly by borrowing status. At the national
level, the mean value of household assets was US$ 49.41, with bank borrowers having the
highest (US$ 233.99) and the lowest being informal sector borrowers (US$ 33.55) (See table
8.6). Non-borrowers even had higher mean assets (US$ 50.06) than informal sector
borrowers. These results lend credence to empirical evidence that while collateral is a
critical factor for borrowing in the formal sector (Teranishi, 1994), it is not a constraint in
the informal sector where collateral substitutes are used (Reindinger, 1994). On a regional
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basis, central region commanded the highest mean asset values (US$ 69.4), followed by
western (US$ 59.39), then eastern (US$ 34.99), and northern (US$ 22.89). The F- ratios
indicated that there was no significant variation in asset holding across the borrowing
categories in central and eastern regions. On the rural/urban level, the mean assets for the
urban sector (US$ 120.68) was significantly higher than for the rural sector (US$ 30.29).
Within the rural sector, there was no significant variation in asset holding across the
borrower categories.
In summary, the bank: borrowers have higher mean assets compared to informal sector
borrowers. Central region has the highest mean household assets, followed by western,
eastern, and northern. The distribution of asset holding among informal sector borrowers
follows the same distribution as the whole sample on a regional basis.
8.3.3.3 Land per adult equivalent (in acres)
At the national level, the mean land holding per adult equivalent was 1.32 acres (See table
8.6). Bank: borrowers had a higher mean of 2.31 acres as compared to informal sector
borrowers (1.63) and non-borrowers (1.29). Between the regions, respondents from central
region had the highest mean land holding (1.95) and eastern region having the least (0.87).
Within the regions, bank:borrowers had higher mean land holdings than informal financial
sector borrowers in all the regions except northern. What was even more striking was that
non-borrowers had higher mean land holdings than informal borrowers in eastern and
northern regions. The urban sector respondents had a higher mean land holding (1.74) as
compared to those in the rural sector (1.27). These results further support the case that
collateral is not a major factor in borrowing from informal credit markets. As the F-ratios
indicate, land holdings in most regions and nationally do not differ significantly by
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borrowing status, which supports the view that this variable seems to have little influence on
credit.
8.3.4 Utilization of Credit
Within the formal sector, borrowers demanded credit for mainly business working capital
(65.1 %) for either starting up or expanding already existing businesses. Agricultural
production credit and consumption credit was demanded from the formal sector by an equal
proportion of bank borrowers (17.4%) [see table 8.7]. Agricultural production activities
included purchase of agricultural land, purchase of livestock and purchase of agricultural
inputs. Consumption credit was used for education, health care, durable consumer goods,
and services. Within the informal financial sector, the majority of the borrowers needed
credit for household consumption purposes (46.6%), followed by business working capital
requirements (33.7%) and agricultural production (19.9%). These results are consistent with
Mohieldin and Wright (2000) who observed thatformal credit in Egypt is demanded mainly
for investment while informal sector credit is for consumption smoothing.
The informal financial sector was further disaggregated in the second part of Table 8.7 to
investigate the intended uses of credit from the respective informal sources. The results
suggest that relatives/friends/community funds were the most important source of
consumption credit. Out of all respondents who demanded informal credit for consumer
goods/services, 84.2% used friends/relatives as the source of funds. The corresponding
proportions of respondents who demanded credit for various categories of consumption
loans and used friends/relatives as the source were as follows: health care (87.6%),
education (65.3%), and housing (64.1%). The co-operative societies/non-governmental
organizations acted as the most important informal source of credit for agricultural
production (39.4%) and business credit (39.5%). Friends and relatives constituted the
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second most important source of credit for agricultural production (32.2%) and business
credit (38.9%).
This empirical evidence confirms what was found in the literature. First, households
demand credit for both productive investments and consumption purposes (Temu and Hill,
1994). Consumption credit is also argued to be highly productive because it raises the long-
term productive capacity of the household and thus their potential to increase their future
output and income levels. This may explain why credit is demanded for health care,
education and housing (World Bank, 1989b). The literature also shows that relatives/friends
are an important source of consumption credit in developing countries. Finally, there is a
need to diversify the credit products to meet the needs of the clients, such as the
development of specific consumption loans within the banking and micro-finance sectors.
The MCAP initiative under MOP referred to in section 4.3.5 is an appropriate market
oriented incentive mechanism to enhance the capacity of MFls to develop appropriate
financial products.
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Table 8.7: Purpose of Credit by Source
Source of Purpose of Credit National
Credit Agricultural Business Housing Education Health Consumer
Production Care goods,
services
Bank 19 71 6 6 1 6 109
17.4% 65.1% 5.5% 5.5% 0.9% 5.5% 100.0%
4.5% 9.3% 8.0% 4.0% 0.3% 1.5% 5.1%
Informal 407 690 69 145 331 408 2,050
Sector 19.9% 33.7% 3.4% 7.1% 16.2% 19.9% 100.0%
95.5% 90.7% 92.0% 96.0% 99.7% 98.6% 95.0%
Total 426 761 75 151 332 414 2,159
19.7% 35.3% 3.5% 7.0% 15.4% 19.2% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Category of Informal Financial Institutions
Source of Purpose National
Credit Agricultural Business Housing Education Health Consumer
Production Care goods,
services
Cooperative, 154 271 11 25 24 35 520
NGOs 29.6% 52.1% 2.1% 4.8% 4.6% 6.7% 100.0%
39.4% 39.5% 17.2% 17.4% 7.3% 8.6% 25.7%
Money 12 34 6 16 17 24 109
lender, 11.0% 31.2% 5.5% 14.7% 15.6% 22.0% 100.0%
Commercial 3.1% 5.0% 9.4% 11.1% 5.2% 5.9% 5.4%
firm
Relatives, 126 267 41 94 289 341 1,158
Friends, 10.9% 23.1% 3.5% 8.1% 25.0% 29.5% 100.0%
Community 32.2% 38.9% 64.1% 65.3% 87.6% 84.2% 57.3%
Funds
Government 99 115 6 9 0 5 234
Agency 42.3% 49.2% 2.6% 3.9% 0.0% 2.1% 100.0%
25.3% 16.7% 9.4% 6.3% 0.0% 1.2% 1l.6%
Total 391 687 64 144 330 405 2,021
19.4% 34.0% 3.2% 7.1% 16.3% 20.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
8.3.5 Security Requirements for the Loan
Within the formal sector, land constituted the most common type of security for bank credit
(37.0%) - see table 8.8. It should be noted that banks accept only titled land with developed
properties as security, and this may explain why the majority of the population does not
have access to bank credit. This is because the small borrowers do not have acceptable
securities. Currently most of the land, especially in the rural areas, is held under the
customary land tenure system without any certificates of title, hence rendering it unviable as
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collateral security especially for bank credit. The Land Act of 1998 was expected to
expedite the land reforms through the decentralization of the land title processing to the
District Land Boards. However, the registration of titles remains centralized for control
purposes. These land titles can then be used as collateral to secure funds from commercial
banks.
Within the informal financial sector, most of the loans were unsecured (64.9%), implying
that security is not the main yardstick that is used to assess the creditworthiness of the
borrowers. This is consistent with the literature, which argues that informal lenders use their
intimate knowledge of the borrowers for screening them (Morduch 1999). As discussed in
section 3.4, informal lenders also use alternative security arrangements such as joint liability
contracts and dynamic incentives to identify low risk borrowers. In addition informal
lenders strive to build relationships with their clients. The length of time of the business
relationship and past repayment performance also acts as an important factor in informal
lenders' decision-making about the creditworthiness of the borrowers. Land is also used as
security for informal sector loans (18.3%). This may be explained in terms of usufruct
arrangements where the owners of the land assign user rights to the informal lender to use
the land until the loan is fully repaid. Because informal lenders may themselves be farmers,
such an arrangement works very well.
The security requirements were further analyzed by informal financial institution category.
The results suggest that of all collateral-free loans, 73.4% were from
relatives/friends/community funds. This underscores the importance of kinship/relationship
within this credit market segment and intimate knowledge for screening the potential
borrowers. In addition, the existence of social mechanisms to enforce repayment further
diminishes the need for collateral to back up borrowing from friends/relatives (Fernando,
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1998). The second most important informal source of unsecured credit was the co-operative
societieslNGOs (17.4%). Co-operative societies use a membership based lending
methodology where the loans are strictly extended to members and linked to savings, which
acts as a collateral substitute. As argued in section 3.4.5, NGOs mainly use group based
lending methodology, where the members are co-signers of the loan contract. The joint
liability contract acts as an incentive for members to self-select low risk members, monitor
each other and even pay on behalf of the defaulting member so as not to lose access to credit
(Ghatak, 1999). In addition, the NGOs use dynamic incentives of small short-term loans
that are progressively increased over time as a strategy to build a long-term relationship with
the clients as a collateral substitute. The clients being desirous to get bigger loans in future
will undertake to have prompt repayment of their loans so as to build a good reputation
(Park and Ren, 2001).
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Table 8.8: Security Requirements for Credit
Source of Security National
Credit None Land Livestock House Future Other
Harvest
Bank 20 40 1 19 5 23 108
18.5% 37.0% 0.9% 17.6% 4.6% 21.3% 100.0%
1.5% 9.8% 2.0% 33.9% 6.6% 11.3% 5.1%
Informal 1,301 367 49 37 71 181 2,006
Sector 64.9% 18.3% 2.4% 1.8% 3.5% 9.0% 100.0%
98.5% 90.2% 98.0% 66.1% 93.4% 88.7% 94.9%
Total 1,321 407 50 56 76 204 2,114
62.5% 19.3% 2.4% 2.7% 3.6% 9.7% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Category ofInformal Financial Institutions
Source of Security National
Credit None Land Livestock House Future Other
Harvest
Cooperative, 225 132 20 17 29 85 508
NGOs 44.3% 26.0% 3.9% 3.4% 5.7% 16.7% 100.0%
17.4% 36.2% 42.6% 47.2% 40.9% 47.2% 25.5%
Money 33 62 2 3 5 4 109
lender, 30.3% 56.9% 1.8% 2.8% 4.6% 3.7% 100.0%
Commercial 2.6% 17.0% 4.3% 8.3% 7.0% 2.2% 5.5%
fum
Relatives, 949 108 9 4 27 59 1,156
Friends, 82.1% 9.3% 0.8% 0.4% 2.3% 5.1% 100.0%
Community 73.4% 29.6% 19.2% 11.1% 38.0% 32.8% 58.0%
Funds
Government 86 63 16 12 10 32 219
Agency 39.3% 28.8% 7.3% 5.5% 4.6% 14.6% 100.0%
6.7% 17.3% 34.0% 33.3% 14.1% 17.8% 11.0%
Total 1,293 365 47 36 71 180 1,992
64.9% 18.3% 2.4% 1.8% 3.6% 9.0% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
8.3.6 Loan Period (in months)
The determination of the loan period by the lender may be influenced by a number of
factors, which include the projected cash flow of the borrower's business, the perceived
project risk and the lending methodology. The mean loan period for the sample was 6.0
months (see table 8.9). Bank loans had a significantly higher mean loan period (9.7 months)
as compared to informal sector loans (5.8 months). Within the banking sector, the
borrowers from central region got longer loan periods (12.6 months), followed by northern
region (9.3 months), and the lowest in eastern (6.9 months). The bank clients in the urban
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sector had a higher mean loan period (8.9 months), which exceeded that of the rural sector
borrowers (8.7 months). However the F ratios indicate that there is no significant variation
in loan periods across the formal and informal lenders in all the regions except central.
Within the informal financial sector, the highest mean periods were given to borrowers from
the northern region (7.5 months), followed by western region (6.9 months) and the least in
eastern region (4.8 months). Informal sector borrowers in the urban sector received a higher
loan period (5.9 months) as compared to rural informal borrowers (5.8 months). A
significant variation in loan period between formal and informal sector borrowers existed
only within the urban sector.
A disaggregation by informal financial institution category suggests that there was
significant variation in loan periods across the various informal lenders in all the regions
except western. The highest mean loan periods were granted by the government agencies
(10.6 months), followed by co-operative societieslNGOs (7.3 months) and the least by
relatives/friends and moneylenders, which all averaged 4.5 months. Co-operative
societieslNGOs granted the highest mean loan period in the eastern region (9.1 months),
while the moneylenders' highest mean loan period was also in eastern region (5.4 months).
Friends/relatives favoured the borrowers in western region with longer loan periods (6.9
months), while the government agencies were more generous in central region (12.8
months).
On the rural/urban decomposition, the results suggested that all informal sector institutions
gave urban borrowers shorter loan periods as compared to rural borrowers with the
exception of co-operative societieslNGOs. The F-ratios also indicate a significant variation
in loan period across the informal lenders within the rural and urban sectors.
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In summary, the results on loan period agree with the literature. Informal financial
institutions give shorter-term loans as compared to the formal bank sector. This has
implications for the kind of investments that can be undertaken with such credit from either
the formal or informal financial sectors. This may explain why most credit from the
banking sector is invested in productive activities while informal credit is largely for
consumption smoothing (Mohieldin and Wright, 2000).
Table 8.9: Mean Loan Period (in months)
Source of Region Sector National
Credit Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Bank 12.6 6.9 9.3 8.5 8.9 8.7 9.7
Informal 5.0 4.8 7.5 6.9 5.9 5.8 5.8
Total 5.6 4.9 7.5 7.0 6.4 5.8 6.0
F-ratio 29.41 0.95 0.68 0.09 7.47 0.41 2.65
Category ofInformal Financial Institution
Source of Region Sector National
Credit Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Cooperative, 6.2 9.1 8.9 6.0 7.5 7.3 7.3
NGOs
Money 2.8 5.4 2.7 4.6 3.6 4.7 4.5
Lender,
Firm
Relatives, 3.2 3.0 4.5 6.9 3.9 4.7 4.5
Friends,
Community
Funds
Government 12.8 9.1 9.2 11.4 10.4 10.6 10.6
Agency
Total 5.0 4.8 7.5 6.8 5.8 5.8 5.8
F-ratio 23.47 32.03 8.18 0.36 13.2 2.18 4.00
8.3.7 Mean Loan Amounts Demanded and Supplied (US$)
At the national level, the mean loan amount demanded (applied for) was US$241.76, with
mean amounts demanded from formal and informal financial sectors being US$ 2,112.31
and US$145.57 respectively (see table 8.10). There was significant variation in the loan
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amounts demanded between the formal and informal sector sources at the national, regional
and rural-urban levels.
Table 8.10: Mean Loan Amounts Demanded and Supplied (US$)
Mean Loan Amounts Applied for (US$)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Bank 2,681.95 656.84 6,485.78 1,160.17 2,001.74 781.17 2,112.31
Informal 189.11 131.47 146.85 129.92 285.49 103.49 145.57
Total 361.54 141.47 480.48 192.97 512.99 118.20 241.76
F-ratio 33.33 11.26 26.33 117.51 26.12 106.41 126.08
Mean Loan Amounts Received (US$)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Bank 1,985.40 405.98 274.00 1,055.32 920.51 266.70 1,201.68
Informal 107.40 70.73 58.18 79.66 198.84 45.75 81.55
Total 233.84 77.24 70.88 142.02 294.48 50.93 137.66
F-ratio 18.60 32.68 7.01 137.31 49.30 86.05 78.52
Mean Credit Rationed Amount (US$)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Bank 775.44 250.85 729.14 73.31 291.72 515.56 367.83
Informal 81.53 60.95 86.89 48.26 88.95 56.44 63.57
Total 128.43 64.64 121.09 49.80 115.82 66.38 79.25
F-ratio 67.45 1.62 17.91 0.29 5.78 52.92 51.08
At the regional level, the highest mean loan demanded was in northern region (US$ 480.48),
followed by central region (US$ 361.54), and least in eastern region (US$ 141.47). Within
the formal sector, the highest mean loan amount demanded was in northern region (US$
6,485.78), followed by central region (US$ 2,681.95) and the least in eastern region (US$
656.84). Within the informal financial sector, the highest mean loan demanded was in
central region (US$ 189.11), followed by northern region (US$ 146.85) and lowest in
western region (US$ 129.92). The rural-urban decomposition suggests that higher loan
amounts were demanded in the urban sector.
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In terms of loan amounts supplied, US$ 137.66 was the overall mean for the full sample.
Within the formal sector, the mean amount supplied was US$ 1,201.68. Central region had
the highest mean loan supplied (US$ 1,985.4), followed by western region (US$ 1,055.32)
and the least in northern region (US$ 274). Within the informal financial sector, the highest
mean loan amount supplied was US$ 81.55. The highest mean informal loan was supplied
in central region (US$ 107.4), followed by western region (US$ 79.66) and the lowest was
in northern region (US$ 58.18).
The interesting observation here is that the distribution of the mean loan amounts supplied
by region in both formal and informal financial sectors follows the welfare status of the
regions.l ' What these results suggest is that the wealth status of the borrower is one of the
key factors that influences the lenders' decision on the amount to be granted both in the
formal and informal financial sectors. The rural-urban disaggregation reveals that higher
mean loan amounts were supplied in the urban sector compared to the rural sector, both in
the formal and informal financial sectors. This may again be explained by the higher
income in the urban sector, which positively influences the lenders' decision to give a higher
loan amount. This result is consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who argued that the
wealth status of the borrowers is one of the indicators that the lenders use to determine their
repayment capacities.
As discussed in section 6.1, a state of being credit rationed is observed if the loan amount
supplied by the lender is less than the loan amount originally applied for by the borrower or
the loan application being completely rejected. The results suggest the presence of credit
rationing both in the formal and informal financial sectors. In the formal sector, the mean
17 As earlier mentioned, Uganda's regional poverty status has central as the richest region, followed by western,
eastern, and northern in that order.
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credit rationed amount (i.e. the difference between the amount applied for and the amount of
the loan actually received) was US$ 367.83.
The severity of credit rationing is higher in informal financial markets as compared to
formal financial markets, which was a pleasant surprise. The expectation was that credit
rationing was more pronounced in the formal fmancial sector. The inference on the intensity
of credit rationing was derived from the comparison of the ratio of mean loan amount
received to mean loan amount demanded in the formal and informal financial sectors. In the
absence of credit rationing this ratio will be equal to one, and the ratio tends to zero with
higher credit rationing. The computed ratios for the formal and informal financial sectors
were 0.569 and 0.559 respectively, implying a higher intensity of credit rationing in the
informal financial sector. This may be explained by the use of information by the informal
lenders to screen the potential borrowers, which may result in higher credit rationing.
Severe formal sector credit rationing was in central region (US$ 775.44) and the mildest in
the western region (US$ 73.31). Within the informal financial sector, the mean credit
rationed amount was US$ 63.57. Northern region topped the list with the highest informal
credit rationing (US$ 86.89), and the lowest in the western region (US$ 48.26). The rural-
urban decomposition highlighted the fact that there was more severe credit rationing in the
rural sector for borrowers from the formal bank sector, while urban borrowers in informal
sector were more credit rationed.
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Table 8.11: Informal Credit Demanded and Supplied (US$)
Mean Loan Amounts Applied for (US$)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Cooperative, 222.4 326.9 181.2 224.7 381.3 180.6 244.9
NGOs
Money 423.1 121.0 41.2 70.0 359.5 47.4 101.8
Lender,
Firm
Relatives, 100.1 52.9 50.6 51.9 160.3 38.8 62.7
Friends,
Community
Funds
Government 522.3 246.3 194.7 437.4 543.3 308.1 354.1
Agency
Total 190.1 131.4 147.0 129.9 288.3 103.3 145.8
F-ratio 11.48 10.45 2.39 14.73 3.42 46.80 31.53
Mean Loan Amounts Received (US$)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Cooperative, 119.7 142.7 57.9 159.2 230.6 76.6 127.7
NGOs
Money 51.2 121.0 38.4 62.3 183.5 39.7 65.0
Lender,
Firm
Relatives, 81.5 48.3 34.1 45.0 134.4 34.0 53.8
Friends,
Community
Funds
Government 219.5 70.1 92.2 160.2 423.2 53.1 134.5
Agency
Total 107.7 70.9 58.5 79.8 200.5 45.8 81.8
F-ratio 2.39 9.62 0.40 3.35 2.64 11.43 8.18
Mean Credit Rationed Amount (US$)
Credit Region Sector National
Status Central Eastern Northern Western Urban Rural
Cooperative, 102.4 195.3 125.3 65.5 163.0 106.5 120.9
NGOs
Money 371.9 0.0 2.8 8.4 176.0 8.1 37.7
Lender,
Firm
Relatives, 18.6 3.5 15.2 6.7 24.4 4.8 8.4
Friends,
Community
Government 302.8 187.5 110.5 329.7 120.1 276.8 242.8
Agency
Total 82.2 60.7 86.7 48.1 90.2 56.2 63.4
F-ratio 15.56 6.05 3.51 22.35 1.75 43.15 27.17
A decomposition of the informal financial sector suggests that there was significant
variation in credit rationing across the informal institutions at national, regional and rural
levels with the exception of the urban sector (see table 8.11). The most severe credit
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rationing was observed within the government agencies (US$ 242.8). The government credit
programs include the "Entandikwa" credit scheme and the Youth Entrepreneurship Scheme
(YES), which to a large extent are perceived to be state grants (Okurut et al, 2004a). If the
borrowers perceive credit to be disguised grants, then there is a likelihood of demanding
larger loan amounts, thus increasing the probability of being credit rationed. In addition,
due to the fact that government credit schemes are financed through the Treasury, the
budgetary constraints limit the availability of funds thus increasing the probability of being
credit rationing within this sector.
The Co-operative societieslNGOs sector ranked second in terms of the severity of credit
rationing amongst informal financial institutions, which may be accounted for by the
lending methodology used. The co-operative credit societies link the members'
accumulated savings to the maximum amount of credit that one can borrow. The amount of
savings therefore acts as a credit-rationing device. NGOs also use dynamic incentives,
where progressive loan limits have been developed. They start with very small amounts,
which are gradually increased over time dependent on previous loan repayment performance
(Park and Ren, 2001). By implication, the maximum loan amount that a borrower can
access from the NGO at any given point in time is predetermined by policy. It will depend
on the borrowing cycle (that is the number of the times the client has borrowed) and also
repayment performance of previous loans. It implies that any amount of loan applied for
that exceeds the stipulated limit will be credit rationed.
The least credit rationing was observed for credit from the friends/relatives/community
funds (US$ 8.4). This may be explained by the small loan amounts involved, the intimate
knowledge they have on the borrowers and strong social relationships between the lenders
and borrowers. The rural/urban decomposition suggests that the urban borrowers were more
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likely to be credit rationed by all categories of informal fmancial institutions with the
exception of government agencies.
8.3.8 Loan Repayment Difficulties
Of the 1,150 respondents who responded to the question as to whether they encountered any
difficulties in meeting loan repayment dates, 36.5% expressed having faced some problems
(see table 8.12).
Table 8.12: Loan Repayment Difficulties
Source of Repayment Difficulty
Credit Yes No Total
Bank 11 40 51
21.6% 78.4% 100.0%
2.6% 5.5% 4.4%
Informal Sector 409 690 1,099
37.2% 62.8% 100.0%
97.4% 94.5% 95.6%
Total 420 730 1,150
36.5% 63.5% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Category of Informal Institution
Source of Repayment Difficulty
Credit Yes No Total
Cooperative, 73 134 207
NGOs 35.3% 64.7% 100.0%
17.9% 19.6% 19.0%
Money Lender, 46 45 91
Firm 50.6% 49.5% 100.0%
11.3% 6.6% 8.4%
Relatives, 268 459 727
Friends, 36.9% 63.1% 100.0%
Conununity 65.9% 67.2% 66.7%
Funds
Government 20 45 65
Agency 30.13% 69.2% 100.0%
4.9% 6.6% 6.0%
Total 407 683 1,090
37.3% 62.7% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
The majority of those who experienced loan repayment problems were informal sector
borrowers (37.2%). Of all those who expressed having faced repayment problems, the
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highest proportion was borrowers from the relatives/friends (65.9%). This figure may seem
to be high merely because there were more people who borrowed from the relatives/friends,
which may have influenced the high probability of reporting the repayment difficulties. The
survey did not capture the actual repayment difficulties experienced by borrowers, hence a
detailed analysis could not be done.
8.4 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the descriptive statistics of the variables of
interest that are used in the study of credit demand and credit rationing in Uganda's informal
financial sector. The ANOV A technique was used to analyze the mean differences of the
variables of interest across various categories, which included credit status (which
categorized the sample into formal sector borrowers, informal sector borrowers, and non-
borrowers), regional decomposition (central, eastern, northern, and western), and rural urban
categorization.
In conclusion, the evidence from the descriptive statistics suggests the co-existence of the
formal and informal financial sectors, with a significant proportion of the population
depending on informal sources to meet their credit needs. Informal lenders mainly use
collateral substitutes (such as group guarantee), which makes credit more accessible even to
low income earners. The means of the socio-economic variables for the formal sector
borrowers were higher as compared to informal sector borrowers for the following variables:
age, education level, household size, household expenditure, household assets, and land size.
However, informal sector borrowers had a higher mean dependency ratio.
The demand for informal credit exists as evidenced by a significant proportion of the
population that depend on informal credit both for investment and consumption purposes.
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Credit rationing also exists both in the formal and informal financial sectors, with higher
severity in the informal sector.
The regional and rural/urban decomposition suggested that there were variations in means of
the variables of interest across the different regions, and rural/urban sectors. The
multivariate regression results are discussed in chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 9: ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION RESULTS
9.1 Introduction
The main motivation for this chapter is to discuss the empirical findings on the determinants
of credit demand and credit rationing in Uganda's informal financial sector based on
multivariate analysis. The descriptive statistics, based on bivariate analysis discussed in
chapter 8, have the major limitation of not revealing the exact relationship between the
variables of interest. The variables for the multivariate analysis were those identified from
the empirical literature in sections 5.4 and 6.4 respectively, and whose specific
measurements in the context of this study were discussed in section 7.3. The results
presented here are outputs of the specific models for credit demand and credit rationing
referred to in section 7.4.2.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 9.2 gives an overview of the
diagnostic tests that are used as a basis for evaluating the model results. Section 9.3 presents
empirical results for determinants of credit demand in the broader financial sector", section
9.4 discusses determinants of informal credit demand, section 9.5 examines the determinants
of lenders' credit rationing behaviour in the broader fmancial sector, section 9.6 discusses
the determinants of informal credit rationing, and section 9.7 gives the conclusions of the
chapter.
9.2 Model Overview and Diagnostic Tests
Four different models (the logit model, the Heckman probit model with sample selection,
the Heckman two-step selection and multinomiallogit models) were used for econometric
estimation, with socio-economic characteristics being explanatory variables. Where the
18 Broader financial sector refers to both the formal and informal financial sectors
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dependent variable was dichotomous, the logit model was used to estimate the determinants
of the probability of credit demand, while the Heckman probit model with sample selection
was used to estimate the determinants of the probability of being credit rationed. The
multinomial logit model was used to estimate the factors that influence the borrowers'
choice between formal and informal sector credit (using those who did not apply for any
credit as the reference category). The multinomial model for the borrowers' choice of
particular informal financial institutions (using the relatives Ifriends I community funds as
the reference category) was also estimated.
The Heckman two-step selection model was used to estimate the factors that influence the
amount of credit demanded or supplied instead of the OLS model so as to address the
problem of potential sample selection bias due to the inclusion of those who did not apply
for credit (Heckman, 1990:313). In addition the use of the Heckman probit model with
sample selection (referred to in section 7.4.2.2) for estimation of the determinants of the
probability of being credit rationed was motivated by the need to control for those who did
not apply for credit.
The analysis was done at two levels, the broader financial sector level (level one) and the
informal financial sector level (level two). Regressions models were estimated at the
national, regional, and rural/urban levels. The motivation for this decomposition was to
examine whether there are regional or rural/urban differences in terms of factors that
influence credit demand and credit rationing. The only exception was the Heckman two-step
selection models and the multinomial logit models which were estimated at the national
level only.
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The reported diagnostic statistics for the logit models include the Likelihood Ratio (LR)
chi2 (n) where "n" is the degrees of freedom. The LR Chi2 ratio tests for the overall
significance of the model against the null that all the estimated coefficients are jointly equal
to zero. As a rough rule of thumb, the LR Chi2, which is equal or greater than two, signifies
that the coefficients are jointly significantly different from zero. The probability of the
critical chi square (from the statistical tables) being greater than the computed chi square
(prob>chi2) is also one of the diagnostic tests. The closer this probability is to zero, the
higher the significance of the overall model estimates. The z-value which is derived as the
estimated coefficient divided by its standard error, is a measure of the significance of the
individual parameter estimates, holding other factors constant. The z-values, which are close
to or greater than two, indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero. The
probability greater than z (Prob>z) gives the significance levels of the parameter estimates.
The variables that are significant in explaining credit demand or credit rationing at the 1%,
5% and 10% significance levels are identified and marked with asterisks. For the
multinomial logit models, the diagnostic statistics and their interpretations are similar to
those of the logit models.
For the Heckman two-step selection models, the diagnostic statistics include lambda (A.)
which gives a summary statistic as to whether the parameter estimates would have been
biased or not if the OLS model had been used in the estimation. If lambda is significantly
different from zero, then the OLS model estimates would have been biased. The parameter
estimates of the Heckman two-step selection model are therefore said to be biased for the
OLS and unbiased for the Heckman model if the error terms of the model of interest and the
selection model are correlated, hence lambda will be significantly different from zero. This
is because A. = op, where o = standard error and p = correlation coefficient of the two error
terms. The wald chi2(n) and the prob>chi2 test the overall significance of the model against
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the null that the coefficients are jointly equal to zero, with the interpretation of the statistics
as previously discussed. The z-values and the Prob>z which give the level of significance of
each of the parameter estimates holding others constant are also reported and similarly
interpreted as discussed above. For the Heckman probit model with sample selection, the
diagnostic statistics and their interpretations are similar to the Heckman two-step selection
model.
Where regional dummies were used, the northern region was the reference region. Various
interaction effects were experimented with, but only the more relevant ones are reported.
Some of the variables such as health status were dropped from the regressions because of
the small number of observations. As can be seen from Appendix 1, the heath status variable
captured by the number of sick days had many missing values. For this reason the days lost
to illness would have restricted the number of observations too greatly (only about 6,600 of
the almost 23,000 individuals have valid values for this variable). A lesser restriction was
imposed by observations for land size, which were restricted to less than 17,000
observations, but this variable was regarded as important enough to retain as the restriction
was less severe. Consequently, the number of observations without any missing values
included differ somewhat between various models, depending on the number of variables
included in the analysis.
9.3 Determinants of Credit Demand in the Broader Financial Sector
9.3.1 National Logit Model for Credit Demand
As earlier pointed out, the dependent variable for the broader financial sector logit model of
credit demand was level (=1 if applied for credit in the formal or informal financial sectors,
otherwise zero), with explanatory variables being socio-economic variables and results
presented in table 9.1.
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Table 9.1: Logit Model for Credit Demand in Broader Financial Sector [National and
Regional]
Equation of Interest: Dependent Variable level (=1 if applied for bank or informal sector credit,
otherwise zero)
Explanatory National Re ion
Variables Central Eastern Northern Western
Lnage 0.737 0.724 0.568 0.866 0.869
(10.24)*** (4.88)*** (4.21)*** (3.20)*** (7.52)***
Sex (Male= 1) 0.684 0.665 0.870 0.345 0.615
(11.5)*** (5.46)*** (7.76)*** (1.55) (6.56)***
lnhhsize -0.033 0.016 -0.112 0.568 -0.113
(0.62) (0.15) (1.16) (2.72)*** (1.17)
lneduc 0.037 0.039 0.045 0.056 0.030
(8.24)*** (3.47)*** (5.15)*** (3.13)*** (4.61)***
lndepr 0.473 0.296 0.516 0.768 0.546
(5.92)*** (1.66)* (3.29)*** (2.50)** (4.55)***
lnhhexp 0.376 0.587 0.092 0.571 0.485
(6.78)*** (4.95)*** (0.93) (3.08)*** (5.07)***
Dummy: Migration 0.053 -0.036 0.387 -0.086 -0.137
(0.90) (0.29) (3.51)*** (0.37) (1.39)
Lnlan -0.051 -0.055 -0.039 0.210 -0.066
(2.29)** (1.22) (1.09) (1.85)* (1.59)
lnastva -0.036 -0.215 -0.153 0.246 0.103
(1.07) (3.10)*** (2.41)** (2.18)** (1.88)*
Dummy: Urban -0.017 -0.114 0.448 -0.512 -0.354
(0.19) (0.64) (2.67)*** (1.36) (2.18)**
Dummy: Central 0.209
Region (1.76)*
Dummy: Eastern 0.682
Region (6.14)***
Dummy: Western 0.790
Region (7.18)***
Constant -7.263 -7.703 -4.178 -10.113 -7.758
(17.29)*** (9.21)*** (5.74)*** (7.11)*** (11.68)***
Number of 15,533 3,920 4,165 2,290 5,158
Observations
LR Chi2 588.38 106.46 184.29 74.95 221.36
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0589 0.0469 0.0637 0.0811 0.0584
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
The diagnostic statistics show that the models are significant, and the variables are as
previously defined in section 7.3 but transformed to natural logarithm, hence the letters "11,"
at the beginning of each variable name. The logit model estimates at the national level
suggest that the probability of applying for credit is positively and significantly influenced
by age at the 1% significance level. The significance of the age coefficient may be
explained by the fact that the older individuals have greater control over household
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productive resources, which can be used to secure and service the loan. This may be
particularly true for formal bank credit, which is characterized by collateral requirements
(Adams and Nehman, 1979).
The sex of the borrower had a positive and significant effect (at 1% significance level) on
the probability of applying for credit from the broader financial sector. The positive
coefficient for the sex dummy conforms to the theory of male dominance in resource control
and therefore having a higher likelihood of applying for credit. Education level has a
positive and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on borrowing behaviour, which
is consistent with the expectation. Education increases the potential returns from capital
investments and in tum increases the probability of credit demand. Household size has an
insignificant effect on credit demand.
The dependency ratio has a positive and significant effect (at 1% significance level) on the
probability of credit demand. Higher dependency ratio increases the demand for
consumption credit such as for education of children and health care. Household
expenditure, which was used as a measure for household income, has a positive and
significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on credit demand. These results are
consistent with a study by Musinguzi and Smith (2000), where the coefficient of income
was positive and significant. Being a migrant has a positive but insignificant effect on the
probability of credit demand.
The size of land holding has a negative and significant effect (at 5% significance level) on
the probability of credit demand, which was surprising. The expectation was that land
constitutes collateral that can be pledged as security for loans, so people with higher land
sizes were expected to have a higher demand for credit. However, the quality of land as
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collateral depends on whether it is titled property, and the developments thereon. The
negative sign of the land size coefficient may be explained by the fact that most of the land
in Uganda, especially in rural areas, is untitled19 and in some cases it is communally owned,
thus not an attractive collateral.
Household asset values have a negative but statistically insignificant effect on the
probability of credit demand. The expectation was that the households that are well
endowed with assets would have good collateral to pledge as security for loans and hence
have a higher demand for credit, thus the sign of the coefficient is surprising. It could also
be that these households have less need for credit.
Being an urban resident has a negative but insignificant effect on credit demand. The
expectation was that urban residents need more credit than their rural counterparts, hence the
coefficient would be positive. This is because urban residents have to buy all the food they
eat, pay rent for accommodation and bills for services consumed (water, electricity) which
raises their financing needs. Rural residents consume own food produced and live in own
houses, thus having relatively lower spending pressures. Regional location, using northern
as the reference category, has a positive and significant effect on credit demand. Households
that are located in other regions relative to northern region have a higher likelihood of
applying for credit as captured by the positive and significant coefficients of the regional
dummies.
19 It is for this reason that the Land Act of 1998 seeks to provide bonafide occupants with
certificates of title so that they can be used to secure credit.
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9.3.2 Regional Logit Models for Credit Demand in Broader Financial Sector
The regional logit model regressions are presented in table 9.1. Age and education level
have positive and significant effects (at 1% significance level) on the probability of credit
demand in all the regions. Being male has a positive and significant effect (at the 1%
significance level) on borrowing behaviour in all the regions except northern where the
coefficient is statistically insignificant. This gives an indication of discrimination against
women in the credit market.
Household size has insignificant effect on credit demand in all the regions except northern
where it was positive and significant (at the 1% significance level). The coefficients for the
dependency ratios were positive and significant in all the regional models but with varying
levels of significance as follows: eastern and western (1% significance level), northern (5%
significance level) and central (10% significance level). Household expenditure had a
positive and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on credit demand in all regions
except in eastern region where it was insignificant. Being a migrant significantly influenced
credit demand in only eastern region (at the 1% significance level), while land size was
positive and significant (at the 10% significance level) only in northern region. Asset values
had a positive and significant effect on credit demand in the northern and western regions at
the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. However in the central and eastern
regions, asset values had a negative and significant effect on the probability of credit
demand at the 1% and 5% significance levels respectively. While being an urban resident
has a positive and significant effect (at 1% significance level) on the probability of credit
demand in eastern region, it has a negative and significant effect (at the 5% significance
level) in the western region.
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9.3.3 RurallUrban Logit Models for Credit Demand in the Broader Financial Sector
The rural/urban analysis suggests that credit demand in the rural areas is positively and
significantly influenced by the following variables (at the 1% significance level): age, sex,
education level, dependency ratio and household expenditure. Household size and asset
values have positive but insignificant effects. Land size had a negative and significant effect
(at the 1% significance level) on credit demand (see table 9.2).
In the urban sector, the probability of credit demand was positively and significantly (at the
1% significance level) influenced by age, education level, dependency ratio and household
expenditure. The coefficient for sex was also positive and significant at the 5% significance
level. An interesting observation was the negative and significant coefficient (at the 1%
significance level) for household size in the urban sector logit model, where large household
sizes may be more indicative of poverty.
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Table 9.2: Logit Model for Credit Demand in the Broader Financial Sector [Rural and
Urban]
Dependent Variable: level (= 1 if applied for bank or informal credit,
otherwise zero)
Explanatory Variables Rural Urban
Lnage 0.661 1.306
(8.67)*** (6.23)***
Sex (Male= 1) 0.766 0.312
(11.94)*** (1.99)**
lnhhsize 0.066 -0.459
(1.14) (3.31)***
lneduc 0.031 0.052
(6.60)*** (3.08)***
lndepr 0.378 0.711
(4.36)*** (3.48)***
lnhhexp 0.355 0.356
(6.01)*** (2.70)***
Dummy: Migration -0.022 0.256
(0.34) (1.59)
Lnlan -0.107 -0.032
(4.15)*** (0.78)
lnastva 0.047 -0.049
(1.31) (0.61)
Constant -6.909 -7.604
(16.35)*** (7.20)***
Number of Observations 13,705 1,828
LRChi2 429.98 89.35
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0494 0.0694
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
9.3.4 Multinomial Model for borrowers' choice between formal and informal sector
credit
The reference category for the multinomiallogit model was those who did not apply for any
credit. The results (see table 9.3) suggest that, relative to the reference category, the
probability of applying for bank credit is positively and significantly influenced at the 1%
significance level by age, sex, education level, household expenditure, and living in the
urban areas. The dependency ratio and household size have positive and significant effects
at the 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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The choice of informal sector credit, relative to the reference category, is positively and
significantly influenced at the 1% significance level by the age of the borrower, being male,
education level, dependency ratio and household expenditure. The coefficient for land size
was negative and significant at the 5% significance level. Being located in other regions,
relative to being in northern region, has a positive and significant effect on the choice of
credit from informal lenders, as captured by the coefficients of the regional dummies.
Table 9.3: Multinomial Logit Model for Choice between Formal and Informal Sector
Credit
Variable Bank Informal
Lnage 1.594 0.703
(4.83)*** (9.59)***
Sex (Male= 1) 1.132 0.665
(3.71)*** (11.03)***
Lnhhsize 0.405 -0.058
(1.70)* (1.05)
Lneduc 0.107 0.036
(2.78)*** (7.95)***
Lndepr 0.769 0.470
(2.27)** (5.75)***
Lnhhexp 1.002 0.337
(4.54)*** (5.92)***
Dummy: Migration 0.171 0.046
(0.63) (0.76)
Lnlan 0.024 -0.052
(0.26) (2.28)**
Lnastva 0.143 -0.051
(1.05) (l.48)
Dummy: Central Region -0.406 0.245
(0.88) (2.00)**
Dummy: Eastern Region -0.727 0.742
(1.41) (6.53)***
Dummy: Western Region -0.073 0.844
(0.16) (7.47)***
Dummy: Urban 0.919 -0.101
(2.84)*** (1.04)
Constant -18.365 -6.897
(10.59)*** _(17.06)***
Reference Category: Those who did not apply for any credit
Log Likelihood -4,917.64
Number of observations 15,533
LR chi2(26) 694.27
Prob>chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0659
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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9.3.5 Heckman two-step Selection Model for Value of Credit Demanded in the Broader
Financial Sector
The Heckman two-step selection model was only estimated at the national level and the
results generally corroborate the logit model estimates (see table 9.4). Lambda is
significantly different from zero, which implies that the sample selection bias would have
been a problem in an OLS model. The results suggest that the amount of credit demanded is
positively and significantly influenced (at the 1% significance level) by age, education level
and household expenditure, which are consistent with the logit regression results. These
variables are associated with control of household resources which increases with age,
increased returns to investment associated with education, and higher capacity to repay
associated with higher household expenditure, all of which have positive effects on the
quantity of credit demanded.
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Table 9.4: Heckman two-step Selection Model for Value of Credit Demanded in the
Broader Financial Sector [National]
Equation ofInterest: Dependent Variable lnammo (amount of credit
demanded)
lnage 0.789
(5.96)***
lneduc 0.050
(7.85)***
lnhhexp 1.141
(17.66)***
Dummy: Migration -0.072
(0.85)
Indepr 0.190
, (1.54)
Constant -3.896
(5.53)***
Selection Model: Dependent Variable leve 1 (= 1 if applied for formal
or informal credit)
Sex (Male= 1) 0.315
(3.49)***
lnhhsize 0.135
(5.26)***
ln1an -0.021
(1.82)
Inastva 0.048
(3.29)***
Dummy: Urban 0.051
(1.14)
Dummy: Central Region 0.167
(2.00)**
Dummy: Eastern Region 0.275
(3.38)***
Dummy: Western Region 0.383
(4.85)***
Interaction: sex and central region 0.056
(0.52)
Interaction: sex and eastern region 0.202
(1.92)*
Interaction: sex and western region 0.071
(0.70)
Constant -2.253
(24.12)"·
lambda -0.856
(4.30)***
rho -0.498
sigma 1.720
Number of Observations 16,783
Censored Observations 15,302
Uncensored Obsci vation 1,481
Wald chi2(5) 481.81
Prob>chi2 0.000
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, *. significant at 5%, ... significant at 1%
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9.4 Informal Credit Demand
9.4.1 National Logit Model for Informal Credit Demand
The logit regression results for the determinants of informal credit demand are presented in
table 9.5 and the models are significant based on diagnostic statistics.
Table 9.5: Logit Model for Informal Credit Demand [National and Regional]
Equation ofInterest: Dependent Variable level (=1 if applied for bank or informal sector credit,
otherwise zero)
Explanatory National Region
Variables Central Eastern Northern Western
Lnage 0.692 0.605 0.533 0.910 0.847
(9.46)*** (3.94)*** (3.91)*** (3.28)*** (7.23)***
Sex (Male= 1) 0.658 0.610 0.856 0.221 0.606
(10.92)*** (4.86)*** (7.58)*** (0.97) (6.37)***
lnhhsize -0.062 -0.087 -0.150 0.591 -0.073
(1.13) (0.80) (1.55) (2.73)*** (0.74)
lneduc 0.036 0.036 0.045 0.055 0.029
(7.89)*** (3.19)*** (5.13)*** (3.08)*** (4.32)***
lndepr 0.465 0.287 0.520 0.671 0.541
(5.70)*** (1.54) (3.28)*** (2.15)** (4.41)***
lnhhexp 0.325 0.513 0.047 0.591 0.430
(5.73)*** (4.18)*** (0.47) (3.11)*** (4.42)***
Dummy: Migration 0.045 -0.045 0.406 -0.204 -0.172
(0.74) (0.36) (3.66)*** (0.82) (1.71)*
Lnlan -0.052 -0.061 -0.041 0.235 -0.055
(2.28)** (1.30) (1.12) (2.00)** (1.30)
lnastva -0.053 -0.223 -0.158 0.244 0.068
(1.55) (3.09)*** (2.45)** (2.10)** (1.22)
Dummy: Urban -0.116 -0.188 0.434 -0.711 -0.566
(1.19) (1.00) (2.55)** (1.75)* (3.20)***
Dummy: Central 0.252
Region (2.06)**
Dummy: Eastern 0.748
Region (6.58)***
Dummy: Western 0.849
Region (7.51)***
Constant -6.787 -6.675 -3.746 -10.424 -7.331
(16.86)*** (7.71)*** (5.09)*** (7.12)*** (10.87)***
Number of 15,533 3,920 4,165 2,290 5,158
Observations
LR Chi2 525.63 81.23 177.71 68.65 195.84
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0542 0.0378 0.0623 0.0778 0.0529
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
The results suggest that at the national level, age has a positive and significant effect (at the
1% significance level) on borrowing behaviour from the informal financial sector. These
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results are consistent with Nagarajan et al (1998) and Zeller (1994), whose coefficients for
age were positive and significant. The positive and significant coefficient for age may be
indicative of the fact that older persons have greater control of household resources, which
raises their creditworthiness, and hence results in a higher probability of applying for credit.
Being male has a positive and significant effect on informal credit demand (at the 1%
significance level), which tallies with findings by Baydas et al (1994) which may be
interpreted as discrimination against women in the informal credit market.
The education level has a positive and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on
borrowing behaviour from informal sector sources. These findings are consistent with
Nagarajan et al (1998) and Zeller (1994), whose coefficients for education level were
positive and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. The
positive coefficient of education level may be interpreted from the productivity point of
view. Education level raises the productivity of human capital through acquisition of skills,
which in turn raises the returns from investment. By implication the more educated are more
likely to make better use of credit, thus raising the probability of credit demand. This is the
main justification that is commonly cited by microfinance institutions for providing credit as
an integrated package that includes training.
The dependency ratio has a positive and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on
the probability of informal credit demand. This result agrees with empirical findings by
Adugna and Heidhues (2000) where the coefficient for dependency ratio was positive and
statistically significant (at the 5% significance level). The positive coefficient for the
dependency ratio may be accounted for by the fact that informal credit is utilized mainly for
consumption smoothing to maintain andlor improve the quality of life (for example,
purchase of food items and durable consumer goods, education and health care). Households
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with higher dependency ratios have a higher likelihood of demanding informal credit for
consumption smoothing.
Migration, though having a positive coefficient, has no significant effect on borrowing
behaviour from the informal financial sector. None of the other empirical studies had the
migration status variable in their econometric models. Nagarajan et al (1998) had used the
reputation of the household head variable (proxied by number of years of stay in the village
as a ratio of the age of household head), which was positive but insignificant. Zeller (1994)
used a proxy for strength of social relationships variable (= 1 if household had a burial place
in the region, otherwise zero), which was positive and significant at the 10% significance
level. It should be noted that the above variables could be used as proxies for migration
status, which if interpreted in this light, could be comparable with the current study.
Household expenditure per adult equivalent has a positive and significant effect (at the 1%
significance level) on household borrowing behaviour from the informal financial sector.
These results are not consistent with Nagarajan et al (1998) where the coefficient for total
non-farm income variable was negative and statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. In the Adugna and Heidhues (2000) study, the economic status of the household was
proxied by the number of oxen owned, which also had a negative and significant effect (at
the 1% significance level) on household informal credit demand.
The coefficient for asset value was negative but statistically insignificant, which suggests
that households with large asset endowments have a lower demand for informal sector
credit. This may be explained by the fact that such households can pledge their assets to
banks and get more credit at better terms. Empirical results by Nagarajan et al (1998) also
suggested that the asset value had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on
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household borrowing behaviour. Bell et al (1997) used liquid assets (as a proxy for assets),
but the results suggested a statistically insignificant relationship with informal credit
demand. However in the Adugna and Heidhues (2000) study, the number of ruminants
(which was used as a proxy for liquid assets) was shown to have a positive and significant
effect (at 10% significance level) on informal credit demand. Mohieldin and Wright (2000)
also found a positive and significant relationship between household asset values and
informal credit demand, which result was explained in terms of information and
enforcement imperfections which motivate informal lenders to demand some form of
collateral.
Household land holding has a negative and significant effect (at the 5% significance level)
on household borrowing behaviour from the informal financial sector. This result is quite
surprising, cannot be explained, and differs from empirical evidence of other studies.
Evidence by Nagarajan et al (1998) suggested a positive and significant relationship (at the
10% significance level) between informal credit demand and the number of cultivated acres,
where the positive coefficient was interpreted as evidence for informal credit being used for
agricultural production. Evidence by Bell et al (1997) also suggested a positive and
significant relationship between land value and informal credit demand.
Regional location, relative to the reference northern region, has a positive and significant
effect on informal credit demand. This is evidenced by the positive and significant
coefficients of the regional dummies of central, eastern and western regions at the 5%, 1%
and 1% significance levels respectively.
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9.4.2 Regional Logit Models for Informal Credit Demand
The regional logit models portray differences in the significance of variables that influence
informal credit demand across regions (see table 9.5). Age and education level have
positive and significant effects on informal credit demand in all the regions (at the 1%
significance level). Being male has positive and significant coefficients (at the 1%
significance level) in all the regions except northern where it is statistically insignificant.
Household size and land holding have insignificant effects on informal credit demand in all
regions, except in northern region where they have positive and significant effects at the 1%
and 5% significance levels respectively.
The dependency ratio has positive and significant effects on informal credit demand in
eastern and western regions (at the 1% significance level), and in northern region (at the 5%
significance level). Household expenditure positively and significantly influences informal
credit demand (at the 1% significance level) in all the regions except eastern. Migration has
a positive and significant effect on credit demand in eastern region (at the 1% significance
level), but has a negative and significant effect in western region (at the 10% significance
level). Asset values negatively influence informal credit demand in central region (at the
1% significance level) and eastern region (at the 5% significance level). However in
northern region, asset values have a positive and significant effect (at the 5% significance
level) on informal credit demand but statistically insignificant effect in western region.
Being an urban resident has a positive and significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on
informal credit demand in eastern region. But being an urban resident negatively and
significantly influences informal credit demand in northern and western regions at the 10%
and 1% significance levels respectively.
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9.4.3 Logit Models for Rural/Urban Informal Credit Demand
The rural/urban decomposition suggests that informal credit demand in the rural sector is
positively and significantly influenced at the 1% significance level by the following
variables: age, sex, education level, dependency ratio and household expenditure (see table
9.6). Land holding has a negative and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on
credit demand.
Within the urban sector, informal credit demand is positively and significantly influenced (at
the 1% significance level) by age, education level and dependency ratio. Household
expenditure is positive and significant at the 10% significance level. Household size has a
negative and significant effect (at the 1% significance level) on informal credit demand in
the urban sector. The rest of the variables were statistically insignificant.
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Table 9.6: Logit Models for Informal Credit Demand [Rural and Urban]
Dependent Variable: level (= J if applied for bank or informal credit,
otherwise zero)
ExJ>lanatory Variab les Rural Urban
Lnage 0.622 1.235
(8.08)*** (5.53)***
Sex (Male= 1) 0.751 0.175
(11.59)*** (1.05)
lnhhsize 0.034 -0.483
(0.57) (3.26)***
lneduc 0.029 0.050
(6.27)*** (2.85)***
lndepr 0.384 0.637
(4.37)*** (2.89)***
lnhhexp 0.327 0.248
(5.47)*** (1.74)*
Dummy: Migration -0.026 0.274
(0.41 ) (1.59)
Lnlan -0.115 -0.025
(4.44)*** (0.59)
lnastva 0.049 -0.140
(1.37) (1.63)
Constant -6.585 -6.440
(15.44)*** (5.70)***
Number of Observations 13,705 1,828
LR Chi2 393.2 65.47
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0460 0.0567
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
9.4.4 Multinomial Logit Model for Choice of Informal Financial Institutions
A multinomial model was estimated to analyze the determinants of the choice of credit from
different informal financial institutions, with relatives/friends/community funds being the
reference category (see table 9.7). As stated earlier, informal lenders were categorized into
Co-operative credit societies / NOOs, Moneylenders / commercial firms, Relatives /friendsl
community funds, and Government agencies.
The results suggest that relative to the friends/relatives/community funds, the choice of
credit from the Co-operative INGO sector is positively and significantly influenced at the
1% significance level by education level, household size, household expenditure and asset
values. Age and land holding have positive and significant effects at the 10% and 5%
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significance levels respectively. The probability of choice of credit from the co-
operativelNGO sector, relative to the reference category, is negatively and significantly
influenced at the 1% significance level by sex and migration status. The negative and
significant coefficient for sex may be explained by the fact that most NGOs target especially
women with their credit. This is closely associated with the economic empowerment
concerns that some NGOs are especially out to address. The group lending methodology that
entails the self-selection process, group guarantee and peer monitoring as an alternative
form of security makes the NGO credit more attractive to women. In the Ugandan situation,
group lending is almost synonymous with women and that is why the groups are often
referred to as "women groups" even if there are some male members. Relative to the
reference region (northern), the choice of credit from the cooperative societieslNGOs
relative to the friends/relatives/community funds, is negatively and significantly influenced
by regional location.
The choice of credit from money lenders/commercial firms, relative to the reference
category, is positively and significantly influenced by household size (at the 5% significance
level) and by household expenditure (at 1% significance level). Being male has a negative
and significant effect (at the 5% significance level) on choice of credit from the money
lenders/commercial firms. The choice of government credit relative to the reference
category, is positively and significantly influenced (at the 1% significance level) by age,
household expenditure and education level. The coefficient for household size is positive
and significant at the 5% significance level. Regional location has a negative and significant
effect on choice of credit from government agencies, relative to the reference region.
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Table 9.7: Multinomial Logit Model for Borrowers' Choice of Informal Financial
Institutions
Variable Co-operatives Money Lender/ Government
/NGOs Firm Agency
lnage 0.392 -0.283 0.982
(1.64)* (0.7) (3.07)***
Sex (Male= 1) -0.675 -0.490 0.058
(4.59)*** (1.95)** (0.27)
Inhhsize 0.457 0.675 0.501
(2.83)*** (2.28)** (2.29)**
lneduc 0.039 0.010 0.073
(3.29)*** (0.59) (3.75)***
lndepr -0.055 0.556 -0.036
(0.25) (1.43) (0.13)
lnhhexp 0.722 1.374 1.106
(4.87)*** (5.29)*** (5.81)***
Dummy: Migration -0.447 -0.236 -0.166
(2.91)*** (0.88) (0.83)
lnlan 0.149 -0.061 0.097
(2.39)** (0.79) (1.23)
lnastva 0.225 -0.067 -0.164
(2.48}*** (0.43) (l.40)
Dummy: Urban 0.152 -0.323 -0.474
(0.68) (0.74) ( 1.43)
Dummy: Central Region -1.815 -2.410 -2.645
(5.61)*** (3.37)*** (6.86)***
Dummy: Eastern Region -2.162 -2.597 -2.468
(7.03)*** (3.68)*** (7.06)***
Dummy: Western Region -2.363 -0.345 -2.459
(7.58)*** (0.59) (6.98)***
Constant -5.148 -7.990 -9.166
(4.68)*** (4.22)*** (6.37)***
Reference Category: RelativeslFriends/Community Funds
Reference Region: Northern Region
Number of observations 1,414
LR chi2 (39) 386.02
Prob>chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.123
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
9.4.5 Heckman two-step Selection Model for Value of Informal Credit Demanded
The results of the Heckman two-step Selection Model for the amount of informal credit
demanded are presented in table 9.8.
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Table 9.8: Heckman two-step Selection Model for Value of Informal Credit Demanded
- [National Level]
Equation ofInterest: Dependent Variable lninfdd (amount of
informal credit demanded)
lnage 0.766
(5.91)***
lneduc 0.049
(8.00)***
lnhhexp 1.061
(15.93)***
Dummy: Migration -0.097
(1.15)
lndepr 0.210
(1.70)*
Constant -3.787
(5.55)***
Selection Model: Dependent variable boro (= 1 if applied for
informal credit)
Sex (Male= I) 0.271
(2.97)***
Inhhsize 0.121
(4.66)***
lnlan -0.023
(1.92)*
lnastva 0.032
(2.10)**
Dummy: Urban -0.009
(0.19)
Dummy: Central Region 0.165
(1.98)**
Dummy: Eastern Region 0.275
(3.39)***
Dummy: Western Region 0.378
(4.79)***
Interaction: sex and central 0.064
region (0.58)
Interaction: sex and eastern 0.234
region (2.21)**
Interaction: sex and western 0.108
region (1.06)
Constant -2.174
(23.17)***
lambda -0.638
(3.26)***
rho -0.400
sigma 1.595
Number of observations 16,786
Censored observations 15,366
Uncensored observations 1,420
Wald chi2(5) 412.22
Prob>chi2 0.000
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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The results suggest that the OLS parameter estimates would have been biased, given that
lambda is statistically significant (at the 1% significance level). The value of informal credit
demanded is positively and significantly influenced at the 1% significance level by age,
education level and household expenditure. The coefficient for dependency ratio is positive
and significant at the 10% significance level. These results are consistent with the logit
regression results.
9.5 Determinants of Lenders' Credit Rationing Behaviour in the Broader Financial
Sector
9.5.1 Heckman Probit Model with Sample Selection for Credit Rationing'"
The Heckman probit model with sample selection was used to estimate the determinants of
credit rationing in the broader financial sector and then later specifically for the informal
sector. For the broader financial sector, the dependent variable for the model of interest was
lessmo (=1 if credit rationed in the formal or informal sector, otherwise zero). For the
selection model, the dependent variable was the probability of applying for credit from the
formal or informal financial sectors level (=1 if applied for credit in the formal or informal
financial sectors, otherwise zero). For the informal sector credit rationing model, the
dependent variable for the model of interest was ration (=1 if credit rationed in the informal
sector, otherwise zero), and the dependent variable for the selection model was the
probability of applying for an informal loan boro (=1 if applied for an informal loan,
otherwise zero). Table 9.9 presents regression results for credit rationing.
20 Credit rationing refers to a state in which the lender grants the borrower less amount than was originally demanded
or completely rejecting the borrower's loan application
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Table 9.9 Heckman Probit Modee1 with Sample Selection for Credit Rationing in the
Broader Financial Sector [National and Regional]
Equation of Interest: Dependent Variable lessmo (=1 if credit rationed formal or informal sector)
Explanatory Variable National Region
Central Eastern Northern Western
lnage -0.163 0.361 -0.163 0.310 -0.178
(1.83)* (1.31) (1.81)* (1.86)'" (0.78)
Sex (Male=l) -0.251 0.098 -0.455 0.405 0.075
(2.80)*** (0.26) (2.50)**'" (3.05)"''''''' (0.29)
lneduc 0.004 0.020 0.005
(1.06) (1.28) (0.69)
lndepr -0.204 0.387 -0.349 0.263 -0.134
(3.20)"''''''' (1.56) (2.99)"''' (1.22) (0.77)
Inhhexp 0.093 0.228 0.026 0.176 0.145
(2.03)** (1.28) (1.09) (4.21)"'" (1.24)
Dummy: Migration 0.028 0.230 -0.001 -0.033 0.062
(0.72) 0.36) (0.01) (0.40) (0.55)
lnastva -0.099 -0.006 -0.044 0.073 -0.020
(3.89)"'** (0.06) (0.57) (1.06) (0.21 )
lnlan 0.001 0.007 0.026 -0.024
(0.06) (0.93) (0.74) (0.52)
Dummy: Urban -0.130 -0.128 -0.067 -0.257 -0.157
(1.69)* (0.57) (1.74)'" (1.28) (0.82)
Dummy: Central -0.360
Region (2.63)"""'"
Dummy: Eastern -0.538
Region (2.70)"""*
Dummy: Western -0.522
Region (2.78)"'''''''
Constant 2.193 -3.621 2.084 -4.271 -0.001
(3.52)"""'" (1.62) (5.98)"''''* (6.23)"""'" (0.00)
Dependent Variable for Selection Equation: level (= I if applied for formal or informal credit)
lnage 0.289 0.286 0.175 0.223 0.493
(10.43)"''''''' (4.80)"""'" (2.32)** (2.32)"'''' (9.00)"'''
Sex (Male=l ) 0.418 0.382 0.524 0.358 0.331
(15.37)"''' (6.53)"""'" (2.94)"''' (3.68)"''' (7.02)"""'"
Indepr 0.253 0.063 0.300 0.336 0.271
(6.98)"''''''' (0.81) (3.25)"''' (2.18)·· (4.47)"·
Inlan -0.037
(1.95)"
Inastva 0.131 0.067 0.219 0.145
(13.94)"'" (0.92) (4.13)·"'''' (7.97)"""'"
Ineduc 0.014
(3.98)"'''
Constant -2.945 -2.585 -2.289 -3.159 -3.477
(25.85)"'" (10.87)*·* (7.46)"'·· (6.33)"""· (16.55)"""·
lanthro -1.603 0.395 -8.965 10.512 -0.658
(2.76)"""* (0.31) (0.10)"'''' (0.07) (0.98)
rho -0.922 0.376 - 1.000 1.000 -0.577
Number of 20,034 4,038 5,404 3,426 5,873
Observations
Censored Observations 18,505 3,707 4,941 3,309 5,252
Uncensored 1,529 331 463 117 621
Observations
Wald chi2 164.6 12.82 76.19 56.42 5.15
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.741
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10% .'" significant at 5% """"'significant at 1%
21 The choice of explanatory variables for the selection equations was based on those that yielded the more significant
effects, hence the variation of variables across the national, regional, and rural/urban models.
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The results suggest that at the national level, the lender's credit rationing behaviour is
negatively influenced at the 1% significance level by sex, dependency ratio and asset values.
The significant coefficient for the dependency ratio was quite surprising. As discussed
earlier, the dependency ratio variable was constructed as a proxy for the income earning
capacity of the household, thus implying an inverse relationship between dependency ratio
and income earning capacity. By implication, households with high dependency ratios
would be judged to be less creditworthy, thus increasing their probability of being credit
rationed. Age and being an urban resident have negative and significant effects on the
probability of being credit rationed at the 5% significance level, while the coefficient of
household expenditure is positive and significant at the 5% level. Again, the positive and
significant coefficient for household expenditure was quite surprising. Regional location,
relative to the reference category (northern) negatively and significantly influences the
probability of being credit rationed (at the 1% significance level).
At the regional level, the lenders' credit rationing behaviour in central and western regions
is not significantly influenced by any of the variables. In eastern region, the probability of
being credit rationed is negatively and significantly influenced by age and being in the urban
sector (at 10% significance level), by sex and dependency ratio (at 1% significance level). In
northern region, credit rationing is positively and significantly influenced at the 1%
significance level by sex and household expenditure, and age (at the 10% significance
level).
The results of the rural/urban dissagregation (see table 9.10) suggest that the lenders' credit
rationing behaviour for borrowers locat~d in the rural sector is positively and significantly
influenced by household expenditure (at the 5% significance level) and education level (at
the 10% significance level). Asset values have a negative and significant effect (at the 1%
significance level) on the probability of being credit rationed in the rural sector. For the
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urban sector probit model, the probability of being credit rationed is negatively and
significantly influenced by age, dependency ratio and asset values (at the 1% significance
level) and migration (at the 5% significance level). The only variable that positively and
significantly influenced the probability of being credit rationed in the urban sector was land
size (at the 1% significance level).
Table 9.10: Heckman Probit Model with Sample Selection for Credit Rationing in
Broader Financial Sector [Rural/Urban]
Equation of Interest: Dependent Variable lessmo (= 1 if credit rationed in the
formal or informal sector)
Explanatory Variables Rural Urban
Lnage -0.003 -0.622
(0.02) (6.96)***
Sex (Male= 1) -0.184 -0.061
(0.94) (1.37)
lneduc 0.011 -0.0008
(1.65)* (0.2)
lndepr -0.121 -0.334
(1.10) (3.57)***
lnhhexp 0.175 0.016
(2.30)** (0.65)
Dummy: Migration 0.055 -0.068
(0.84) (1.94)**
lnastva -0.151 -0.130
(3.31)*** (4.04)***
Ln1an 0.041 0.007
(0.96) (2.64)***
Constant 0.301 4.124
(0.18) (11.03)***
Selection Equation: Dependent Variable level (= 1 if applied for formal or
informal credit)
Lnage 0.226 0.604
(7.49)*** (10.2)***
Sex (Male= 1) 0.459 0.169
(15.40)*** (5.07)***
lndepr 0.197 0.386
(4.83)*** (5.11)***
Inastva 0.138 0.183
(11.80)*** (9.96)***
Constant -2.759 -4.207
(22.11 )*** (16.73)***
lathrho -0.827 -11.2
(1.24) (8.14)***
rho -0.679 -1.000
Number of Observations 16,215 3,677
Censored Observations 14,892 3,471
Uncensored 1,323 206
Observations
Wald chi2 29.56 7186
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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9.5.2 Heckman Selection Model for Value of Credit Supplied in Broader Financial
Sector
One alternative to understanding the dynamics of lenders' credit rationing behaviour is
through the estimation of the credit supply function (see table 9.11).
Table 9.11 Heckman two-step Selection Model for Amount of Credit Supplied in
Broader Financial Sector [National]
Equation oflnterest: Dependent Variable lnrecivo (amount of loan received)
Explanatory Variables Coefficients
Lnage 0.185
(1.42)
Inhhexp 1.251
(16.64)***
Inastva 0.201
(4.04)***
Lnlan 0.040
(1.26)
Inhhsize 0.918
(10.26)***
Constant -6.047
(9.35)***
Selection Equation: Dependent Variable level (=1 if applied for formal or
informal credit)
Sex (Male=l) 0.396
(13.67)***
Dummy: Urban -0.087
(2.20)**
Indepr 0.200
(5.02)"·
Dummy: Central Region 0.438
(7.37)··*
Dummy: Eastern Region 0.636
(11.08)···
Dummy: Western Region 0.765
(13.60)***
Constant -2.146
(35.73)***
lambda -0.394
(2.40)**
rho -0.272
sigma 1.445
N umber of Observations 20,003
Censored Observations 18,730
Uncensored Observations 1,273
Wald chi2(5) 618.6
Prob>chi2 0.000
Absolute value ofz-statistics in parentheses
• significant at 10%, •• significant at 5% .** significant at 1%
Intuitively the households' characteristics that positively and significantly affect the a
lenders' decision to supply credit can be inferred to have a negative and significant effect on
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the lenders' credit rationing behaviour, and the reverse also holds true. For this reason the
Heckman two-step selection model was estimated for the amount of credit supplied from the
whole credit sector (both formal and informal). The results suggest that the amount of credit
supplied is positively and significantly influenced (at the 1% significance level) by
household expenditure, household size and asset values. The positive and significant
coefficient for household size was surprising though. The inference is that households with
high household expenditure and asset values will be rated as creditworthy, and this reduces
the likelihood of their being credit rationed.
9.6 Determinants of Informal Credit Rationing
9.6.1 Heckman Probit Models with Sample Selection for Informal Credit Rationing -
National and Regional
The factors affecting informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour were also analyzed using
the Heckman probit model with sample selection (see table 9.12). The dependent variable
for the model of interest was the probability of being credit rationed ration (= 1 if
respondent was credit rationed in the informal financial sector, otherwise zero), with the
explanatory variables being the socio-economic characteristics of the household. The
dependent variable for the selection model was the probability of applying for an informal
loan boro (=1 if applied for an informal loan, otherwise zero). The major factor expected to
influence the informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour is their perception of the
borrowers' repayment capacity. The higher the repayment capacity, the lower will be the
probability of their being credit-rationed, and vice versa.
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Table 9.12: Heckman Probit Model with Sample Selection for Informal Credit
Rationing - [National and Regional]
Equation ofInterest: Dependent Variable ration (=1 ifrationed in informal secto~)
Variable National Region
Central Eastern Northern Western
lnage -0.226 -0.069 0.192 0.173 -0.288
(4.01)*** (0.23) (0.71) (0.24) (0.48)
Sex (Male=l) -0.308 -0.204 0.275 0.160 -0.134
(5.22)*** (0.90) (0.85) (0.23) (0.12)
lneduc 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.003
(0.830) (0.92) (0.10) (0.24)
lndepr -0.220 0.227 -0.123 -0.309 -0.191
(4.32)*** (0.73) (0.44) (0.84) (0.47)
lnhhexp 0.064 0.171 0.130 0.408 0.149
(1.71)* (1.10) (0.94) (0.93) (0.27)
Dummy: Migration 0.014 0.150 -0.035 -0.182 0.067
(0.58) (0.92) (0.22) (0.60) (0.37)
lnastva -0.086 -0.038 0.086 -0.322 -0.003
(4.91)*** (0.49) (0.94) (2.30)** (0.01)
ln1an 0.001 0.029 0.020 -0.029
(0.170) (0.43) (0.41) (0.23)
Dummy: Urban -0.078 -0.121 -0.335 -0.600 -0.049
(1.56) (0.58) (1.38) (0.67) (0.31)
Dummy: Central -0.269
Region (2.87)***
Dummy: Eastern -0.357
Region (2.76)***
Dummy: Western -0.355
Region (2.97)***
Constant 2.614 0.578 -2.926 -0.762 1.146
(7.00)*** (0.20) (1.29) (0.10) (0.10)
Selection Equation: Dependent Variable boro (= 1 if applied for informal credit)
lnage 0.275 0.229 0.295 0.196 0.393
(9.77)*** (3.93)*** (4.95)*** (2.12)** (8.12)***
Sex (Male= 1) 0.401 0.339 0.436 0.281 0.376
(14.59)*** (5.99)*** (7.99)*** (3.03)*** (8.20)***
lndepr 0.260 0.188 0.324 0.238 0.274
(7.09)*** (2.48)*** (4.76)*** (1.76) (4.43)***
lnlan 0.071
(1.57)
lnastva 0.114 0.054 0.044 0.158 0.121
(12.35)*** (2.90)*** (2.29)** (3.54)*** (7.12)***
lneduc 0.019
(4.52)***
Constant -2.844 -0.2626 -2.550 -2.802 -3.123
(24.73)*** (10.88)*** (11.38)*** (7.07)*** (15.84)***
lathrho -2.410 -0.856 0.076 -0.617 -1.379
(2.70)*** (0.74) (0.10) (0.29) (0.23)
rho -0.984 -0.694 0.076 -0.549 -0.881
Number of 20,070 5,305 5,365 2,309 5,932
Observations
Censored 18,606 4,999 4,915 2,199 5,334
Observations
Uncensored 1,464 306 450 110 598
Observations
Wald chi2 255.02 9.64 9.55 11.16 21.97
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.380 0.298 0.193 0.009
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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At the national level, the informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour is negatively and
significantly influenced at the 1% significance level by sex, age, dependency ratio, and asset
values. The significance of the age coefficient may be explained in terms of older persons
controlling more of the household resources which raises their creditworthiness and lowers
the likelihood of their being credit rationed. The results differ from those of Zeller (1994)
which suggested a positive and significant relationship between age and the probability of
being credit rationed (at the 5% significance level). Zeller (1994) however qualified his
results on the grounds that older persons were more likely to apply for large amounts of
loans, therefore raising their probability of being credit rationed in the informal financial
sector.
Sex of the respondent has a negative and significant effect on the probability of being credit
rationed. This result suggests that the women are discriminated against in the informal
credit sector. This result is not consistent with the arguments in the literature that women,
who have limited borrowing opportunities from the formal financial sector due to lack of
collateral security, tend to be more disciplined in servicing loans from the informal credit
markets so as not to lose access to such credit (Morduch, 1999). Though men mainly control
productive resources, which could be offered as collateral for the loans, the use of collateral
substitutes (such as group guarantee) in the informal financial sector enable the women to be
creditworthy even in the absence of physical collateral. This therefore is assumed to reduce
the likelihood of women being credit rationed. Zeller (1994) however found no statistically
significant relationship between sex and the probability of being credit rationed.
Households with higher dependency ratios were less likely to be credit rationed in the
informal fmancial sector, which result is quite surprising. The expectation was that lenders
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may associate high dependency ratios with lower household repayment capacity and hence
credit ration such households.
Household asset holding significantly lowers the probability of being credit rationed in the
informal financial sector. The assets can be liquidated to repay the loan in cases of default,
hence the lenders perceive households with high asset values to have high repayment
potential thus reducing the likelihood of their being credit rationed. These results are
consistent with Zeller (1994) who found a negative and significant relationship between
informal credit rationing and value of assets owned by the household.
Education level has a positive but insignificant effect on the probability of being credit
rationed in the informal financial sector. The positive coefficient may be explained by the
fact that though education level tends to increase the effective utilization of the loan and
increases returns from credit, it may not necessarily improve loan repayment. More
educated people who are better informed of legal issues may be more demanding borrowers.
Since the informal financial sector activities are not regulated by law, what may be more
critical to the informal lender is trustworthiness of the borrower as compared to education
level.
Migration (= 1 if household head migrated to current location, otherwise zero) also has a
positive effect on being credit rationed, but again it is not statistically significant. A positive
coefficient would suggest that informal lenders discriminate against immigrants in their loan
granting decision-making. As informal loans are secured mainly by collateral substitutes,
immigrants may be cautiously handled given the fact that they may easily relocate, making
loan recovery difficult. In addition, there may be few people of good social status within the
community willing to guarantee immigrants for loans, especially if the immigrants have not
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stayed in the area for a sufficiently long time and their behaviour is not well known. It may
also be explained by the weak social relations between informal lenders and immigrants.
This may be true in a scenario where lenders prefer to lend only to people with whom they
have strong social ties and on whom the traditional community laws can be applied in case
of default.
Household expenditure has a positive and significant effect (at the 10% significance level)
on the probability of being credit rationed. These results are not consistent with the
expectation that wealthy households may be perceived by the lenders to have a high
repayment capacity, and that they are therefore less likely to be credit rationed. This result is
quite surprising because if the lenders were rational, one would expect to observe low-
income borrowers being more constrained in their access to credit as compared to large
income borrowers.
Land size has a positive but insignificant effect on the probability of being credit rationed in
the informal financial sector. The positive coefficient was contrary to the a priori
expectation that households with large land holding have a higher repayment potential (as
land can be sold to repay the loan) and therefore are less likely to be credit rationed.
However the lack of a statistical relationship between credit rationing and land holding was
not surprising given the current land tenure system where most of the land, especially in the
rural areas, is held under the customary land tenure system (without any title deeds), which
makes it difficult to sell in cases of default, as the land market is undeveloped.
Being in an urban area reduces the probability of being credit rationed as compared to those
in rural areas, though the relationship is not statistically significant. The negative coefficient
conforms to the expectation that urban households have more diversified income bases for
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loan repayment, as compared to rural households who depend mainly on agricultural
income, which is prone to high variability due to exogenous production and price shocks.
The higher the income variability, the lower the repayment potential and hence the higher
the probability of default, thus increasing the likelihood of being credit rationed.
Being located in other regions, relative to the northern region the reference category, has a
negative and significant effect on the probability of being credit rationed. This result is not
surprising because based on Uganda's poverty statistics, the northern region is the poorest.
By implication, borrowers in other regions are on average wealthier and more credit worthy
as compared to those in northern region.
At the regional level, most coefficients were statistically insignificant, apart from northern
region where informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour is negatively and significantly
influenced at the 5% significance level by household asset values.
9.6.2 Heckman Probit Models with Sample Selection for Informal Credit Rationing -
Rural and Urban
In the rural sector (see table 9.l3), the informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour is
negatively and significantly influenced (at the 1% significance level) by sex and asset
values, while positively and significantly influenced by education level (at the 5%
significance level) and by household expenditure (at the 1% significance level). In the urban
sector model, the probability of being credit rationed is negatively and significantly
influenced by the dependency ratio (at the 5% significance level), age (at the 1%
significance level) and asset values (at the 1% significance level). However informal credit
rationing in the urban sector is positively and significantly influenced by land size (at the
10% significance level).
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Table 9.13: Heckman Probit Model with Sample Selection for Informal Credit
Rationing - [Rural/Urban]
Equation of Interest: Dependent Variable ration (=1 if credit rationed in
informal sector)
Explanatory Variables Sector
Rural Urban
Lnage -0,054 -0,634
(0.54) (7.4)***
Sex (Male= 1) -0,231 0,010
(2.46)*** (0,14)
lneduc 0,0096 -0,001
(1,93)** (0,17)
lndepr -0,115 -0,309
(1.27) (2,20)**
lnhhexp 0,152 0,022
(2,62)*** (0,79)
Dummy: Migration 0,029 -0,072
(0,51) (1,84)
lnastva -0,130 -0,082
(3,37)*** (2,83)***
lnlan 0,035 0,008
(0,98) (1.75)*
Constant 0,786 4,007
(1,04) (10,91)***
Selection Equation: Dependent Variable boro (= 1 if applied for informal
credit)
lnage 0,212 0,574
(6,99)*** (9,61)***
Sex (Male= 1) 0.447 6,107
(14,91)*** (1.78)*
lndepr 0,202 0,365
(4,93)*** (3,23)***
lnastva 0,134 0,135
(11.44)*** (7,97)***
Constant -2,700 -3,978
(21,5)*** (15,99)***
lathrho -1.025 -8,916
(3,23)*** (1.13)
rho -0,772 -1.000
Number of 16,218 3,708
Observations
Censored 14,929 3,533
Observations
Uncensored 1,289 175
Observations
Wald chi2 32,3 140,3
Prob>chi2 0,001 0,000
Absolute values ofz-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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9.6.3 Heckman two-step Selection Model for Amount of Informal Credit Supplied
The Heckman selection model parameter estimates (see table 9.14) suggest that informal
credit supply is positively and significantly influenced (at the 1% significance level) by
household expenditure, asset values and household size. Again, the positive and significant
coefficient for household size was quite surprising.
Table 9.14: Heckman two-step Selection Model for Value of Informal Credit Supplied
- National Level
Equation of Interest: Dependent Variable lninfss (amount of informal
credit received)
Explanatory Variables Coefficients
Lnage 0.187
(1.44)
lnhhexp 1.190
(15.41)***
lnastva 0.159
(3.12)***
Lnlan 0.044
(1.36)
lnhhsize 0.879
(9.74)***
Constant -5.648
(8.70)***
Selection Equation: Dependent Variable boro (= 1 if applied for informal
credit)
Sex (Male= 1) 0.382
(13.04)***
Dummy: Urban -0.162)
(3.89)***
lndepr 0.205
(5.06)***
Dummy: Central Region 0.434
(7.17)***
Dummy: Eastern Region 0.645
(11.08)***
Dummy: Western Region 0.757
(13.24)***
Constant -2.142
(35.15)***
lambda -0.337
(2.06)**
rho -0.238
sigma 1.413
Number of Observations 20,034
Censored Observations 18,806
Uncensored Observations 1,228
Wald chi2 (5) 465.35
Prob>chi2 0.000
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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9.7 Conclusions
This chapter had set out to analyze the specific factors that influence credit demand and
credit rationing in the informal financial sector in Uganda. The study estimated different
models to investigate the different components of the research problem as follows: the logit
model (for the estimation of the factors that influence households' borrowing behaviour),
Heckman probit model with sample selection (for estimation of factors that influence the
lenders' credit rationing behaviour), Heckman two-step selection model (for estimation of
factors that influence the amount of credit demanded and supplied), multinomial logit
models (for estimation of the factors that influence the borrowers' choice between the
formal and informal financial sectors, and between different informal institutions). The
analysis was done for the full sample (both formal and informal financial sectors) and
specifically for the informal financial sector at the national, regional and rural/urban levels.
The conclusions from the chapter are as follows:
(i) At the national level, households' borrowing behaviour from the informal financial sector
is positively and significantly influenced by age, sex, education level, dependency ratio,
household expenditure, and regional location (northern region being the reference category).
The education level and household expenditure variables are closely related to the capacity
of the household to effectively utilize the loans, and generate increased returns from
investments. However land size has a negative and significant effect on informal credit
demand.
(ii) At the national level, informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour is negatively and
significantly influenced by age, sex, dependency ratio, asset values, and regional location
(northern region as reference category). The negative and significant coefficient for the
dependency ratio was unexpected and quite surprising. The asset values are closely related
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to the creditworthiness of the borrower. Informal lenders' credit rationing behaviour is
positively and significantly influenced by household expenditure, which result was
unexpected and also quite surprising. The expectation was that household expenditure is an
indicator of repayment capacity, and a rational lender would not credit ration such wealthy
households.
(iii) There are variations across regions and rural/urban sectors in significance levels of
estimated parameters both in the credit demand and credit rationing models.
(iv) The borrowers' choice between the formal and informal financial sector (relative to
those that did not apply for any credit as the reference category), is positively and
significantly influenced by age, sex, education level, dependency ratio, and household
expenditure.
(v) The borrowers' choice between different informal institutions, relative to the reference
category (friends/relatives/community funds) is positively and significantly influenced by
household size, and household expenditure.
Given the empirical findings of the key determinants of credit demand and credit rationing,
the question that arises and is addressed in the next chapter is: what policy measures should
be put in place to improve households' access to the broader financial sector given the fact
that households demand credit for both investment and consumption smoothing purposes,
and that lenders, who are weary of loan default, are keen to ration households that are
perceived to be less creditworthy based on conventional parameters (such as wealth and
asset values)?
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CHAPTER 10: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1 Introduction
The overall motivation of the study was to investigate the factors that influence households'
credit demand and lenders' credit rationing behaviour so as to design policies to improve
household access to financial services from the broader financial sector. Credit is important
to households for investment and consumption smoothing purposes so as to improve their
welfare and move out of poverty. As indicated earlier, lack of access to investment and
consumption smoothing credit is rated as one of the key causes of poverty (MFED, 200lc).
The study involved a literature survey with regard to the functions of the financial sector (as
the informal financial sector is part of the broader financial system), the theoretical
framework for the existence of the informal financial sector, the characteristics of the
Ugandan financial sector, and the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical evidence on
the determinants of informal credit demand and credit rationing based on similar studies
done elsewhere. The study estimated the following models using UNHS 1999/00 data set:
the logit model for determinants of households' borrowing behaviour, the Heckman probit
model with sample selection for determinants of lenders' credit rationing behaviour, the
Heckman two-step Selection model for factors that influence the amount of credit demanded
and supplied, the multinomial logit model for factors that influence the borrowers'choice
between formal and informal sector credit and also the choice between various informal
financial institutions. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the key findings from the
study and suggest policy recommendations to enhance household access (especially for
small borrowers) to the broader financial sector.
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10.2 Main Findings and Policy Recommendations
10.2.1 Improving the Stability of the Financial Sector
The broader financial sector plays a key role in resource intermediation, thereby promoting
economic growth. In Uganda, as in all other developing economies, the informal financial
sector co-exists with its formal counterpart. To enhance the broadening of the financial
sector and reap the benefits of higher economic growth, appropriate regulation of the
financial sector is important to maintain its stability and protect consumers. The recent
enactment of the MDI Act (2003) to regulate deposit-taking microfinance institutions in
Uganda is a policy instrument in the right direction. As regulation imposes certain costs to
the institutions, the policy objective must be to keep the regulatory compliance costs to a
minimum so as not to stifle the sector. The specific recommendation here regards the
detailed regulations to be prescribed by the Bank of Uganda to operationalize the MDI Act
2003, which should not impose excessive compliance costs (such as detailed and regular
reporting requirements on numerous small borrowers).
10.2.2 Improving Household Access to the Broader Financial Sector
Evidence from the empirical literature review suggested that poor households need credit for
both investment and consumption smoothing. The formal financial sector provides mainly
investment credit, while the informal financial sector provides mainly consumption
smoothing credit, and some households participate in both markets. By implication, the
welfare of poor households will improve if they have access to the broader financial system.
The participation of poor households in formal financial markets is constrained by their lack
of collateral, which is used as a measure of creditworthiness. The results from this study
bring out two important revelations. First, there is credit rationing in both the formal and
informal financial sectors in Uganda, with the severity of credit rationing being highest in
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the informal financial markets. Secondly, the lenders' credit rationing behaviour is
negatively and significantly influenced by asset values in both the broader financial sector
and the informal credit markets. What this points to is that lenders are concerned with the
risk of default on their loans and use asset values as an indicator of the creditworthiness of
the borrowers. Informal lenders have developed additional mechanisms to those used in the
formal sector to control default risk, which include joint liability contracts and interlinked
credit contracts. Thus policy options to increase smaller borrowers' access to the broader
financial sector can be put in two main categories: policies that reduce the risk of default to
the lender (such as provision of incentives to banks to serve smaller borrowers,
establishment of credit reference bureaus, and development of innovative insurance
products), and policies that increase the capacity of the household to acquire more wealth to
improve their creditworthiness.
10.2.2.1 Provision of Incentives to Banks to Serve Smaller Borrowers
Limited access to formal sector credit among the poor is accounted for by banks' perception
of the high default risk and high transaction costs. The high transaction costs (especially
informational costs) involved in small credit transactions and the lack of acceptable
collateral by small borrowers make the banks averse to participating in the lower end retail
market. This motivates the banks to serve mainly urban-based corporate clients, leaving the
majority of the population that is engaged especially in the agricultural sector under served.
The policy instruments to motivate banks to serve the small borrowers include provision of
market-oriented incentives (such as setting up of guarantee schemes). The guarantee fund
will act as alternative collateral to the banks for lending to the small borrowers, which
reduces the cost of default risk to the lenders. However the design and implementation of the
guarantee schemes has to be done with care in terms of the risk-sharing ratio to avert
potential moral hazard behaviour by banks, and clarity of rules of getting the refund. In
231
addition, adjustments may have to be made to the regulations so as to minimize the costs of
having to report on a regular basis the detailed portfolio of numerous small borrower
accounts.
10.2.2.2 Establishment of Credit Reference Bureaus
There is significant progress in the setting up a credit reference bureau for commercial bank
clients under the Uganda Institute of Bankers. The recommendation is that a credit reference
bureau be set up for clients of the deposit-taking micro finance institutions. Credit reference
bureaus reduce informational costs on potential borrowers and provide the lenders with vital
credit history of borrowers on which they can base their financing decisions. In addition the
credit reference bureau puts pressure on clients to service their loan obligations so as to
create a good credit history in order not to be blacklisted in the credit markets, thereby
improving their creditworthiness. In the Ugandan situation, one of the pre-conditions for
setting up a well functioning credit reference bureau is the establishment of a national
identification system, where all persons have unique identification numbers which cannot be
falsified.
10.2.2.3 Development of Innovative Insurance Products for the Poor
One of the ways of improving the creditworthiness of borrowers is to provide them access to
innovative insurance products that cover the risks in the activities in which they derive their
livelihood. Of particular concern are the small agricultural households that face exogenous
production and price shocks, which cause high variability in their incomes. Such households
are rated by lenders as being less creditworthy on account of the high variability of their
incomes. The development of innovative insurance products like crop insurance products
will go a long way in improving the creditworthiness of poor households, where lenders can
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rely on the crop insurance premium as alternative collateral and grant more credit to the
households for investment and/or consumption.
The steps that have so far been taken by insurance companies to design "microfmance
insurance" products in Uganda provides hope on the possibility of the successful design of
crop insurance products. Under the "micro finance insurance" scheme, the insurance
companies undertake to refund the microfinance institution the balance of the loan amount
in case of the death of the client. The insurance is only valid during the loan period and the
clients pay an insurance premium of about 1% of the loan amount received from the
micro finance institution. The insurance premium is collected by the MFls and remitted to
the insurance companies. There are also some benefits that the insurance company pays
directly to the bereaved family in case of death of the insured's spouse or any of the
registered dependants. This innovative microfinance insurance product greatly helped the
clients (in terms of reducing the burden to pay back loans for dead group members as
required by the joint liability credit contracts), the MFls (in terms of maintaining a high
repayment rate despite the death of clients), the insurance companies (in terms of generating
new business opportunities), and communities (in terms of minimizing discrimination
against those who are HN positive at the group level).
10.2.2.4 Policies to Increase Wealth Creating Capacity of the Small Borrowers
Policies to increase the capacity of the smaller borrowers to acquire wealth and improve
their creditworthiness in credit markets are very broad in nature but include provision of
high yielding seeds to agricultural households, infrastructural development (such as rural
roads) to improve their access to markets, and maintaining macro-economic stability.
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In a nutshell, the improvement of the creditworthiness of the smaller borrowers is good for
the borrowers themselves, the financial institutions, and the economy in general. A high
level of creditworthiness will ensure that the borrowers are not credit rationed in credit
markets, thereby increasing their access both to production and consumption smoothing
credit. This will enable them to earn more investment income and move out of poverty. For
the financial institutions, an improvement in the borrowers' creditworthiness will result in
low loan default, and higher profitability. The economy wide effects of improved
creditworthiness of the borrowers will be that it will result in the stability of the financial
system and greater economic progress.
10.2.3 Capacity Building in Financial Services Management
The results of this study also suggest that household credit demand is positively and
significantly influenced by education level and household expenditure in both the broader
financial sector and the informal financial sector. These variables are closely linked to the
capacity of the household to utilize the loans. As argued by Musinguzi and Smith (2000),
households need not only increased access to credit but also training in financial services
management so as to increase the effective utilization of the loans so as to generate income
and move out of poverty. Education enhances human capital which increases returns from
investments. The positive correlation between household expenditure and credit demand
may imply that wealth motivates more risk taking so as to generate more wealth. Thus the
more educated and the wealthy have a higher capacity to make better use of the loans.
10.2.4 Development of Linkages Between Formal and Informal Financial Sectors
The informal financial sector is part and parcel of the broader fmancial sector. To enhance
,the broadening of the financial sector, a further policy option may be to develop linkages
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between the two sectors. This may be through wholesale credit arrangement where banks
lend in bulk to informal lenders, who in turn on-lend to their clients. The other option is to
encourage savings arrangements where informal lenders deposit savings mobilized from
their clients with the banking system, where such savings deposit accounts may act as
collateral for bank loans. However these linkages between the formal and informal financial
institutions can only flourish if there is high customer confidence in the banking system,
which again brings into play the importance of financial regulation to enhance stability of
the financial system and consumer protection.
10.2.5 Additional Credit Information from Household Surveys
The lack of price information related to credit transactions at the household level (interest
rates and other related transaction costs) from the UNHS 1999/2000 data constrained
analytical work in terms of estimating the effect of interest rates on credit demand and credit
rationing. Since microfinance is one of the interventions that have been prioritized for
poverty alleviation, it is recommended that subsequent national household surveys collect
detailed credit price information so as to enable the evaluation of the impact of various
policies at the household level. For example most of the literature on informal finance is rife
with statements such as "what matters to the poor is access to credit but not interest rates"
which would be important to test empirically.
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Appendix 1: Summary Statistics for Variables for the Study
Variable Mean Median Standard Skewness Kurtosis Number of
Deviation Observations
Age (yearS) 36.75 32.00 16.07 1.03 3.50 22,922
Sex (Male= 1) 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.11 1.01 22,932
Household size 6.38 6.00 3.72 1.68 9.97 22,926
Sick days 10.00 7.00 8.72 1.22 3.44 6,617
Education level 4.92 5.00 4.15 0.49 2.39 22,742
(years)
Dependency ratio 0.47 0.50 0.23 -0.51 2.91 22,932
Household 224.99 223.28 419.75 9.08 157.33 22,926
expenditure (US$)
Migration (= 1 if 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.37 1.14 22,932
migrated)
Land size-( acres) 1.32 0.75 16.19 40.54 1,880.73 16,975
Household assets 49.41 22.50 485.65 40.57 2,246.99 22,896
(US$)
Loan amount 241.76 38.89 1,800.21 27.38 832.19 2,148
demanded (US$)
Loan amount received 137.66 16.67 1,285.33 38.70 1,652.10 2,097
(US$)
Loan period (months) 6.03 4.00 23.57 38.66 1,623.67 1,941
Appendix 2: Financial Sector Performance Indicators
Indicator Economic Regulation Financial liberalization
Period (1980 - 1986i2 Period (1987 - 2003)
Deposit Rates (Average) 13% 17%
Lending Rates (average) 19% 27%
Intermediation Margins 6% 10%
Commercial Bank 7% 8%
Deposita" as a
percentage of GDP
Source: Compiled by Author from International Financial Statistics Yearbook,
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
22 Information on deposit and Lending rates was availabLe only from 1980. The lending interest rates were missing for
period 1992 -1994. The averages were based on the periods for which data was available. These are nominal interest
rates.
23 Commercial bank deposits include demand and time deposits
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